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Introduction:  
China’s Long-march Towards a Restoration of Global Power 
 
 
Li Xing 
 
 
“Quand la Chine s'éveillera, le monde trembera”  
(China is a sleeping giant. Let her lie and sleep, for when she awakens she 
will shake the world.)  
                   Napoleon Bonaparte (1816) 
 
China’s century-long struggles 
The long and dramatic transformations taking pace China in the 20th century 
makes it an ideal “case study” for scientific research of political and economic 
development and social changes. Very few societies like China had been so 
radically transformed in such a short time within one century. Politically, the 
Chinese state and society transformed from a long imperial system to a short-
lived republic, and then from a fragile and predatory warlordism to a 
revolutionary centralized socialist state. Economically, the country underwent a 
state-led socialist industrialization project based on “politics in command”, 
planned economy and collective egalitarianism, and then moved to an all-round 
economic reform based on “economics in command” and market mechanisms. 
Ideologically, the Chinese value systems went through many “great leaps 
forward” from Confucianism to Marxism, from imperialism to republicanism, 
from feudalism to socialism and from collectivism to individualism. The 
Chinese political and economic landscape had experienced repeated shifts from 
crisis and failure to very rapid growth and achievement as well as from an order- 
and hierarchy-based society to mass mobilization movements and to mass 
pursuit of wealth. 
 
In China’s contemporary history, the search to ensure its existence as a 
prosperous strong nation and a united political entity has been a key concern for 
generations of Chinese in their struggles to find a solution for restoring its great 
power status. A series of modernization “attempts” including the socialist 
project suffered a series of setbacks due to the challenges and the constraints 
from internal and external factors. Depending on how one assesses its successes 
and failures, China was remembered as conducting historically unique 
experiment to skip over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a socialist 
transformation in terms of both social structures and consciousness of the 
people.  
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The market reform program initiated by the post-Mao elites since the end of 
1970s has been hailed as one of the most important events in modern world 
history. While the reform programs in Russia and much of Eastern Europe sank 
into depression, China’s market reform has turned it into the fastest growing 
economy in the world for three decades. The Chinese self-claimed model - 
“market economy with Chinese characteristics” or “market socialism” - is 
increasingly seen, however, debatably, as the third alternative model challenging 
the existing mainstream political and ideological establishment. 
 
Although in terms of cultural and political values, China is still labeled by the 
West as a regime of authoritarianism and human rights abuses, its success in 
tripling gross domestic product within a short period has made China attractive 
to many developing countries in terms of how to manage state-market-society 
relations and political economy in international relations. In the past half century 
China has indicated its capability of responding to external and internal 
challenges while retaining China’s essential features of socio-political 
organization and mode of functioning. Some call it a “Chinese model of 
development”, whereas others simply name it “Beijing Consensus”, a notion 
coined with distinct attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of 
power. 
 
The post-Mao China dramatically readjusted its course of international relations 
and diplomacy. Various multilateral arrangements at cross purposes were signed 
with various international organization as well as many of its neighbors. Its 
membership in the World Trade Organization along with other international 
involvements, such as contributing troops for the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, assisting nonproliferation issues (including hosting the six-party 
talks on North Korea), settling territorial disputes with its neighbors, and 
participating in a variety of regional and global organizations. This new style of 
diplomacy, coupled with its official slogan of “China’s peaceful rise”, helps to 
alleviate fears and reduce the likelihood of other countries allying to balance a 
rising power. 
 
 
Placement of discussion: China-West relations 
The difficult relations between China and the West have a long historical 
background, partly inherited from China’s memory of the humiliations it 
suffered including a profound sense of national frustration, exploitation and loss, 
derived from its harsh experiences with the West since 19th century. Beginning 
from the Sino-British Opium War of more than 150 years ago Western 
colonialists started several wars against China plundering its wealth, carving its 
territory and demanding their respective concessions and extra-territorial 
“rights” from the Chinese. Ever since then China’s nationalism is historically 
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shaped by its pride in its civilization as well as its century of humiliation at the 
hands of the West and Japan.  
 
In historical retrospect, the development of China-West relations in the context 
of China’s own historical evolution can be divided into three major stages 
according to Zheng Yongnian1: 1) the cultural China; 2) the economic China; 
and 3) the political China, where the development of Western knowledge and 
understanding on China can be identified.  
 
The “cultural China”  
The “cultural China” refers to the long period of “historical China”, an old 
civilization whose philosophy and classics inspired many European intellectuals. 
The Western knowledge of the “classic China” was largely influenced by the 
studies of its history, literature and cultural philosophy, and the vestige of such 
an influence is still traceable now. China, an image of “orientalism” represented 
in Western thought a civilizational superiority of non-European pre-capitalist 
advancement. It must not be forgotten that leading figures of the age of 
European Enlightenment such as Leibniz, Voltaire, and Quesnay, among others 
found inspirations in many aspects of Chinese society and political organization. 
They “looked to China for moral instruction, guidance in institutional 
development, and supporting evidence for their advocacy of causes such as 
benevolent absolutism, meritocracy, and an agriculturally based national 
economy.”2  
 
Very often, the image of the “cultural China” was often not the real China, 
rather, a utopian exotic kingdom. The image was further mystified by The 
Travels of Marco Polo, which described the Chinese socio-economic formation 
and gave medieval Europe its first consequential knowledge of China’s power 
and civilization. However, since China’s defeat in the Opium War, this 
mysterious “traditional” and “despotic” civilization had never been able to 
compete with the Western “modernity”. As Pye points out, the cultural China is 
“a civilization pretending to be a state.”3 Even those Western leftist intellectuals, 
who desired to help to transform China into a modern state, identified 
themselves as a professorial tutor with moral and intellectual superiority. 
 
However, a real part of China which was less emphasized in the history 
textbooks of the West was China’s achievements and development of the pre-
modern science, technology, and medicine. The prosperity of major cities and 
the level of craftsmanship surprised and amazed many first-time European 
                                                          
1  An article in Chinese by Zheng Yongnian on May 13, 2008, available at zaobao.com 
2  Adas, Michael (1989) Machines as Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies 
of Western Dominance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 79. 
3  Pye , Lucian W. (1990) “Erratic State, Frustrated Society”, Foreign Affairs, Fall, p. 58. 
 4
travelers and missionaries to China. China was at the forefront of modernization 
in the domains of scientific discoveries and application to production process. 
The three major inventions4 - paper, gunpowder, and the magnetic compass - had 
an enormous impact not only on the development of Chinese civilization but 
also changed the world on a fundamental nature. In 1620 the English 
philosopher Francis Bacon noted their importance: 
 
Printing, gunpowder and the compass: These three have changed the whole 
face and state of things throughout the world; the first in literature, the second 
in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable 
changes, in so much that no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted 
greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical 
discoveries.5 (Italic added) 
 
What needs to particularly emphasize, according to Joseph Needham, is the 
emergence of modern science in the West owed major debts to many influences 
and innovations from China other than those of the ancient Greek tradition.6 
 
The “economic China”  
Capitalism has been regarded as historically unique to Europe and as an organic 
development of Western civilization. However, according to Frank7, the modern 
capitalist world system with West as the core, surrounded by semi periphery and 
periphery structures is a relatively contemporary phenomenon; and the rise of 
the West in world economic and demographic terms and the decline of the East 
occurred around the 19th century. He predicted that the “center” of the world 
economy would be now again moving to East Asia with the rise of the “Middle 
Kingdom” (China) as the key driving force. 
 
In light of this view, the “economic China” refers to the post-Mao period in 
which China’s rapid economic growth began to unleash its worldwide impact. 
Largely influenced by the modernization school of thought, the West expected 
that economic reform would lead China into economic marketization, which 
would further lead the country into political liberation. There were hopeful 
writings of confidence about China’s “second revolution” in the most of 1980s. 
However, the June 4th incident in 1989 wiped out the Western expectation of a 
                                                          
4  In Chinese history, it is mentioned four inventions: Compass, gunpowder, paper-making 
and printing. 
5  Bacon, Francis (1620)  Novum Organum - Liber Primus, CXXIX. Adapted from the 1863 
translation. 
6  Needham, Joseph et al (1954) Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 1, London: CUP. 
7  Frank, A. Gunder (2002) [1998] ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
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comprehensible China making the West deeply antagonistic toward China’s lack 
of political democratization.  
 
For the past three decades China’s remarkable success so far has already made 
its economic impact felt worldwide in the areas of FDI, commodity price, 
international trade, regional integration, international relations, etc. China’s size, 
population and its integration with the world economy have contributed to 
uncertainties about the global inflationary environment; its currency has been a 
subject of contention; its trade has raised concerns for workers and firms in both 
developed and developing countries; its demand for energy has led to 
competition, price rise and conflict; it has rivaled the United States and the rest 
developing countries as a destination for foreign direct investment; and the 
effects of its own overseas investments have begun to be felt across the world. 
Beijing’s policies on finance, currency, trade, military security, environment 
issues, resource management, food security, raw material and product prices are 
increasingly seen as connecting with the economies of millions of people 
outside China’s boundary because its shifts in supply and demand cause changes 
in prices hence leading to adjustment in other countries. China’s has the largest 
foreign currency reserve in the world and its financial policies and economic 
performances are bearing worldwide implications.  
 
As a result, China is increasingly seen by many as having the quality of the 
previous United States as an “indispensable country”. China has generated 
incremental growth in the global economy that has made its success significant 
for the welfare of other countries. Some scholars and analysts begin to compare 
the role of the Chinese economy – the workshop of the world – with that of 
Great Britain in the 19th century and that of the United States in the 20th 
century.8 Consequently, many begin to ask the crucial questions: “what could 
happen when China will be able to manufacture nearly everything --- computers, 
cars, jumbo jets, and pharmaceuticals ---  that the United States and Europe can, 
at perhaps half the cost?” and “how do these developments reach around the 
world and straight into the lives of all Americans?”9 These questions indicate 
clear signs of worry and anxiety, a popular sentiment currently prevailing in the 
West and the United States in particular. 
 
Nowadays when the “economic China” has increasingly become a reality and 
when the Chinese economy is being integrated with the lives of millions of 
people in the West, the demand that “China must be a responsible stakeholder” 
                                                          
8  Zakaria, Fareed (2006) “Does the Future Belong to China?”, Newsweek, September 2. 
9  These questions are raised by Ted C. Fishman, who attempts to answer them in his book 
China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World, 
New York: Scribner Publisher. 
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is becoming legitimized. China is being associated with almost all global issues, 
trade balance, exchange rate, energy price, commodity price, environmental 
protection, unemployment, food security, etc. In addition to these economic 
arenas, other related issues are unavoidably linked with China’s footsteps, such 
as intellectual property rights, labor rights, child labor, inequality, human rights 
and democracy. 
 
The “political China” 
The notion of the “political China” goes beyond the fact that China’s success in 
moving from a plan economy owned and controlled by the state to a market 
economy supervised and regulated by the state in combination with market 
mechanism has established itself a Chinese model of development.  The 
“Chinese model” is increasingly attractive to many developing countries at 
large. Such a model embraces specific historical dimensions, cultural elements 
and ideological discourse, and it has made China attractive to many developing 
countries in terms of how to manage state-market-society relations and political 
economy in international relations. It is recently termed as the “Beijing 
Consensus”10 in contrast to the “Washington Consensus”, which is seen as a 
great challenge in “soft power” in terms of hegemonic discourses and value 
systems. This is much unexpected because it is firmly believed in the West that 
China will eventually transform itself into a Western type of democracy as many 
other non-Western countries had experiences, such as Russia, South Korea and 
Japan. This is also much unprepared because China’s success has turned itself 
into a model of its own. 
 
The “political China” in many ways manifests the strengthening of China’s 
hegemonic discourses in the process of constructing a unique indigenous 
political culture. Observing the historical interplay of economic and political 
hegemony in the evolution of the capitalist world-system, Arrighi, in his new 
book11, invites people to re-read Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in a 
radically different way through a unique interpretation of the economic ascent of 
China along with its far-reaching political implications. Arrighi argues that 
Smith’s vision of a world market society based on greater equality among the 
world’ civilizations may well be likely, and China may well become what Smith 
described as a non-neoliberal market economy that defies conventional 
ideological and political norms by the established capitalist hegemony. A 
potential consequence of this evolution will be a new “beginning of history” 
                                                          
10  Ramo, Joshua Cooper (2004) The Beijing Consensus. London: the Foreign Policy Centre. 
11  Arrighi, Giovanni (2007) Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. 
London: Verso. 
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rather than the “end of history”.12 In other words, the world will perhaps witness 
a “paradigm shift”. 
 
A paradigm shift refers to a recurrent situation where different ideological 
paradigms may occupy the dominant position at different times. It also presents 
a constant war of ideologies. Since ideological cognition/consciousness is 
discourse-dependent, the construction of theoretical discourses is embedded 
with powerful meanings and implications in social-political contexts. It is 
expected that within the near future Chinese social science theories will 
gradually emerge to challenge the existing ones which have been defined, 
constructed and dominated by the West. As one Chinese scholar notices, 
Chinese schools of “international relations theories” will be likely and even 
inevitable to come forward following its great economic and social 
achievement.13  
 
In line with the above framework of understanding, the “political China” also 
implies the fact that the West does not know how to conceptualize, analyze and 
deal with China outside of the frameworks that it feels familiar and comfortable 
with. On the one hand, the West wishes China to continue its market growth, 
which can generate enormous business opportunities. On the other hand, to 
many western politicians and opinion-makers China simply does not conform to 
some most basic beliefs perceived in the West about what makes nations grow 
and about a set of mutually dependent relationship between property rights and 
economic growth, between the rule of law and market economy, between free 
currency flow and economic order, and most importantly between political 
system and popular sentiment. This mismatching seems to verify what 
Huntington has attempted to argue about the “clashes of civilization”: 
 
“Different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and 
man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and 
children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative 
important of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and 
hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon 
disappear.”14  
 
The above spells out an uneasiness of the West in dealing with a country that 
does not readily fit into the Western cultural and political framework. Dressing 
                                                          
12  Francis Fukuyama, in his The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 
1992, claims that the end of the Cold War has proved that free market capitalism 
combined with liberal democracy is perhaps the highest stage of human history.  
13  Qin, Yaqing (2007) “Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7(3):313-340. 
14  Huntington, Samuel (1993): “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs, 72(3), p. 25. 
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concepts like democracy, freedom, human rights, liberalism, authoritarianism, 
dictatorship, etc., one is consciously or unconsciously inserting oneself into a 
Western intellectual and historical context. It is needless to accentuate the 
important roles of the historical milestones in the history of the West, such as the 
English Revolution (1640-88) the American Declaration of Independence (1776) 
and the French Revolution (1789), in the formation of the political discourses with 
which these concepts are associated. Unfortunately the historicity of these events 
is somehow disembedded in the lens through which the West sees and compares 
with other cultures nowadays. 
 
The West does not necessarily worry about China’s rapid economic advance 
from which the West has gained tremendous business interest. What worries the 
West is the political “uncertainties” generated by the rise of China. Questions 
like “what will China become?”, “what will China want?”, “how will China use 
its power” are still hanging in the minds of many Western politicians and 
mainstream public. As Lego points out, “the “rising China” problem is not just 
about power, but purpose.”15 China’s unknown political future and its 
accumulation of economic and military power trigger uncertainty and mistrust 
about how China will use its power and about whether China’s power 
application is defensive or hegemonic. 
 
Therefore, the “political China” also portrays a military threat of China followed 
by its increase in military budget and rapid defense modernization. China’s 
ascendance in military capacities is argued to be a serious menace to the 
regional balance of power in East Asia and to America’s global dominance in 
military and strategic influence. Thus, many realists and opinion-makers predict 
an eventual China-West conflict on the basic of the historical lessons that the 
rapid growth of the economy of a great country has often triggered enormous, 
often disruptive, transformations both internally and externally. The West is still 
struggling for realizing the hope that China will eventually become a 
“responsible stakeholder” in the global system, a system in which China is 
already highly integrated, and from which China is seen as enjoying substantial 
benefits. It is expected that the rise of China and its development model will 
unavoidably have to absorb and adjust to hardcore external challenges and 
constraints by the existing capitalist world system.  
 
 
In summary, the long historical relations between China and the West reflected 
by the periodical transitions from the “cultural China”, to the “economic China” 
and then to the “political China” indicate a dialectical process of waxing and 
                                                          
15  Legro, Jeffrey W. (2007) “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising 
Power”, Perspectives on Politics, 5(3): 515-534. 
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waning, decline and rise, as understood in the ancient Chinese concept of yin 
and yang. Seen from this perspective, China-West relations will continue to be 
in a state of flux and reflux, rather than in a purposeful forward or backward 
movement as deterministic theories imply. 
 
Ever since its first contact with the West some centuries ago China has been a 
source of both fascination and disturbance for the West and it has been seen as a 
nation of puzzle, mystery and unfathomably beyond comprehension. Even now 
when China has become an integral part of the capitalist world economy, China 
is still a country that the West finds it difficult to accommodate. Nowadays 
China finds itself to be a “middle kingdom” surrounded by jealousy, admiration, 
anxiety, worry and even resentment. Within the near future both China as the 
rising power and the West as the established world order will have to find ways 
to accommodate each other. In order to do so both will have to go through a 
considerable period of struggle, adjustment and tension. It is still too early to 
predict whether the rise of China to the West means a world disorder, a world 
reorder or a new world order.  
 
 
The achievement of the workshop 
Recognizing the fact that the rise of China is a phenomenon that is of global 
importance and China’s rapid development is laden with significant worldwide 
consequences, the workshop - The Rise of China and Its Impact on the Existing 
Capitalist World System - held on May 8-9, 2008 at Aalborg University of 
Denmark served as a good discussion forum for scholars from Aalborg 
University as well as from other universities and institutions of Denmark who 
are specialized or interested in China studies to 1) exchange ideas and 
viewpoints on the factors and forces shaping China’s rise; and to 2) 
conceptualize the implications of its resurgence on the existing capitalist world 
system; and to 3) enhance exchanges and understanding between China and 
Denmark in the areas of China research and teaching. 
 
The workshop together with its timely topic manifests an endeavor to gain a 
better conceptualization of the possible impacts of these changes brought about 
by the “China effects” or “China factors”. In other words it attempts to promote 
a better understanding of the complexities of modern-day China, especially its 
rapid social, economic, and political transformations, its foreign policy 
objectives, its role in the global economy and the dialectics of China-West 
relations.  
 
The papers presented during the workshop are wide in their scope encompassing 
various levels of analysis from different internal and external perspectives. They 
deal with a whole range of issues, such as China-West relations, China’s 
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globalization strategy, China’s impact on the world order, the nexus between the 
internalities and externalities of China’s evolution, China’s new national identity 
and foreign policy, China’s innovation vision, China’s new “cultural revolution” 
and China’s military expansion and strategy. The workshop discussions and 
paper presentations are rich in their contents and heuristic in their approaches 
covering a variety of academic domains – economic history, political science, 
development studies, international political economy, international relations, and 
military strategy, etc.  
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Chinese globalization: state strategies and their societal anchoring 
 
 
Clemens Stubbe Østergaard 
 
 
This is a joint ongoing project, by Stig Thøgersen and CSØ, to investigate 
whether the last two decades have brought a qualitative change to China in 
relations between local, national and global forces, or whether it is simply an 
intensification of a long-running process, or perhaps even primarily a new 
discursive cloak for a neo-liberal ideology. Whatever our attitude to the concept 
of globalization, there is no doubt that it pinpoints the way central actors in 
China have experienced the process that the country has gone through since its 
opening in 1978. A more or less self-reliant system, with minimal economic and 
cultural exchange has in 20 years been penetrated by global economic, cultural 
and political currents. The state at all levels, corporations, organizations and 
individuals have all had to integrate the global level in their strategies in an 
entirely new way (hitherto unseen way). For the rest of the world, Chinas 
integration in the world market has been one of the most decisive trends of the 
global economy in the last decades, and in the political-cultural field, China has 
been one of the most consistent proponents of the view that global value-sets, 
conventions and regimes have to be adapted to ‘national culture’, as it is defined 
by leaderships of each state. In this way, China can be seen as a focus point for 
many of the discussions about the manifestations and consequences of 
globalization. 
 
We want to pose two main questions: which strategies has the Chinese state 
employed towards the challenges of globalization, and how has it attempted to 
anchor these strategies in the population?  
 
The first part analyses state globalizations strategies: if it is true that there is a 
fundamentally new form of competition between states in the international 
system, i.e. about world market shares, then the state has to adapt to this and 
find suitable strategies. The imperatives of global competition in this case forces 
the “competition state” of Philip Cerny to strengthen its transnationalization and 
deliver an “enabling environment” which can maintain and hopefully expand 
national competitiveness, for instance via comprehensive structural reforms. 
National competitiveness is the new criterion of survival and politics is about 
creating conditions which can increase growth.  
 
This can be done in many ways, the most visible (obvious) is the East-Asian 
developmental state, the liberal Anglo-American, and the neo-corporatist 
European version. China attempts to maintain at strong role for the state, but this 
12 
 
 
is dependent on its capacity to formulate internal and external globalization-
strategies. This part of the project on one hand attempts to describe a cluster of 
strategies which have crystallized over particularly the last 15 years, on the other 
hand uses an actor-structure model to try to explain the particular noted 
characteristics of the collected state response to the threats and possibilities of 
globalization.  
 
These strategies fall into to main groups, those directed internationally, and 
those which seek to transform the state and the economy.  
 
To the first one belong the ‘over-involvement’ in international organizations, the 
strong emphasis on multilateralism – not least the regionalism-version - , and 
also a thorough liberalization of trade. But liberalization towards FDI is also 
important, in so far as it has made China an ‘integrator’ in a number of the 
production chains of East Asia. It requires a continuing emphasis on moving up 
the value-chain, from labor-intensive to hi-tech contributions. As a part of these 
strategies, China strengthens its own industries, encourages their overseas 
investment and internationalization. It even backs up this effort with large state 
investment funds like the CIC.      
 
In the second group we find primarily the transformation of the state, via 
recentralization and structural reforms in the direction of the modern regulatory 
state, in order to maintain the autonomy and capacity of the state. (Evans). 
Secondly the struggle to cope with the core area of globalization: the globalized 
financial markets. This financial integration is seen to require internationalizing 
of the financial system, relaxation of capital controls and an incremental 
currency reform. These things are accompanied by a cooptation of the new 
economic elite into the party, and a taking away of the privileges of labor 
(workers).  
 
The analysis of these many policies and their genesis, proceeds in a simple 
framework, inspired by Prakash and Hart (2000). It includes global processes, 
like market pressures, and the pressure exerted by international regimes and 
other governments. It adds the institutional context, in particular the changing 
rules for policy-making and for relations between the institutions of government. 
The domestic dynamics, and the mobilization of winning coalitions behind 
particular globalization-strategies, is equally important. The actors are in the 
first instance bureaucracies, but increasingly also firms, business associations, 
NGO’s and interest groupings. Ideational factors play a role as an intermediary 
variable, in the shape of the ideas and norms of decision-makers, such as their 
concepts of the phenomenon of globalization, or their relevant causal beliefs 
(Goldmann 1982).  
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The research task is to go deeper into the strategies sketched out, both to be able 
to characterize their respective weight and interconnections, and to try to explain 
their origin and shape. This is mostly done from documents and academic 
analysis, but also based on interviews with actors in relevant ministries, think-
tanks and business organizations with their growing lobbying role.  
 
The second part of the project takes a closer look at how the Chinese state has 
sought to anchor these strategies in various social groups, first discursively by 
trying to depict China’s role in a globalized world in a way that legitimizes 
globalization in general and the strategies in question in particular, secondly 
through the building of hierarchically structured links to the population, so that 
the government – even without a democratic mandate – obtains a degree of 
popular support for its strategic goals and the derived policies. The point of 
departure is that the networks which connect state and society are of decisive 
importance (crucial) for the states ability to determine strategies and carry them 
out (Evans 1995)  
 
The discursive aspect will be investigated through an analysis of authoritative 
texts (of programmatic character, from Chinese top leaders) and of voices from 
the public which challenge the official account of globalization. The purpose is 
to reach an understanding of the mental aspects of globalization: how does the 
leadership and that part of the population which takes an active part in societal 
debate, construct China’s role in the world, and has the leadership succeeded in 
creating a meaningful and convincing story about globalization and its effects, 
thus furthering popular accept of the chosen strategies?  
 
Somewhat more weight attaches to the second aspect of this part of the project, 
namely the institutions that the state has created as part of its creation of a 
consultative-authoritarian system, in which the views of the population form 
part of the basis of political decision-making, without the hands of the 
leadership being tied by it. We are talking about institutions, which link the state 
to diverse social layers in a hierarchic pattern, where you are consulted in so far 
as you have social, cultural or (not least) economic capital. Business 
associations tend to have a corporatist look, and at the same time the economic 
elite is increasingly recruited into the party. Intellectuals have an input through 
think tanks, requested research, and certainly also through the relatively open 
academic debate which characterizes China.  
 
The state has been less successful in integrating groups outside the elite in the 
political process. Some of these groups see themselves as victims of social and 
political processes which are not necessarily related to globalization, but can 
easily be depicted as such: peasants, workers sacked from SOE’s, and low-wage 
migrant labor in foreign owned firms are the most important groups here.  
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The Chinese leadership is certainly aware of the problems these groups can 
create, and have increasingly tried to create “input institutions” which will allow 
the Chinese to believe they have some influence on policy decisions and 
personal choices at the local level. This is a broad palette of institutions and 
mechanisms. Beyond the well-known village-elections, there are the 
experiments with direct election of delegates to local peoples congresses and 
xiang-leaderships, popularity-contests which test the popular appeal of local 
leaders, focus-groups, deliberative democracy, panels which vote on people and 
policies, petition-bureaus, hot-lines, more transparency and publicity in the 
appointment of local officials, etc. 
 
This part of the project will also base itself on interviews with researchers and 
local officials, in order to determine how these new mechanisms are working, 
and to what degree the really embed the state in society by creating networks 
which can tie the losers in the process of globalization into the political process. 
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The Rise of China and its Impact on  
World Order, Disorder and Reorder 
 
 
Mammo Muchie 
 
 
 
Inspiring Quotes! 
 
“With our historical background and our natural and human resources, it 
should be easier for us than it was for Japan to rise to the place of a first class 
Power by a partial adaptation of Western civilisation. We ought to be ten 
times stronger than Japan because our country is more than ten times bigger 
and richer than Japan.. China is potentially equal to ten Powers.” 1 
 
“.. If China follows at the heels of the imperialistic and militaristic nations, 
China’s ascendency to power would not only be useless, but harmful to 
humanity. The only glorious and honourable path for us to pursue is to 
maintain in full force the old policy of “helping the weak and curbing the 
strong”2 
 
“When the days of our prosperity come, we must not forget the pain and 
misery which we are now suffering from the pressure of economic and 
political forces of the Powers. When our country becomes powerful, we 
should assume responsibility of delivering those nations which suffer in the 
same way as we do now. This is what ‘Ta Hseuch’ means by ‘securing 
tranquility.”3 
 
 
Abstract 
The rise of China has given rise to the China threat theory where a pessimist 
oppressive temper asserts that such rise can not be peaceful or non-threatening 
to the declining power that occupy the current status as a sole super power. 
“China represents the central challenge to the American way of life in the 21st 
century”.  It has been described as the “... strongest intentional illiberal state on 
this planet”4 Deng Xiaoping linked liberal multi party elections to amounting 
                                                          
1  Sun  Yat-sen, National Morale and World Tranquillity, in Lewis Copeland, Lawrence W. 
Lamm & Stephen J.McKenna (eds.), The World Great Speeches,  Dover Publications, 
Mineola, New York, 1999, pp. 399- 401. 
2  Ibid., p. 401. 
3  Ibid. 
4  See Lynn T. White III, America at the Taiwan Strait: Five Scenarios, In Asia Perspective 
Vol.31 No.3, 2007, pp. 5-40. 
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creating chaos in China.5 Despite the illiberal political system, China has 
attained spectacular economic achievements since its opening of its economy to 
the rest of the world in 1979. It has been projected by some analysts to become a 
leading economy in the next decade or so. Its economy is now interdependent 
with the major economies of the world. This integration of China’s economy 
increasingly within the world economy makes it impossible to hold credibly that 
any problem to China or by China can be confined merely to China alone or 
others. In spite of this growing interdependence, there is an alarmist agitation by 
some scholars, journalists, policy makers, pundits that spread the view that a 
looming China threat is what the rise of China means to the world.  This notion 
of a China threat instigates China containment rather than engagement strategy 
which if pursued with zeal can turn into a self fulfilling prophecy. China can be 
cornered into a position where it may have no option but to resist this constraint 
on its desire to grow prosperous and join the community of developed 
economies by resolving its current identity that exhibits features of both a 
developing and developed economy status. China should not be framed with 
either malevolent or benevolent imaging or character. It is an emergent and 
transitional economy with a very large economic size,  population, production 
and market sizes, that can be harnessed to a win- win outcome provided the 
world is willing to risk engaging with China and understand and respect Chinese 
patriotism as clearly expressed by the  
 
Modern founder of Chinese nationalism Dr. Sun Yun-Sen quoted above...
  
 
 
Introduction: The Context and the Main Issues 
Are we going to live in interesting/ uncertain or exciting/ hopeful times? What 
can be the imagination for the possible portrait of the future given the 
challenges, risks, and threats of the 21st century world?  
 
In this exploratory paper I shall outline briefly some of the general portraits of 
the rise and fall of the great powers from the past to the present in order to see 
the likely opportunities and possible dynamics of the future in broad sketches.  
 
To be frank, I find politics to be harder than physics. With physics one tries to 
research and comprehend the mysteries of the physical universe from its lowest 
quantum mechanistic sub-atomic entities to the grander cosmos and the 
universe. With politics there are elements of interest, will, deception, 
immorality, cheating, double standard, chasm between rhetoric and reality, and 
                                                          
5  “If our one billion people jumped into multiparty  elections, we’d get chaos like the’ all-
out civil war’ we saw during the Cultural Revolution.” (quoted in Lynn T. White III, op. 
cit. p. 9. 
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promise and delivery, policy and action, and a general lack of integrity and 
massive dishonesty built into the way the various players try to manipulate and 
control the dilemmas of the relationship of the domestic and international, the 
internal and the external, the political and the economic affairs, problems and 
challenges confronting  their own nations as well as the world whether one 
welcomes it or opposes it.  
 
One hardly sees a sincere acknowledgment of what the great powers have done 
to the lesser powers from the injustices and failure to mitigate global inequities 
for the purpose of bringing about both an equitable, just and fair system of 
power, resource and knowledge distribution as well as sharing the burdens of 
climate change, global energy and food crises, the emergence of new diseases 
across the world. It has been very often the case that the way interests, motives, 
ideologies, contrarian perceptions, views and language- games manifest amongst 
the players in the world, makes it rather hard to see how the future of the world 
may shape out. With the way politics is being played in contemporary times, it is 
infinitely hard to predict the future.  
 
A humbling caveat is thus in order, it is not easy to get to the bottom of how the 
contradictory forces  with diverse interests, views and beliefs that  try to shape  
our world work: how the ordering, disordering and re-ordering  logic expressed 
in the dynamics of the rise and fall of the great  powers can be understood both 
for the purposes of knowing precisely  how the world is  currently either ruled or 
misruled  or has been ordered in the past,  may be disordered by the rise of new 
powers to great power status and may be re-ordered also in the future by either 
accommodating, engaging and welcoming the rising powers or by unleashing 
the opposite impulse of reaction against perceived threats from them. The 
normative trajectory for world reorder is dependent heavily on how the 
disordering impact of the rise of new powers either elicits a discouraging 
response or welcoming response to join the great power constellation for the 21st 
century. At a deeper level it remains to be seen, whether the new rising powers 
are accommodated or not, the values and goals of global power can reflect the 
normative choices for shaping a world that can either self- govern on the basis of 
justice and equitable distribution of the current uneven political, economic and 
military power, resources and knowledge for the promotion of life, health and 
happiness or weapons, death and sorrow. The choice is stark either the world 
order is re-founded and built on the means that promotes life, heath and well b 
being or remains stuck on  a system that promotes the means of death, weapons, 
misery, lies, criminality and hypocrisy. It is either a world where the plutocrats 
reproduce the military-industrial-finance complex, or where people can create a 
social- health, education, wellbeing and life promoting complex. At a deeper 
world order may be better sustained if this choice resolves in favor of life 
against death, peace instead of war and food instead of armament production. 
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World Order: Problems and Discontents? 
World order has always resulted from the disordering dynamics implicit in the 
history and context of the rise of aspiring powers and the decline of established 
powers. There is an uncomfortable disestablishing logic implicit in the rise of 
nations to great power status historically. Those that have been strong have 
come by making the stronger before them relatively weaker. Conversely, those 
that have been weaker have climbed the ladder to the status of great power by 
replacing the economic, political and military position of the previously stronger 
powers. Part of the ability to emerge as a great power is related to alliance 
building. In the 20th century the USA was a stronger hegemonic power partly 
also because it made alliances with North Western Europe and Japan and  drew 
vast parts of the world to fall in to its sphere of influence  or orbit both for itself 
and through its alliances. The other power that contested the US hegemony was 
the former USSR. It too forged both military alliances and political alliances 
with countries of Central and Easter Europe and a number of developing 
countries.  
 
In reality, the making or re-making of world order has never been a smooth and 
peaceful process. It has involved very often the relatively weaker becoming 
relatively stronger by combining preponderance in economic, military and 
political power. Very often the coming from behind, catching up and surpassing 
by rising nations to great power status  is fraught with the potential of injecting 
violence  to the  process  for realizing and bringing about the historic switch. 
Rare are the historical accounts where world hegemonic leadership has been 
attained without some form of deception, hypocrisy and violence injected in the 
process. The interesting puzzle is, whether or not in the 21st century risers to 
global economic and political prominence such as China, India and Brazil, the 
opportunity is open for them to join the club of great powers or even catch up 
and surpass the existing powers without violence?  That possibility exists in 
theory. In reality, it is hard to predict the reaction of the already established 
powers to the rising powers. As we shall see in the case of China, the reaction to 
the rise of China is an overblown talk of how to contain the Chinese ‘danger’ 
rather than engage with China. The important question is whether the rise of 
China will be consummated without major wars being fought. If such a rise is 
attained without war, then a new and important milestone in world history 
would have taken place. It may mean the rise and decline of nations including 
historical switches in ‘world leadership’ can be a peaceful and civilized process 
forestalling the very often unwelcome danger of rivalry and possible conflict. It 
may mean also it is not any longer impossible for nations to attain great power 
status and not fear being thwarted by major wars. The de- linking of war with 
the rise of great powers takes the two sides that are involved to demonstrate a 
willingness to reach out to each other, understand each others’ fears, learn to 
engage and enter into consultation whilst competing by avoiding indulgence and 
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toying with containment strategies based on perceptions of threats and risks. 
This is however easier said than done in reality. 
 
We recall how the country that wanted to emerge as a great power, Germany 
went to war with the allied powers eventually prompting the USA to get 
involved in the last phase of the  second world war. The Second World War was 
a typical example where the Axis Powers led by Nazis Germany failed to assert 
leadership or hegemony in shaping world order with fascism, and instead the 
USA emerged as the hegemonic power of the post World War order. US 
hegemony was contested by the Cold War where ideological disputes between 
the former USSR and the USA led to hundreds of proxy wars fought largely in 
the geographical areas in what came to be known later derogatorily as the ‘third 
world.’ The demise of the USSR opened the possibility for the USA policy 
makers to speculate on how to bring a ‘new world order’ by a renewed assertion 
of US unilateral domination of world politics and economics by maintaining the 
possibility of employing US military threats.  
 
The discussion on making world order with the motivation to put behind the 
back of the human race the unmitigated and barbarous slaughter by major wars 
has been long. H.G. Wells in 1939 recommended a social-democratic world 
order to forestall the impulse of the human race enclosed within national, 
religious, ethnic, class and other distinctions continuing to throwing itself again 
and again into war and slaughter. He anticipated the concept of a world order or 
Government would be opposed, but he urged that despite the protest, the effort 
must be pursued. Such ideas to create a world order that can control human 
conflict from degenerating into war have manifested at various times. Politicians 
in the UN always routinely talk about creating a world order although these 
same politicians will loath the notion of seeing a very strong UN capable of 
restraining their behavior mainly or even exclusively to act in the pursuit of their 
real or imagined interest rather than the shared interest of global humanity.  
 
After the cold war was over, a number of notions appeared that relate directly 
and indirectly with how to make, re-make or maintain the 20th century world 
order up to 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell.  The notions or phrases that came to 
dominate public debate were the following expressions that are now part of the 
popular imagination:  The End of history by Francis Fukuyama, Clash of 
Civilisations by Samuel Huntingdon, and New World Order by Bush Senior. 
There are also people saying Bush Junior stands not so much for unilateralism 
but for a “New, New World Order”.6 
                                                          
6  The US administration failed to get UN Security Council endorsement for its military 
invasion of Iraq. It formed quickly a number of states that the officials from State 
Department and National Security Advisors described as the “coalition of the willing.” 
Getting around the UN lack of endorsement by a UN member country taking military 
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This is how Daniel Drezner put it:” Given its performance over the last six 
years, one would not expect the Bush administration to handle this challenge 
terribly well. After all, its unilateralist impulses, on vivid display in the Iraq war, 
have become a lightning rod for criticism of U.S. foreign policy. But the Iraq 
controversy has overshadowed a more pragmatic and multilateral component of 
the Bush administration's grand strategy: Washington’s attempt to reconfigure 
U.S. foreign policy and international institutions in order to account for shifts in 
the global distribution of power. The Bush administration has been reallocating 
the resources of the executive branch to focus on emerging powers. In an 
attempt to ensure that these countries buy into the core tenets of the U.S.-created 
world order, Washington has tried to bolster their profiles in forums ranging 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the World Health Organization, 
on issues as diverse as nuclear proliferation, monetary relations, and the 
environment. Because these efforts have focused more on so-called low politics 
than on the global war on terrorism, they have flown under the radar of many 
observers. But in fact, George W. Bush has revived George H. W. Bush's call 
for a “new world order” -- by creating, in effect, a new world order.”7 
 
The coinage of the’ new world order’ or ‘the new, new world order’ from Bush  
Senior to Bush Junior does not change the fact that World Order or System still 
is dominated even today largely by the Post-World War II victors with the USA 
at the apex  or the helm as the hegemonic central commander. As the Cold War 
stalemate from 1945-1989 did not change the world order fundamentally, so has 
the post Cold War world order failed to become any newer except for the fact 
that the danger to the planet in terms of the possibility of its incineration or 
extinction is heightened by the lessening commitment to international norms and 
regulations that the hegemonic power displayed  that has become a license 
ironically to others unfortunately  to copy by disparate groups that resent 
American hegemony for  a variety  of one reason or another. The manner by 
which the Great Powers showed disrespect to evidence for selecting the policy 
option to wage war in Iraq can also potentially be read that others can do the 
same with evidence and take action on false information! This has the 
unintended consequence of creating moral anarchy rather than moral strength to 
observe norms, rules, procedures and institutional integrity in international 
public life. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
action against another UN member country led to a wide variety of commentary that the 
US is willing and capable of undermining the UN when it perceives its vital interest is not 
served by going through the UN. The unilateralist and unipolar quest for an American 
projection of global power for the 21st century was advocated with zeal and certainty by 
the ideologues of the Project for the New American Century such as William Kristol, 
Robert Kegan and others. 
7  Daniel W. Drezner, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2007. 
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With norms and rules for regulating behavior faltering and policy choice without 
a basis of evidence permitted by the action of the great powers, the space was 
open for various actors to make their own rules as each fights to claim a stake in 
the scheme of things. Rather than a norm and rule guided world order where 
evidence matters for policy choice, we have a world gripped with fear where the 
restraints of morality, evidence and norms  have become relatively looser and 
public life  is open to uncertainty, risks, threats and danger.  
 
At present the world seems to have not so much a world order, but world 
disorder or a world gripped with fear where every person has become a suspect 
as a potential ‘terrorist.’ Like an unexpected and unpredictable earthquake 
defying any seismic prediction, it looks periodic acts of random terror affecting 
any part of the globe has become part of the post Cold War phenomenon. This 
situation has led the Bush Junior administration to define world politics in terms 
that makes the pursuit against terrorists to be a permanent and time-defying 
feature of global politics: “Our war on terror... will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”8   
 
It looks those who fight US power have found exactly where they want the US 
Government to be in a position where it has to continue being preoccupied with 
trying to identify and find even individuals who engage in acts of terror. Instead 
of treating terror as crime, the US Government policy makers gave it global 
ideological significance by coining the political-ideological circum-framing of 
‘the Global war on terrorism” and thus raised the stakes high forgetting those 
who are pursued by USA power paradoxically turn such US pursuits into a 
brand name to carry out more acts that the USA and indeed much of the world 
wish to prevent. As a consequence in the post cold war period, far from getting 
the peace dividend and a climate for peace and security, we have a peace penalty 
situation where the whole world has turned into a vast guerrilla theatre where 
those individuals or groups who choose to do so can operate using the facilities 
and conveniences of the information and technology revolution. 
 
One of the most negative developments after the Cold War was the addition to 
the character or behavior portfolio of the individual not only as ‘homo-
economy-cus’, but also ‘homo-terror suspect-cus’ This has made almost 
everyone in the world including those who may be employed to track suspects 
of unlawful potential military acts as suspects. The empirical proof of this 
adverse development can be easily witnessed by all those who know the 
inconvenience during flights and travels at various airports and borders across 
the world.  
                                                          
8  Speech by Bush Jr., September 20,2001 after the September 11,2001 attack, quoted in 
Glenn P.Hastedt & Kay M.Knickrehm (ed.), International Politics in a Changing World, 
2003, p. 9. 
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Today power fears citizens and citizens fear both power and the terrorists. Such 
has been the unwelcome outcome of the post-cold war world order whether   one 
describes it as new or new, new world order! Today, fear has replaced trust, and 
random acts of terror have replaced a potentially peaceful global atmosphere. 
 
From Afghanistan to Somalia one sees air strikes targeting individuals that are 
suspected to be terrorist ring leaders suggesting that the mode of waging war has 
moved from states and organized movements directly to identifying individuals, 
pursue them, target them and hit them. Thus military action has degraded from 
being war between states and organized groups to the level of major powers, 
NATO and others pursuing individual actors. This has changed the norms of war 
and the places where wars have been fought in the Cold War period. The 9 /11 
Twin Towers attack in New York showed, if it showed anything no power on 
earth is immune from terrorism, thus converting the war arena from being 
fought in the geographical area of what has been described as the ‘third world’ 
to encompass literally the whole world including the financial and political hub 
of the central hegemonic power itself.  
 
The attempt to reorder the world order in the Cold War came from the 
decolonizing world, the workers movements in many countries, the national 
liberation movements and even the countries of the former Soviet Union, and 
from advocates for new International Economic Order. During the Cold War 
disorder represented the desire to change word order to accommodate national 
liberation, independence and the desire for spreading justice and equitable 
sharing of resources and the burdens and the battle to contain or fight that 
aspiration 
 
Reorder implies the rise of new ideas, new powers, and movements to contribute 
to making world order and the response of those who are entrenched and have 
become self- appointed defenders of the existing status quo world order.  The 
question that we ask in this paper is whether the rise of China is a world order 
reordering factor or not. 
 
There are three possible reordering thrusts that can be mentioned.  
 
The first is reordering world order from below. That is to say, from below the 
Social World Forum and others with similar concerns would like to claim that 
another world is possible, and the globalization driven world spearheaded by 
business, commerce and finance is not inevitable. Thus they mount protest 
against the global ordering institutions such as WTO, IMF and WB and others. 
They claim that through anti- globalization actions they wish to reach the poor 
and raise their voice, and participation. But this remains yet to be translated into 
concrete action. 
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The second is world order through globalization from above where there is a 
hegemonic centre based on the US and North Western Europe primarily with the 
US as the leader. The main actors are states supposed to seek and form alliances 
by entering into international arrangements to protect their interests and security, 
and businesses engaged in seeking profitable outlets. Together states and 
business ally to create the political economy of making a global order those 
policies those who are excluded and at the same time hopes that through the 
goods of security and commerce, further inclusion of the excluded world will be 
promoted. That is what the World Economic Forum advocates as opposed to the 
Social World Forum where citizens, peoples, civil society and others are to 
come and create another world based order. 
 
The third is the rise of China, India and other hitherto not so powerful states. 
Whilst there is recognition of the impressive rise of China, sizzling disputes 
have also accompanied this claim of the rise of China, where fears, threats and 
containment talk on one side and a welcoming and salutary assessment have 
been locked into a kind of argument which will remain without closure 
undoubtedly for a considerable time. The controversy has boiled down to either  
recognize positively, engage, accommodate , refrain from fearing and containing 
China or fight this rising by spreading fear, disengagement, surveillance, 
negative presentation. Whatever ones view today China cannot be ignored or 
avoided and has a role in any reordering process more so now than at any time 
in its long history. 9 
 
The 20th Century world order was led by the USA, what would be the world 
order like in the 21st century and who is likely to shape and dominate that world 
order. Will there be a world disorder to establish or reorder a world order? How 
might that play out in reality? 
 
 
The Rise of China and Implications for World Order 
From 1500-1945 the rise and fall of the great powers has always been 
accompanied by rivalries, conflicts and wars.10 The Post Word War II period 
saw at the same time a peaceful switch of power from Britain to the USA whilst 
these two boasted of their ‘special relationship’, the world as a whole entered 
into a period of the Cold War between the former USSR and the US led Western 
world. Much of the wars, conflicts and rivalries were played out in what then 
came to be known as the ‘third world’  since 1952. Many wars in Asia and 
Africa raged on in the vulnerable parts of the world. 
 
                                                          
9  William Kristol, Chairman of the Project for New American Century, May, 1997. 
10  P. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Vintage Books, New York, 1989. 
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The critical question that confronts both China and the USA is this: how will the 
rise of China evolve and which model is likely to be the one likely to be 
preferred by both sides in accommodating China’s rise and US hegemonic 
decline? Will it be the Britain-USA model, the former USSR and USA model of 
the Cold War, and the classic pre-1949 pattern of war, conflicts and rivalry? 
 
The most desirable evolution in Sino-US relationships is of course the Britain-
USA model of benign and peaceful transition of power.  It is interesting that 
some Chinese analysts have begun to stimulate such thinking in China11 the 
most undesirable evolution is both the Cold war variant and /or the Pre-1945 
variation. Both of these patterns of relationships will lead to world destruction. 
 
It is thus critical for both the USA and China how they construct images of each 
other, whether they discuss their issues with hostility, fear and threat or benign 
imaging matters a great deal how each side relates to the other. 
 
When we examine how those who influenced the foreign policy of the current 
Bush administration see the rise of China, one wonders whether the desirable 
option may be lost and the more unsettling options of the pre-1945 and post 
World War II cold war may remain to define the tensions and relations between 
china and the USA. US power is seen exclusively in terms of sole and an 
unquestionable cause where it is assumed that US leadership is natural to the 
whole world to solve its innumerable crises. This is how I. Kristol put it:  “One 
of these days, the American people are going to awaken to the fact that we have 
become an imperial nation, even though public opinion and all of our political 
traditions are hostile to the idea.  ...It happened because the world wanted it to 
happen, needed it to happen and signaled this need by a long series of relatively 
minor crises that could not be resolved except by some American 
involvement.”12 The neo conservatives of the Project for New American 
Century(PNAC) also reinforce this exclusive preservation of US exceptional 
leadership of the world: They write in their vision statement: “American 
leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership 
requires military strength,  energetic diplomacy and moral clarity..” 
 
The neo-conservatives are famous for advocating regime change in Iraq making 
that more or less an exemplification of what they mean by projecting American 
global leadership through US military strength, energetic diplomacy and moral 
                                                          
11  Y. Feng, The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US, The Chinese Journal 
of International Politics 1(1) 2006, pp. 83-108. 
12  Irving Kristol, The Emerging American Imperium, Wall Street Journal, August 18,1997, 
p. 14. 
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clarity.13 Once the argument for US hegemonic tenure is cast at a meta- moral 
universe level as a cause, it is far removed far from any earthly based temporal 
interrogation.  All are disenfranchised because we are told the whole world 
wants America to be imperial and to intervene because without the USA no 
crises minor or big can be resolved. This perspective has been deployed to 
extend US hegemonic leadership without interruption like Trotsky’s permanent 
revolution which some of the neo- conservatives apparently subscribed in their 
youth. The Project for New American Century is committed to continue the US-
led world order of the 20th century to the 21century and even beyond. US 
unilateralism is seen as ‘a natural cause’ and US power and leadership is benign 
and morally good. Any opposition to US leadership shows moral weakness and 
un-clarity including opposition to the use of US military strength guided by 
energetic diplomacy. 
 
It means if American leadership is good for the world, and opposition to it 
means also opposing what is not only good for America but also for the world, 
any new power that appears to contest or even perceived to contest US authority 
is likely to be condemned. The Neo Conservatives have been very shrill in 
condemning the rise of China as a threat. A China threat theory treating very 
much China’s rise with Chinese ‘malice and dishonesty’ has been spawned with 
hysterical condemnations.14  The theory argues that China is unlikely to have a 
peaceful and benevolent rise to great power status. If it reaches super power 
status, it will be a threat and not an ally of the USA. 
 
This is how Robert Kegan put it:” The Chinese leadership views the world in 
much the same way Kaiser Wilhelm I did a century ago. Chinese leaders chafe 
at the constraints on them and worry that they must change the rules of the 
international system before the international system changes them.”15 He goes 
on to add: China aims “in the mean time, to replace the United States as the 
dominant power in East-Asia, and in the long term to challenge America’s 
position as the dominant power.”16 
 
What the neo-conservative reaction demonstrates is the intensity of competition 
that puts pressure on the US power to reassert and revalidate with a mix of 
                                                          
13  William Kristol & Robert Kagan, ”Bombing Iraq is not Enough”. See the New York 
Times, January 30, 1998, also see a Great Victory for Iraq, The Washington Post, 
February 26, 1998. 
14  See Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, “A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic 
Analyses in Asian Perspective”, Vol. 31, no. 3, 2007, pp. 41-66. 
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moral and military strength to continue its hegemonic status by freely admitting 
and adding openly to preserve it with imperial dispositions. 
 
The China threat theory challenges the concept of China’s possible peaceful rise. 
Again Robert Kegan says: “ The history of rising powers… and their attempted’ 
management’ by established powers provides littler reason for confidence or 
comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that 
reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power.”17 
 
What the neo-conservatives are saying is that any new power that wishes to 
come will find an occupied space of world leadership by the US unwilling to 
allow a peaceful rise of the new power because the old power is divinely or 
morally entitled to remain as a super power without any one to pass this mantle 
to... There is no vacancy. That is why the neo conservatives are ringing the 
alarm bells on the significance of the threat from the rise of China:  
 
The rise of China has to acknowledge this US posture never to relinquish or 
share the status of super power with any new entrants after the US saw off the 
former USSR by the disintegration of the latter into 15 new states! The fact the 
US goes alone when others do not come on board every time its leadership 
deems a vital interest is at stake in any part of the world demonstrates US 
attitude indeed to others as well as China that dared to rise and claim similar 
status as the USA today. 
 
It is not only the neo conservatives, senior politicians also corroborate the view 
of a Chinese threat: the current World Bank Chief Robert Zeoellick expressed 
the view:” Many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a 
fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about China.”18 Secretary of State 
Rice adds her voice to the China threat theory:” China is still a potential threat to 
stability in the Asia Pacific region…. China is not a status quo power, but one 
that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor. That alone 
makes it a strategic competitor and not a strategic partner.”19 American public 
opinion also shows that ‘China threat’ is worrying. In 2005, 31 % believed that 
China will soon dominate the world.20 54 % believed that the emergence of 
China as a superpower is a threat to world peace.21 Surveys of Western opinion 
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reported by the Economist classifies China as part of the rogue states along with 
North Korea and Iran, proof that the media in the west has succeeded to create 
an image of China as illiberal and authoritarian that is not part of the status quo 
worthy of strategic partnership that Clinton toyed with for a while in the USA. 
 
What is this China threat then? There are three threats that are mentioned very 
often regarding China. The first is economic, the second military and the third is 
China’s expansion to other parts of the world especially in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. 
 
In the economic sphere the following type of claims are made about China: 
China’s domestic economy has registered a dramatic growth averaging 10% per 
year for over a decade. It is said it has massive currency reserves, requires 
commodities to feed its production, it has vast holdings of US Treasury bonds, a 
growing high technology and modernized military. 
 
The OECD economic survey of China has predicted that China’s economy 
would overtake both the US and German economies by 2010, which is very 
doubtful it would happen. 
 
“In terms of an expanding share of world output, China’s growth spurt has been 
much greater than any other yet seen.” It is said China contributed to 28 % to the 
increase of global GDP between 1990-2005 compared to 19 % from the USA 
and 18 % of the OECED, If China continues with reforms that sustain the rate of 
economic growth, China would account for 37 % of global GDP and is likely to 
grow more than the combined GDP of the OECD economies by 2020! 
 
Other analysts corroborate the dynamism of the Chinese economic growth: “ 
Since 1978 it has burst back on the world scene in a manner paralleled in scale 
and speed in world history only by the rise of the USA between the Civil War 
and the First World War”22 China is not just a big producer, it is also a big 
market, has become the world’s biggest exporter after USA and Germany, 
largest recipient of FDI, a new workshop of the world, producer of two thirds of 
photo copiers, microwave ovens, DVD players and shoes, over half of the digital 
cameras and around  two fifths of personal computers.23 The world economy 
grew by 5 % in 2004, its fastest pace in two decades. Growth was powered by 
two high octave fuels America’s exceptionally loose monopoly policy which has 
encouraged consumers to keep spending and an unprecedented investment by 
china. America and China together account for almost half of global growth in 
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2004.24 If American consumers and Chinese producers were to retreat at the 
same time, global growth could slump.25 If China continues its reforms, it will 
enjoy faster growth than America ever achieved. Within a decade it will be the 
world’s largest exporter and importer, and one day it may overtake America as 
the world’s largest economy.26 
 
China sees its foreign trade as mutually supplementary with many countries and 
says that about 70 % of china’s exports to the US, Japan and European Union 
are labor intensive while 80 % of its inputs from there are capital intensive and 
knowledge intensive. In the evolving international division of labor, the country 
has become a key link in the global industrial value chain. China stresses its 
peaceful development road, global interdependence, caution, and pragmatism.27 
 
The military threat thesis from China is also built on the mistrust of what China 
is perceived to be and becoming. Analysts and Pentagon sources allege the 
modernization of the Chinese military is a threat to the USA. They allege the 
Chinese Government reports less military expenditure when it spends more. 
They allege China is producing weapons that give it capability to project global 
military reach, and they argue why China modernizes its army when it faces 
hardly any recognizable threat, forgetting that the repeated invocation of China 
as a threat itself can make the Chinese prepare at the minimum to defend 
themselves in the event of the talk of them being a threat turns nasty. 
 
The other threat from China is its investment and trade with Africa, Latin 
America and other developing countries.  We mention a few of the kind of 
things and the scale with which China’s engagement in Africa that has sent 
worrying signals to countries in Europe and the USA which have had much 
influence in Africa and still do for that matter. The New Africa reported the 
following:28 
 
Between 2000 and 2006 China’s trade with Africa has seen a dramatic increase 
from the US 11bn to US 50 bn dollars. 
 
President Hu Jintao visited 17 African states in 2006-2007. No other foreign 
head of state has done this before. 
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In the first 10 months of 2007 China’s exports to Africa rose by 36 %, while 
imports from Africa surged 81 % 
 
In 2005, total trade between Africa and China was 40bn and is expected to reach 
100bn by 2010. It is true China’s investment to Africa, for example is expected 
to reach 100 billion in 2010 while the World Bank is struggling to reach 3 
billion.29 
 
By November 2006, China and Africa had signed 16 agreements worth a total of 
1.9 bn dollars. The deals, between 12 Chinese firms and 11 African 
governments and companies, followed President Hu’s pledge to offer 5 bn 
dollars in loans and credit and to double aid by 2009. 
China sees” Africa as a business opportunity and partner, not as a charity case as 
has been seen with western economic deals.”30  
 
The official China’s view is that what they do in Africa is to “assist African 
countries to seek economic independence…”31 Increasingly it looks China is 
trying to make Africa an integral part of its own economic development, 
prepared to write off or cancel debts, training people from the various 
professions, opening a development fund and pledging to increase its 
concessional loans.32 
 
A glimpse to the official African response to the Chinese presence in Africa is 
provided by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal: “ I achieved more in my 
one hour meeting with president Hu Jiantao in an executive suite at my hotel in 
Berlin during the recent G8 meeting in Heiligendamm than I did during the 
entire, orchestrated meeting of world leaders at the summit where African 
leaders were told little more than that the G8 nations would respect existing 
commitments”33 He admonished it is  about “ time the west practice what it 
preaches.”34 At the Africa-India Summit Wade added that ‘Africa’s future is 
bound up with that of India’s’35  He  added: “ Much has been written about the 
spectacular growth of China in Africa’s emerging economy, but too little 
attention has been paid to India’s role in the burgeoning economies of the 
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continent. After France, it is India that leads the list of Senegal’s trading 
partners, not China.—Indian trade with South Africa has increased by 75 % over 
the last five years.”36  
 
The Asian interest from China, India, Japan , Malaysia and South Korea and 
others  can be perceived  as providing African countries options that they did not 
have to succumb to conditions and demands from the international financial 
institutions. If the West perceives China and others as threatening their interests 
in Africa, it could turn Africa into a battle ground for new scramble for Africa. 
This danger exists. It matters therefore how the relationship between the West, 
China and India is regulated. If China is a strategic partner then the opportunity 
exists to construct a win- win outcome to all, but if it is seen as a strategic 
competitor, there will always be a looming danger. Unfortunately the perception 
of threat from China is felt more than the opportunity to relate with maturity by 
respecting Chinese patriotic sentiments as witnessed in the recent mix up of 
Tibet’s issues with Chinas hosting the Olympics game. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
The rise of China does not project a Chinese benign image or character. Those 
who fear China’s rise project a malevolent dragon out to beat and swallow the 
eagle. This perception or misperception is hard to cure the longer the rise of 
China creates the China threat theory. 
 
There is no doubt as the Chinese modern nationalist leader Sun-Yat-Sen said 
China can become a superpower if it is not distracted by other concerns. He also 
said that it must not do what others did when they achieve power and prosperity, 
i.e., being imperialistic and militaristic. He also said that China should share its 
prosperity with those that went through historical humiliation like itself before.  
 
It seems the Chinese leadership is doing more or less what their first nationalist 
leader admonished on the whole. What they do, that we see, looks very much 
like that. But the advocates of China threat theory see more than what may be 
there in China’s re-building and modernization of the army, the economy and its 
relations with other developing economies. 
 
What is refreshing is that China continues to advocate peaceful rise and its 
analysts suggest a China-USA special relationship much like the Britain-USA 
relationship. That is a very noble ambition. But the reality is that for that to take 
place the imagination for the future should first require building and storing 
social capital, trust and the mutual recognition that one is not cheating the other. 
                                                          
36  Ibid. 
31  
As long as these commodities are not there or a willingness to create them  
obtains or exists, getting any form of balance of power equation remains 
unstable, as it would be  , indeed, in the end  futile, and the ensuing international 
arrangement is likely to be fragile and open to breakdown at any time when 
pressures pile up for one reason or another. 
 
Given the interdependence of China with the rest of the world, it is not 
containment but engagement with China that can stabilize a new world order. 
Otherwise China can be a factor for world disorder not because that it wants this 
but because it is forced to be in this situation. The real challenge is to forestall 
this outcome and construct a future of benign imaging by both the risers and the 
declining powers rather than continuing the current hysteria. There is a need for 
wisdom to change strategic confrontation into networks of renewed strategic 
partnerships across the globe. Ultimately an unjust word order is nothing but 
disorder waiting to happen. The world order must be founded not on balance of 
power with all the mistrust remaining undiluted and in fact exacerbated, but a 
balance of justice and fairness where morality, non-deception in politics , 
integrity , honesty are commitments that all must share as a value, mission, 
vision and imagination. 
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Understanding China’s Transformations: 
The Dialectical Nexus between Internalities and Externalities  
 
 
Li Xing 
 
 
Introduction 
After China was united in 221 BC under the first emperor, Emperor Qin, his 
response to the external threat along the northern borders was to build a long 
wall of “civilizational division” – the Great Wall - along its northern borders in 
order to keep the “barbarians” outside the “land of civilization”. Until the arrival 
of European colonialists in the 19th century, China had been an autonomous, 
self-contained and self-assertive civilization. Historically Chinese used to 
perceive their civilization as the “middle kingdom” of the world surrounded by 
barbarians.  
 
China had traditionally been a land of empire in the length of unbroken history 
and cultural tradition, and Chinese devoted much of their energies to the 
sophistication of civil and cultural activities, and social organization. Despite the 
changes of imperial dynasties, the basic fabrics of Chinese civilization had been 
unchallenged until the 19th century. 
 
The West began to have a great curiosity and serious interest in the Far East 
after Marco Polo returned to Italy and brought back his image of China to 
Europe: the most powerful and wealthy country in the world ruled by stable and 
efficient elites. Since the Rome’s time, the flows of trade and commodities were 
overwhelmingly from the East to the West through the Silk Road. Although the 
West now takes special pride in its technological achievements, the original 
transmission of major new techniques was, until the recent past before the 
western industrial revolution, no less overwhelmingly from the East to the West 
(Segal, 1966: 318). The Western image of China had been indeed mysterious 
and promising.  
 
For a long period of time China had no interest in dealing with outsiders and it 
claimed to need nothing form the West. But Western countries wanted a great 
deal from China and their ambition was not only to urge their government to 
protect their trade but also to force a passage for their own products. Since the 
early 19th century the Chinese civilization when the well equilibrated Chinese 
imperial system was gradually challenged. Unlike the downfall of previous 
dynasties, which did not inflict any obvious damage to the way of Chinese life 
and the integration of Chinese culture, the decline of the last Manchus dynasty 
had the whole civilizational foundations weakened. The causes of the decline 
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were both multiple and complex. There were certainly a number of domestic 
socioeconomic factors as well as external forces which contributed to this state 
of affairs. 
 
China’s first war with the West, The Opium War (1840-1842), ended with its 
disgraceful defeat. The Treaty of Nanjing forced China to pay a huge indemnity 
to Britain for the compensation of the war and imposed China a tariff on all 
imported goods. The consequences were very damaging: traditional tributaries 
were taken away; concessions to foreign privileges were made; the authority of 
the emperor, upon which the Chinese order based, was ended; the hand-labor-
based industries on which Chinese economy depended were destroyed; and the 
favorable balance of trade, which existed until 1830 and which had brought an 
uninterrupted flow of silver from the outside, became lopsided (Kapur, 1987: 2). 
China became indeed an “international colony”. The traditional social structure 
was finally broken down. China’s customs and post offices were largely 
controlled by Westerners; Western ships were permitted to navigate freely in its 
water, and even to demolish some of its coastal defense; many Western troops 
were stationed at a number of points on a permanent basis; pieces of territory in 
various parts of the country were taken over as concessions. China was thus 
divided by Western powers as “spheres of interest” and was “carved up like a 
melon.”  
 
China in the late 19th and early 20th century was in a turbulent period of social 
disintegration, regional warlordism, popular revolution and political chaos. Very 
few societies like China had been so radically transformed in such a short time 
within the 20th century. Politically, the Chinese state and society transformed 
from a long imperial system to a short-lived republic, and then from a fragile 
and predatory warlordism to a revolutionary centralized socialist authoritarian 
state. Ideologically the Chinese value systems went through many “great leaps 
forward” from Confucianism to Marxism, from imperialism to republicanism, 
from feudalism to socialism and from collectivism to individualism. 
Economically China underwent a state-led socialist industrialization project 
based on planned economy and collective egalitarianism, and then moved to an 
all-round economic reform based on market mechanisms. The Chinese political 
and economic landscape had experienced repeated shifts from crisis and failure 
to very rapid growth and achievement.  
 
Objective and methodological consideration 
How can we comprehend and interpret these historical transformations shaped 
by fundamental changes? What are the internal driving forces and the external 
influences behind these transformations? And what are the consequential 
impacts when internal transformations were trigged by external thrust, and vice 
versa?   
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The objective of this paper is to offer a framework of understanding the 
dialectical nexus between China’s internal evolutions and the external influences 
with a focus on the century-long “challenge-response” dynamism. That is to 
explore how external factors helped shaping China’s internal transformations, 
i.e. how generations of Chinese have been struggling in responding to the 
external challenges and attempting to sinicize external political ideas in order to 
change China from within. Likewise, it is equally important to understand how 
China’s inner transformation contributed to reshaping the world. Each time, be it 
China’s dominance or decline, the capitalist world system has to adjust and 
readjust itself to the opportunities and constraints brought about by the “China 
factors”. The current rise of China is and will be arguably the most challenging 
event in the 21st century that has an impact on the “future of the West” 
(Ikenberry, 2008). 
 
Analytical propositions 
Methodologically, the paper’s analytical frameworks proposes an analysis of the 
fundamental changes in the socio-political components of the Chinese society 
brought about by drastic revolutionary transformations at different periods and 
their external reciprocal impact (see Figure 1): 
 
1) Before its collapse at the beginning of the 20th century China’s imperial 
system consisted of two poles of societal components: the imperial 
authority at the top and the family structure at the bottom. Ideologically, 
culturally and politically Confucianism contributed to moral and ethnical 
frameworks for the sustainability of this two-pole system. The references 
of cultural understanding and the production and reproduction of political 
and individual life were structured around this two-pole system which had 
been unchallenged for more than 2000 thousand years. Linguistically, the 
vocabulary of “civil society” (the third social force between the state and 
the market) does not exist in the Chinese language, and even today the 
Chinese translation of “civil society” cannot cover its actual notion and 
implications. 
2) Imperial China was less interested in the outside world, whereas the 
Western curiosity about China had never stopped. China’s defeat in the 
Opium War not only had such an impact on the nation’s psychological 
understanding of the “middle kingdom” as well as the Confucian 
teachings but also forced China to open its doors to external ideas and 
political thoughts. As a consequence of the China-West conflicts, the 
traditional equilibrium of the two-pole system began to be destabilized 
leading to several decades of disintegration and chaos. 
3) Through sinicizing Western Marxism with Chinese reality, the Chinese 
communists achieved the state power in 1949. The Chinese revolution cut 
the root of the “old China” and created a socialist “new China” 
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characterized by a historically unique experiment to skip over the stage of 
capitalism and to bring about a socialist transformation of both the social 
structure and the consciousness of its people in ways that defied 
conventional ideological and political norms in established capitalist as 
well as socialist states. Externally the “loss of China” had a shock effect 
to the US-based capitalist system and contributed to the political economy 
of the rise of East Asian authoritarian capitalism. 
4) The historical two-pole system was replaced by a new type of two-pole 
system represented by the party leadership at the top and class struggles at 
the bottom. The whole socialist period was characterized by state 
ownership, agricultural collectivism and welfare egalitarianism. However, 
such an endeavor of independent and self-reliance development 
alternative was severely constrained by the US-led capitalist world order. 
Chinese socialism had to adjust to both internal constraints and external 
pressures. Nevertheless, the overall achievements of socialism paved a 
solid material and infrastructural foundation to China’s comparative 
advantage in its post-Mao integration with the global economy. During 
the socialist period, red China’s attempt of “sinicizing socialism”, 
although seemingly threatening, did not impose any direct destructive 
impact on the capitalist world system. 
5) The post-Mao leadership undertook a modernization process through 
economic reforms aiming at sinicizing Western market capitalism with 
“Chinese characteristics” and through embracing market capitalism while 
incorporating China into the existing world system. China is now 
undergoing transformative changes through a series of processes of 
economic, institutional and ideological “passive revolutions”. Not only 
has the previous party-class system been replaced by a party-market 
system, but also has it successfully integrated with the capitalist world 
system. The sinicized “Chinese capitalism” or “Chinese market socialism” 
combining market mechanism with an active role of the party-state is 
unleashing direct “threatening” impact on the existing international order. 
Dialectically internal economic achievement and external dependence are 
two sides of the same coin creating both internal contradictions and 
external anxieties. 
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The classical China in the 19th century: emerging underdevelopment 
Between the early 19th century and the victory of the Communist revolution in 
1949, China exhibited the classic symptoms of backwardness: political 
corruption, social debility and class exploitation, economic stagnation, 
negligible technical change, and heavy demographic pressure. The reality China 
faced was a typical picture of political-economic underdevelopment by any 
standard.  
 
Then, the questions are: how had this come about? What were constraints that 
brought about China’s decline and underdevelopment? Were constraints mainly 
external or internal? The decline of the Chinese civilization and its 
underdevelopment has been a subject of interest in social science and especially 
in the field of development studies. Different schools of thought have tried to 
offer the explanations from different perspectives. 
 
In line with the classical Marxist conceptualization, which identifies East Asia 
societies with the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), the AMP goes that 
geographically, the landscape of the Chinese traditional communities was 
dependent on irrigation systems which required a centralized authority to 
coordinate and develop large-scale hydraulic works; politically, the Chinese 
state were stagnant societies dominated by a despotic state class with a 
centralized governance; and socioeconomically, the Chinese economic bases 
consisted of economically self-sufficient families and village communities 
combining agriculture and handicrafts. The sustainability of the system was built 
on loyalty to the state on the hand and filial piety to the family on the other, 
which made political patriarchy and patrimonialism possible. Under this type of 
socio-political organization, the middle space between the state and family 
became so narrow that it was not possible to expect China (or any other non-
Western historical society) to have had, or to have required, anything like the 
complex of attitudes, values, and institutions that are amalgamated and reified 
under the term “civil society”. 
 
The concept of the AMP endorses “the privileged position of Occidental over 
Oriental history: the dynamic and progressive character of the West versus the 
stationary and regressive features of the East (Bottomore, 1983: 33). It argues 
that the Oriental pre-capitalist economic formations together with their 
“primitive” societal forms and family- or clan-based social structures were 
unfavorable for the emergence of the “capitalist mode of production,” i.e. the 
existence of the Occidental feudalism in politically independent kingdoms and 
cities was crucial for the growth of the production of exchange values and for 
the rise of a bourgeois class and industrial capitalism. The primary hub of this 
conceptual approach focuses on the constraints of the internal economic 
organization. 
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Another school of thought which also emphasizes the internal factors is The 
state and social structure theory. It is an attempt by China-scholars to explain 
underdevelopment in China specifically from the perspectives of its internal 
factors in relation to a number of features of the Chinese state and social 
structure. It stresses the social structure symbolized by Chinese family system, a 
conservative bureaucracy and ruling ideology, a parasitic elite, fatalistic attitude, 
etc. as obstacles to modernization. The arguments of this theory suggest that the 
requirements of modernization were incompatible with the requirements of 
Confucian stability and hierarchy system (Lippit, 1980). Again, the conceptual 
framework of this school emphasizes the malfunctioning of the domestic socio-
political structure. 
 
The most challenging arguments come from the culturalist line of thinking. 
Hegel, for example, at a time when the Western consciousness of the world 
created revolutionary history, saw China in the “Childhood” of history (Engels 
in Dirlik & Meisner, 1989: 17); and Marx, whose theories and insight inspired 
the Chinese revolution, described China a society “vegetating in the teeth of 
time” and discovered in the Great Wall of China a metaphor for the universal 
resistance of non-European societies to change (Marx in Dirlik & Meisner, ibid.: 
17). Their views were understandable because these perceptions of China, 
although premature, were a product of a comparison between the immobility of 
non-Western cultures and the revolutionary Europe. What was behind the 
viewpoint was to establish a European model for other cultures to follow. To put 
China in the framework of the Weberian explanation, the failure of China’s 
transition to the stage of capitalism was due to the fact that Chinese Confucian 
cultural values were not receptive to the development of capitalism in terms of 
creativity, competition and development. Once again, the theoretical paradigm 
of this approach points to the limits of inner value systems. 
 
 
The revolutionary China: sinicizing Western Marxism 
Since China’s defeat in the Opium War and its final collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty, Chinese academics and elites were deeply divided in which direction 
China should move to. There were mainly four schools of attitude. The first 
school favored the restoration of traditional social structure, recovering the 
ancient power and expelling outsiders. The second school preferred a limited 
change, but was not interested in modern science and industry nor was it 
interested in learning Western political philosophy and economic system. Its 
only interest was Western weaponry technology and military training. The third 
school went to the opposite extreme. It favored total Westernization, and was 
convinced that science and technology did affect values. People belonging to 
this school believed that it was impossible to borrow Western technology while 
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maintaining Chinese ways of thinking and its outdated institutional structure. 
The most influential one was the fourth school - Marxism and Leninism.  
 
The historical role of Marxism-Leninism 
Confucian cultural and value system developed over several thousands of years 
under feudal systems, while Marxism emerged in a Europe context in the 18th 
century. They appear to be unrelated both in timing and content; nevertheless, 
history has brought the two together in China. 
 
The post-Opium War challenges to the Chinese nation were dual: China had not 
only to build a modern economy, but also to create a new culture and value 
system in order to shape the direction of national development. The requirement 
for forming a new cultural identity became a yardstick for generations of 
Chinese reformers and revolutionaries because new value system and attitude 
were preconditions for the transformation of individuals as well as the material 
base of society, and economic development and culture were intricately 
interconnected (Kung, 1975: 219). China indeed needed a new comprehensive 
philosophical base, a new framework of understanding - a new Confucianism, 
and that was why Western communism found its precise role in China.  
 
During this period different of schools of thoughts entered China including 
many foreign-inspired schools, such as Constitutionalism, Positivism, Marxism-
Leninism, Socialism, Liberalism, Darwinism, etc. It was during this period that 
the Marxist proletarian culture and class theory began to influence and inspire 
the worldviews of revolutionary Chinese people especially some intellectuals, 
among them Mao Zedong, who was one of the founders of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The CCP successfully linked the potential of the 
Chinese proletarian revolution to the worldwide proletarian movement and 
paved the way for the establishment of a populist tradition in the course of the 
national struggle for independence and prosperity. 
 
 
Marxism-Leninism opened the horizons of the Chinese progressive intellectuals 
and internationalized their conceptualization of China’s domestic problems. The 
Marxist-Leninist teachings of colonialism and imperialism provided China with 
a radical approach viewing underdevelopment as essentially an outcome of a 
historical process caused by western colonial-imperialist expansion. Marxism 
and especially Lenin’s theory of capitalist imperialism provided Chinese 
intellectuals with a partial theoretical framework as well as a psychological 
answer to their difficulties in finding the proper explanations and theories to the 
failures of traditional Chinese culture and for the humiliation suffered at the 
hands of the West (Peck, 1975: 73). It offered them a great source of inspiration 
to take positions and to analyze the world from different perspectives. China, as 
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they saw, was no longer an isolated center of globe surrounded by barbarians, 
but a part of the world full of different forces and ideas. Since the establishment 
of Chinese Communist Party in 1927, the Chinese impact on both transforming 
and strengthening Marxism-Leninism was equally important. The Chinese view 
on its role in the international affairs had changed from regarding itself as the 
center of the world and universal authority to seeing that China’s problem was 
part of the world problems and Chinese revolution was relevant for the outside 
world. 
 
Nevertheless, whatever political discourse might be more suitable to China, it 
was Mao who was able to combine both learning and statesmanship and 
combine Marxism-Leninism with China’s reality. He seized this opportunity to 
sinicize the Chinese Communist movement in terms of skilful redefinition of 
“class” and application of class politics1. Mao’s strategy of “using countryside to 
surround city” turned the Chinese revolution into a peasant-based and backward 
Chinese uprising. No matter how significant Western progressive theories were 
in influencing the Chinese revolution, without combining it to China’s reality by 
Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism would probably have aroused only a few 
rebels. Although communist historians maintain that it is “the people who create 
history” and reject the great-man theory of history, it is no doubt that without 
Mao’s contribution Chinese history would have run a different course (Chi, 
1986: 296). 
 
The “loss of China” and the rise of East Asian developmental states 
This “loss” of China to Communism had a tremendous impact on American 
society (Thomson, 1992). From the president and government officials down to 
the media and ordinary people, Americans simply could not understand how a 
hopeful Chinese Nationalist government with modern US military support could 
be defeated by a Communist-led insurrection. There might have been a chance 
after the Second World War and the Chinese communist victory, when an 
American government could have actually coexisted and developed normal 
relations with socialist China. But the US government immediately responded to 
the “loss” of China by military containment and isolation of Red China under 
the assumption that the containment of China could prevent the spread of 
revolution. For nearly a quarter of a century, the “loss of China” had a grave 
impact on America’s policies in Asia which were skewed by the fear of 
Communism, so were American politics, education, and society. This fear of 
Communism not only founded McCarthyism in the US politics but also made America 
take part in two perhaps entirely avoidable wars in Korean Peninsula and 
                                                          
1 Mao realized the power of hundreds of millions of peasants who could be converted to 
become part of the revolutionary army. The Chinese Revolution is in reality a peasant 
revolution rather than a working class one 
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Southeast Asia. And America-East Asia relations became engulfed by years of 
blind and lethal zealotry. The “loss of China” also attributed to the political 
economy of the rise of East Asian developmental states under the American 
parenthood (Hersh, 1993) 
Under the American protection, external military threats and the internal danger 
of communist expansion were substantially contained in these two regions. 
Through providing security, economic support and military aid to Japan and 
other East Asian states, the American goal was consequently to control and 
define their roles (including Germany in Europe) within the American-led 
alliance and prevent them from embarking upon an independent political and 
military course (Schwarz, 1996: 92-102)2. The burden of the allied countries’ 
military expenses was also greatly reduced by the American military presence. 
American military bases have been documented to have not only protected these 
countries but also provided them with economic benefits such as employment. 
Even now, the withdrawal of American military forces would be considered as a 
substantial economic loss. 
 
America’s long-term strategic interest in East Asia can be understood as having 
a dual objective: “watching” the role of Japan and “managing” the risk by the 
rise of China as a regional and global power. American role and presence in this 
region as a balance-of-power guarantor are generally welcome by the smaller 
nations. It is expected that in the foreseeable future the US will remain a key 
role player in this region’s integration process whether one like it or not. 
 
 
The socialist China: alternative experiment in a capitalist world system 
The history and trajectory of Chinese socialism 
According to some scholars that the reason why China was able to industrialize 
more rapidly since 1949 was that the Communist revolution “decisively broke 
the ties that chained China to the imperialist system” (Moulder 1977: viii-ix) and 
also broke free of a variety of complicated domestic confinements, such as 
localism, warlordism and foreign domination. However, like all socialist states, 
post-revolutionary China was still a constituent part of the “capitalist world 
system”3. Would China be able to form an autonomous entity interacting with 
the capitalist system while avoiding the vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the 
larger capitalist bloc? In other ways, would China be allowed to peacefully 
                                                          
2 It is recognized that the US post-war objective in East Asia, as a part of its global strategies, 
was to restore the functioning of the capitalist world system, which was fundamentally 
different from the fascist-militarist Japanese agenda during the Second World War. 
3 Socialist countries, in the view of the World System Theory, are “state capitalism” because 
the state is the key actor in the capital accumulation process. 
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develop an alternative model and an independent path to social and economic 
development? The answer, as proved by the history, is no. 
 
The ideas and ideologies of socialism can be traced back to some centuries ago, 
but worldwide socialist moments as a political force of global historical 
significance were relatively a recent phenomenon centered in the 20th century. 
Seen from a world system perspective, the historical evolutions of socialist and 
communist movements can be seen as part of long-run spiraling struggles 
between the expansion capitalism and the counter-reactions (Chase-Dunn, 
1999). This history of spiraling struggles between these two contending forces 
can be comparably referred to “double movements” in a Polanyian term 
(Polanyi, 1957). Socialism, seen as part of antisystemic or counter-hegemonic 
movements, necessitated the capitalist world to initiate a number of social, 
economic and political “passive revolutions” including the New Deal, 
Keynesianism and Fordism in order to regain its dynamic and resilient 
capacities. Between the period of the post-war and the end of Cold War it was 
popular then for Western governments to proclaim themselves to be Keynesian 
or Social Democratic, rejecting laissez-faire capitalism and favoring for a more 
regulated macro-economic system of controlled and rationalized production. 
 
The history and trajectory of socialist states in the 20th century indicates that 
worldwide socialist movements in the periphery and semi-periphery all initially 
attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism and establish an alternative 
mode of product, but they ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize national 
industrialization in order to catch up with advanced capitalist states in the core. 
Hence, seen from a world system perspective, socialist states were still situated 
within the interactions of the capitalist world economy, and their activities are 
very much constrained by the international system of the capitalist world 
economy (So and Chiu 1995:139-40). Socialist states, despite of some socialist 
feature, such as egalitarian distribution, employment security, comprehensive 
welfare provision, etc, nevertheless they were still an integral part of capitalist 
accumulation. The history of Chinese socialism proved to be no exception. 
 
It is necessary to point out that the setback of Chinese socialism must not be 
simply reduced to “utopianism” or domestic policy failures because, in addition 
to internal difficulties, Chinese socialism encountered severe external 
constraints such as imperialist hostility, economic embargoes, deprival of access 
to capital and technology, diplomatic isolation and military interventions from 
the capitalist world led by the US. China faced the severe external constraints 
from the Cold-War world order, which in many ways influenced the choices and 
strategies of its socialist experiments as well as the course they took. Even its 
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institutional set-ups were structured according to the need of survival in a war 
situation.4 
The legacy of Chinese socialism 
Before drawing any deterministic conclusions on the period of Maoist socialism, 
we have to keep in mind that what Deng’s China has been doing since the end of 
the 1970s is not “economic reconstruction” but “economic reform” aiming at 
correcting the “irrational” part of the earlier economic policies. Hence, it is 
historically incorrect to ignore the fact that the achievements Chinese socialism 
under political sovereignty and a major change in domestic class relations paved 
the foundation of the economic progress achieved in the post-Mao era. If we do 
not make a realistic assessment of China’s socialist development during Mao’s 
period when it developed from a backward agrarian society to a major industrial 
power in the 1970s, we will not be able to understand both the economic 
achievements and problems inherited from that era. The legacy of Chinese 
socialism can be obviously seen from the favorable position China had, when 
the economic reform started, in defining the terms and establishing parameters 
of interaction with the capitalist world order. As a China-scholar observes,  
 
it [China] was not entangled in a complex web of external economic 
constraints which limited its freedom of action or skewed its decision in the 
interests of foreign powers or corporations. ... the establishment of a strong, 
autonomous state provided the political precondition for ensuring – with a 
margin for miscalculation – that international economic ties were more likely 
to be beneficial, as classical economic theory and modern development 
economics have promised. 
 (White 1982: 131) 
 
The Maoist independent and non-alliance foreign policy, armed with concrete 
advance in certain industries and military technologies as mentioned before, and 
assisted by its strong ties with the developing world which backed China’s 
victorious re-entry into the United Nations as a permanent member of the 
Security Council, paved a solid foundation for its successful rapprochement with 
the United States. Consequently and not coincidently, the post-Mao regime was 
in a favorable position to negotiate political, economic and military relations 
with the outside world on a either relatively equal or advantageous basis.  
 
The success of the post-Mao market reform proves fact that the fundamental 
changes and achievements during the reform period in the 1980s and the 1990s 
were a clear indication of the contribution of the socialist development strategy 
                                                          
4  The organizational logics of Chinese institution (in Chinese “Dan Wei”) have their roots 
from the war periods (the anti-Japanese war and the civil war). It was a decentralized 
system in which each unit/institution is supposed to survive on its own in terms of 
production, reserve, welfare, medical care, etc. 
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rather than its failure. For example, it has been recognized that China’s village-
township enterprises had played an important role in its economic growth during 
the reform period. Township enterprises became, more than the state sectors, the 
most dynamic engine of China’s economic growth. According to the World 
Bank report, the growth and performance of China’s township and village 
enterprises (TVE) was extraordinary: their share in GDP rose from 13 per cent 
in 1985 to 31 per cent in 1994; their output grew by about 25 per cent a year 
since the mid-1980s; they now accounted for a third of total industrial growth in 
China; and for more than a decade TVEs had created 95 million jobs (World 
Bank 1996: 51).  
 
Conventional wisdom claims that the rapid development of village-township 
enterprises is only due to the reform-oriented leadership which came to power 
and ended the public ownership system, and unleashed their enormous potential 
of entrepreneurship. While such a view contains elements of truth, it is not 
historically correct and can be seriously misleading.  
 
What we must not forget is that the rise of TVEs was not a product of the reform 
policy; rather, it is the direct result of the socialist mass-line mobilization 
development strategy to push forward rural industrialization aiming at making 
rural areas into affiliations of industrialization processes alongside major 
industrial cities. What was behind the socialist economic policy, albeit it was 
radical, was the standpoint that Chinese peasants would ultimately bear the 
burden of industrial investment in one way or another; and instead of over-
taxing them and widening the rural/urban gap, they could be helped to develop 
rural industries along with urban industrialization. The essential goal of the 
Maoist rural development policy was to create a simultaneous process in which 
collectivization went hand-in-hand with industrialization.  
 
Therefore, TVEs were the outcomes emerged during the “Great Leap Forward” 
and the Cultural Revolution. Village-township enterprises are direct 
‘descendants’ of those previously owned by communes and brigades (Putterman 
1997). It was a gradual process based on a number of innovative ideas such as 
factory and commune linkage, young intellectual going to the countryside, 
cadres and technicians working in grass roots units, and linkage between 
industry and agriculture, etc. About 28 million people were employed in 
commune and brigade factories out of a total labor force of about 300 million 
(Lippit 1982: 128). In 1958, 85 per cent of the 1,165 enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of the central state were transferred to local administrations; and 
within one year there were about 6 million small-scale industries: coal, power 
station, cement, fertilizer, agricultural machinery and processing enterprises 
(Gao 1997).  
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The socialist foundation for China’s economic emergence 
As it is well known, the success story of Japan and the rapid economic 
development of some Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) were largely 
based on export-oriented strategy. It is widely recognized that the engine of 
economic growth in the East Asian model of development was attributable to the 
rapid growth of exports. Beginning in the 1960s, favorable conditions created 
opportunities for relatively low-cost industrial production to be integrated into 
the world economy through increased relocation of production by multinational 
corporations to low-wage sites. China was obviously denied access to all these 
benefits and was thus excluded from taking advantage of the favorable 
international development conditions during the upward phase of the world 
economy. Neither was China unable to pursue a development strategy based on 
export-oriented industrialization even if it had so desired, nor was it able to 
adopt the import-substitution option due to the economic sanctions and embargo 
imposed upon it. 
 
Ironically and not coincidentally, the rapid economic advance of China in the 
post-Mao decades is actually because of the “regaining” of these favorable 
international conditions. Furthermore, dialectically, because of the international 
isolation leading to the alternative choice of self-reliance and self-sufficiency 
Chinese socialism, it was possible for China to confine the external impact of 
distortion at a limited level. Due to the socialist legacy, “China also stands out as 
the only developing country without any internal or external debts outstanding 
and a uniquely stable currency.” (Bhattacharya in Bergmann, 1977: 228) 
 
In a nutshell, the economic success and comparative advantages generated 
during the decades of Chinese socialist experiment laid a solid foundation and 
paved the way for Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy in integrating the Chinese 
economy with the world market. However, the latter course was not 
predetermined. The socialist achievements made China relatively stronger and 
equal in world market exchanges. The present contradiction between China and 
the west, especially the US, is that the latter wants to make sure that China 
competes in the world market according to the “established rules” because its 
comparative advantages could be used to break these rules. Therefore, it is 
ahistorical to stress the present success without giving a proper assessment of 
the contribution of the socialist achievements. 
 
 
The capitalist China: challenges and opportunities in the capitalist world 
system 
China’s rejoining the capitalist world after restoring diplomatic relations with 
the United States and especially after it started the economic reform since the 
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end of 1970s was regarded as the biggest savoir to the capitalist world order 
because the core parts of the capitalist world system - the United States and 
Europe - were also much weakened by the long Cold-War competition with the 
former Soviet Union.  
 
If the Maoist self-reliance and self-sufficient path of development was projected 
as a potential development model and ideology and the central goal of socialist 
politics was seen to challenge the unequal hierarchy in the world economic 
system, such a socialist hegemonic project, although threatening, existed more 
or less outside the US-led capitalist world system. In other words, it was more 
an ideological challenge without being able to construct an alternative world 
system to replace the capitalist world system. But ironically, the post-Mao 
economic marketization together with its political authoritarianism is also 
beginning to be viewed as a menace because of its ambition to have access to a 
larger share of world wealth, resources, and its responsibility in creating 
environmental problems as well as resisting American political demands. More 
importantly, such a “menace” exists within the mechanism of global capitalism! 
And it can be summarized in the following areas: 
 
The global “China factors” 
China’s high economic growth of three decades has already made its economic 
impact felt worldwide. China’s size and integration with the world economy 
have contributed to uncertainty about the global inflationary environment; its 
currency has been a subject of contention; its trade has raised concerns for 
workers and firms in both developed and developing countries; its hunger for 
energy has led to competition and conflict; it has rivaled the United States and 
the rest developing countries as a destination for foreign direct investment; and 
the effects of its own overseas investments have begun to be felt across the 
world; Beijing’s policies on finance, currency, trade, military security, 
environment issues, resource management, food security, raw material and 
product prices are increasingly seen as connecting with the economies of 
millions of people outside China’s boundary because China’s shifts in supply 
and demand cause changes in prices hence leading to adjustment in other 
countries. As a result, China is increasingly seen as having the quality of the 
previous US as an “indispensable country” (Feffer, 2007). China has generated 
incremental growth in the global economy that has made its success significant 
for the welfare of other countries. The global “China factors” can be 
summarized in the following areas: 
 
1)  Research and development 
China is rapidly developing as a more sophisticated industrial power. According 
to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
mainly due to growing international investment, China recently surpassed Japan 
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and became the world’s second largest spender on research and development 
(International Herald Tribune, Business Section, December 4, 2006). China has 
also overtaken Germany as the fifth most prolific nation in filing patents for new 
processes and technologies. Although its overall capacity for technological 
innovation still lags behind industrially advanced countries, these figures 
demonstrate that China is rapidly catching up.  
 
2)  Two-track FDI 
China has in the recent years become a magnet for global foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Especially in 2002, China replaced the United States as the 
world’s number one destination for FDI, nearly $53 billion. The dramatic 
inflows of foreign investment come due to China’s progress on structural 
reforms, its accession to the World Trade Organization as well as its continuous 
effort in bringing regulations in line with international standards. China is to aim 
at developing a more transparent business environment with a clear legal and 
regulatory framework, which will help attract higher-quality investments that are 
focused on long-term, high-technology, capital-intensive projects. 
 
In terms of China’s outflow FDI to the developing world, Beijing has developed 
strategic plans on how to provide aid without following the colonial model of 
economic relations and without following the suit of Western condition-based 
practices. Most FDI to developing countries such as Africa are placed in the 
extractive mineral and primary economy sector, whilst China’s FDI targets 
mainly at the manufacturing sectors in developing economies of Africa, Latin 
America and Asia. China does not tie aid to policy preference by those who 
receive its assistance, which is seen as a great challenge to the conventional 
ideologies and practices of Western donors. 
 
3)  Natural resource and commodity price 
Metal prices have increased sharply due to strong demand, particularly from 
China which has contributed 50 percent to the increase in world consumption of 
the main metals (aluminum, copper, and steel) in recent years. Due to its rapid 
growth and rising share in the world economy, China is expected to retain its 
critical role in driving commodity market prices (World Economic Outlook, 
September 2006). China offers above world market prices for buying raw 
materials, which attributes great comparative advantages to the developing 
world.  
 
China has always sought to maintain self-sufficiency in the production of basic 
food products for its entire population. However, following the rising living 
standards, it is forecasted China’s demand for grains, meat and oilseeds will be 
gradually outpacing its ability to produce them. China has already become the 
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world’s largest soybean importer and is expected to become a significant grain 
importer as well, with profound impacts on global commodity prices. 
It is foreseeable that in the near future China’s import of natural resources 
especially oil and gas will have to be substantially increased. The implication is 
seemingly clear that not only the global commodity price and international 
geopolitical power relations will be affected but also China’s own internal 
evolutions, such as foreign policy thinking, foreign aid designing, arms sale 
consideration and compulsory expansion of its long-range naval power 
projection capabilities will be closely connected. 
 
4) International trade  
Nowadays Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage is being questioned as 
never before. China is currently the world’s third-largest trading nation and it 
will soon be the second in the coming years. The rapid rise of China as a major 
actor in the global economy is provoking a controversial debate about whether 
free trade is still in America’s interest. China’s rapid rise is feeding a common 
fear in the West: developing nations led by China and India may out-compete 
the western powers for high-tech jobs while keeping the low-skill, labor-
intensive manufacturing jobs they won already. The fear is that China might 
soon gain comparative advantages of labor, capital and even technology that will 
allow it to dominate the world economy. According to the IMF studies, a strong 
tendency is shown that China is moving out of labor-intensive manufacturing 
such as textiles, apparel, footwear, toys, etc, and beginning to increase its share 
of technology-intensive products, such as machines, electrical machinery, 
telecommunications, together with increasing degree of specialization (Amiti 
and Freund, 2007:39-40) 
 
The US trade deficit with China reached a new record of $230 billion. The 
American and Chinese ruling elites have no progressive means for resolving 
these massive economic imbalances. Beijing needs to keep foreign capital 
flowing in and exports expanding, in order to create millions of jobs to maintain 
social stability. The US economy requires the supply of $2 billion a day from 
the rest of the world, especially from Asian central banks, to finance its massive 
trade deficits. If this process continues indefinitely, the financial system must 
collapse at some point with incalculable consequences for the world economy. 
 
5) An emerging global creditor 
China used to be proud of being one of the largest recipients of FDI. Although in 
comparative terms China’s overseas investment is still small, the situation is 
changing considerably: China’s foreign currency reserves surpassed the $1.5 
trillion last year; and according to the official statistics, “China’s net overseas 
investment hit $21.16 billion in 2006, with an annual average growth rate of 60 
percent over the past five years” (China Daily, Oct. 2, 2007). 
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Recently, China’s state Sovereign Wealth Fund has attracted the global 
attention. China Investment Corp (CIC), a state-owned investment company 
with $200 billion of assets. In early this year during his visit to China the UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown openly offered London as an overseas base for 
China’s sovereign wealth fund, aiming to get a share of Beijing’s overseas 
invests in Britain. However, due to the state ownership of the fund, suspicions 
and worries about China’s economic agenda and geopolitical motivations can be 
revealed by some headlines like “China Sovereign Wealth Fund Could Buy 
Every US Company” (Bonner, 2007), and “Sovereign Wealth Funds: China’s 
Potent Economic Weapon” (Navarro, 2008). 
 
6) International relations 
China’s rise to the status of a world power is leading to some profound changes 
in the world system. The Chinese “indispensable” roles in influencing 
international politics and national policies are globally recognized: its active 
leadership in the 6-party talks in preventing North Korea from developing its 
nuclear program; its new approaches and policies to development assistance to 
the African continent are welcomed by most African nations and the 
representatives of 48 Africa nations gathered last fall in Beijing and expressed a 
new hope that Chinese investments in the continent will bring about their 
economic development. China’s growing influence in Africa and in other 
developing countries under the Five-Principles approaches to international 
relations specially to development assistance and aid to in which Beijing’s 
adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and its 
determination not to impose conditionality is challenging the Western especially 
the EU’s ideology-based policies. In East Asia, the region since the 1990s has 
witnessed a gradual shift away from the vertical Japan-led “flying-geese” model 
of regional development to a new horizontal China-driven regional economic 
integration (Li, 2007a).  
 
China’s enlarging involvement in the relationship with Latin America, its new 
activism at the United Nations, its representative voice in the WTO for the 
developing world, and its close relations with the World Bank, and its efforts in 
promoting regional multilateralism through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in central Asia, indicates China’s global presence. Even for the 
China-US relations, which are the world’s most difficult and complicated 
relations, the Bush administration will readily admit that China’s purchase of 
American bonds is indispensable in keeping the U.S. economy afloat despite of 
the fact that American politicians tend to demonize China’s large trade surplus 
and Beijing’s reluctance to liberalize its financial sector.  
 
 
 51
 
The impact of China’s challenges 
To some scholars the rise of China can be termed to be “Beijing Consensus” 
(Ramo, 2004 and Li, 2007b), a notion coined with distinct attitudes to politics, 
development and the global balance of power; to others it can simply be called 
the “Chinese model”, a sinicized market capitalism called “a socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics” implying an active role of the Chinese 
party-state in attaining macro-policy independence and socio-political stability. 
Both the “Beijing Consensus” and the “Chinese model” are being interpreted 
either as the rise of China’s soft power (Nye, 2005) or as a serious challenge to 
the existing economic theories (Chow, 1997) as well as to international relation 
theories (Paltiel, 2005). Will we witness the emergence of “Chinese 
international relations theories” in the near future along with the great economic 
and social transformation? The answer is both likely and even inevitable (Qin, 
2007). 
What is the implication of the rise of China to interest of the Western World at 
large and the United States in particular? Will a rising China be willing to be 
constrained by the established rules of games set up and defined by the post-war 
world order? Or will it alter the rules or write its own rules in many areas, such 
as intellectual property rights, trade practices, state-market relations, military 
expansion, and inter-state relations? Opinion-makers of both realists and 
neoliberals provide very different analyses and policy recommendations in 
response to the rise of China. Realists stress the importance of understanding the 
world system as zero-sum game advocating prevention against the “coming 
conflict with China” (Bernstein and Munro, 1997 and Mearsheimer, 2001 and 
2006). Whereas, neoliberals emphasize strength of an institutional approach to 
engage China so that it will be incorporated in international regimes and 
becoming a stake-holder in the existing global system (Ikenberry, 2008). 
 
In the past decades either fascination or irritation with China has always 
influenced Western scholarship and journalism, which often produce abrupt 
sentiment from excessive approval and unqualified optimism to unwarranted 
revulsion and deep pessimism. There were hopeful writings of confidence about 
China’s “second revolution” in the most of 1980s; then there was deep 
antagonism toward China’s lack of political reform following the June 1989 
crackdown; and in recent years, there are exaggerated projections of China’s 
threatening rise to the superpower status. From time to time Western politicians 
and observers selectively use China’s successes and failures to justify their 
existing theories and prejudices. A correct reading of the anxieties and 
contractions connected with the rise of China must be found in the 
understanding of a dialectical process of “mutual generation” and “mutual 
destruction” between domestic transformations and international premises. 
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A dual pressure on the capitalist world system 
Internally China has dramatically transformed itself from being an agrarian 
society to becoming the “world factory” and within a short period China has 
experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization which the West has gone 
through for about 200 years. Consequently China’s class components of the 
population will be fundamentally transformed in such a way that the share of its 
proletarian and semi-proletarian wage workers will increase substantially, and in 
the foreseeable future China’s degree of proletarianization and wage level will 
be equivalent to the current levels of the semi-peripheral states in Latin America 
and Southeast Asia (Li, 2005:435). Here, the “China threat” could come from 
purely domestic destabilizing effects of economic marketization: massive social 
dislocations stemming from the, rising unemployment, energy shortage, and 
widespread protest over widening inequalities, environmental degradations, 
mass migrations, ethnic tensions, minority separatism, and etc. Some of these 
are of serious concern of both internal sustainability and global security. The 
social cost of the contradiction of China’s transformation is hugely high (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett, 2004). 
 
The concerned scenario of China’s internal collapse portraits a threatening 
situation that if China suffered a Soviet type of sudden-death syndrome and 
spinned out of control, the whole world would face the worse nightmare – the 
return of pre-revolution China: a failed and predatory state surrounded by 
warlordism, civil war, crime, in addition to the modern China’s problems which 
are impossible for the world to deal with: huge refuge problem and proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
 
Externally China’s competitive advantages are weakening the relative monopoly 
of the existing semiperipheral states in certain commodity chains exerting 
pressures on their production cost and wage level (Li, 2005). The danger of 
peripheralization of the semiperiphery in the current capitalist world system is 
analytically theorized by a scholar: 
 
This has dangerous implications for the capitalist world economy. The semi-
periphery plays the indispensable role of the “middle stratum” in the world 
system. A layer of the semi-periphery offers hope of “modernization,” 
“development,” and ultimately, upward mobility for the great majority living 
in the peripheral states. Should this layer disappear and be reduced to no more 
than a part of the periphery, the world system is likely to become politically 
highly unstable. 
 
Peripheralization of the semi-periphery would deprive the capitalist world-
economy of a major source of effective demand. Moreover, the peripheralized 
semi-peripheral states will inevitably face highly explosive political situations 
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at home. The relatively more proletarianized working classes will demand 
semi-peripheral levels of wages and political and social rights. However, the 
peripheralized semi-peripheral states will not be able to simultaneously offer 
the relatively high wages and survive the competition against other peripheral 
or peripheralized semi-peripheral states in the world market. The entire semi-
periphery will be threatened with revolution and political turmoil. 
(Li, 2005: 436-437) 
 
It is unavoidable that China’s capitalist growth strategy has generated regional 
and global contractions. China is being associated to the cause of the problems 
of other countries and other regions: overproduction, decreasing regional wage 
rates, destructive regional competition for investment and resource, etc. (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The paper attempts to construct a framework of understanding the dialectical 
nexus between the internalities and externalities behind China transformations. 
Such an internal-external linkage intertwined with challenge-response 
paradigms has a dialectical process of mutual generation: internal struggles were 
triggered by external challenges while internal transformations were responded 
by external adjustments and accommodations. China’s century-long internal 
struggles to overcome constraints on its development can be equally paralleled 
by the continuous external responses to the “China factors”. China’s ability to 
successfully solve its internal development problems and manage external 
challenges will not only influence it internal stability, economic and political 
liberalization, and leadership but also affect regional and global security.   
 
Historically China has been able to display a capacity of absorbing foreign ideas 
and influences as well as sinicizing and transforming them into part of native 
value systems, such as the sinicization of Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism. 
Today it is still a question whether China is attempting to sinicize capitalism and 
create a “socialist market economy”. In recent decades economic growth has 
torn down much of the physical symbols of China’s cultural history, but Chinese 
people still remain an intensely historical nation with strong and popular 
nationalism. Chinese nationalism is an integral part of the internalities of the 
driving forces which can be turned into strong anti-west sentiment if the West 
refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China. The time when 
nationalism was mainly led by the party and the state, today nationalists, assisted 
by modern technology and economic prosperity, are acting independently 
beyond the control of the state (Gries, 2005). 
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Currently we witnessing an interesting dialectical situation China is facing: due 
to its embeddedness in the global capitalist system Beijing is gaining economic 
strength on the one hand but losing traditional political independence on the 
other. In other words, China’s rise through active participation in the global 
political economy is, at the same time, translating into greater vulnerability and 
dependence (Economy, 1998). Beijing’s desire to retain its legitimacy through 
integrating China’s economy with global capitalism will make it politically 
vulnerable to internal economic setbacks and external pressures, thus 
endangering the preservation of its integration. Today China again finds itself to 
be a “middle kingdom” surrounded by jealousy, admiration, anxiety, worry and 
even resentment. The West must understand the political inevitability, cultural 
requirement and social necessity that China’s adaptive sinicization is of vital 
importance. 
 
Historically China, ever since its first contact with West, has been seen as a 
nation of puzzle, mystery and unfathomably beyond comprehension. Even now 
when China has become an integral part of the capitalist world economy, China 
is still a country that the West finds it difficult to understand. To many western 
politicians and opinion-makers China simply does not conform to some most 
basic beliefs in the West about what makes nations grow and about a set of 
mutually dependent relationship between property rights and economic growth, 
between the rule of law and market economy, between free currency flow and 
economic order, and most importantly between political system and popular 
sentiment (Zakaria, 2007). As a well-known historian put it clearly “the most 
salient characteristic of international relations during the last century was the 
inability of the rich, established powers - Great Britain and the United States - to 
adjust peacefully to the emergence of new centres of power in Germany, Japan 
and Russia” (Johnson, 2005, online). 
 
Within the near future both China and the West will have to find a regional and 
global role which the other will accept and support. In order to do so both will 
have to go through a considerable period of struggle, adjustment and tension. It 
is still too early to predict whether the eventual outcome is a world disorder, 
reorder or new order. 
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Bombs upon a brittle Sino-American relationship:  
The 1999 bombing of China’s Belgrade Embassy 
 
 
Erik Beukel 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The American bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy on 7 May, 1999, triggered 
a major crisis between China and the United States. In China, the responses 
were strong, both from the government and thousands of demonstrators outside 
the American embassy in Beijing and American consulates throughout China 
who saw the bombing as a deliberate attempt to humiliate China. After a couple 
of days the demonstrations subsided, among others because the Chinese 
government realized that it might not be able to control a continuing outburst of 
nationalistic feelings. In Washington, the Clinton administration’s response to 
the bombing was marked by its preoccupation with the wars in the Balkans, and 
its primary concern was to continue the military offensive against Serbia. The 
Administration apologized several times for the bombing, but Americans 
underestimated the independent role of Chinese nationalism as an important 
background for the strong popular reactions in China. China underestimated the 
significance of bureaucratic and domestic politics in the United States as well as 
the impact on Americans when China’s state-controlled media didn’t report 
American apologizes as they appeared. The features of the 1999 bombing 
aftermath point to some of the critical problems in relations between the 
American superpower and the rising China. 
 
Introduction 
At 11:45 pm on May 7, 1999, Belgrade time (that is, early in the morning at 
5:45 am on May 8, Beijing time), five American cruise missiles, launched by 
two Air Force B-2 bombers that took part in NATO’s bombing of Serbia, struck 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (Strategic Survey 1999/2000: 199-200; Wu, 
2007-08: 61f.)). Three Chinese journalists, two from the Guangming Daily 
which is one of China’s premier national newspapers, and one from the Xinhua 
News Agency, were killed. Twenty-one other persons from the embassy’s 
diplomatic personnel were wounded. The bombing triggered a major crisis 
between China and the United States, and for a few days there were big 
demonstrations against the United States in several Chinese cities. The intensity 
of the demonstrations took not only Western observers but also the Chinese 
government by surprise. However, the Chinese leadership did not try to prevent 
protests, primarily because it shared the demonstrators’ view that the bombing 
was intentional rather than mistaken, although the leadership probably 
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considered rogue elements in the American military or intelligence community 
as the guilty rather than President Clinton (Wu, 2007-08: 62). The bombing was 
a watershed event for many in China, especially urban elites and students who 
had focused their hopes and aspirations on America, and for them it represented 
the end of illusions about America’s good intentions toward China; actually, 
some intellectuals who in the 1980s had had much admiration for America were 
deeply disappointed by American arrogance in the aftermath of the bombing 
incident (Heng and Ngok, 2004: 97; Suettinger, 2003: 377). The most severe 
aspects of the crisis subsided after a few weeks, and in late July the two 
governments reached agreement on the compensation by the United States to the 
Chinese casualties. Toward the end of the year they agreed on the compensation 
for the damage done to Chinese properties by the bombing in Belgrade and the 
damage done to American facilities by the demonstrations in China. In April, 
2000, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a statement declaring that 
intelligence officers responsible for the bombing had been disciplined (Wu, 
2006: 370).  
 
The Belgrade bombing crisis demonstrated the brittle, labile and unstable 
character of the relations between China and the United States, and it 
strengthened a legacy of deep suspicion and distrust in both countries. The Sino-
American relationship is not only brittle but the relations between the two 
countries are important as a source of instability in the post-Cold War order and 
will be critical to world politics in the 21st century. After the end of the Cold 
War, the United States is the only global superpower with unrivalled military 
and economic power and extensive influence in international politics. China is a 
rising power whose strongly growing economy through almost 30 years 
provides a solid basis for claiming a prominent role in world politics and 
especially in its regional environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-
Pacific region is the area where American and Chinese security interests meet 
directly, with the United States as the incumbent dominant power and China as 
the rising challenger. The region contains two of the world’s most dangerous 
flashpoints, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, and China and the 
United States share an interest in a stable East Asia. Thus one crucial 
determinant in East Asia’s evolving security situation is whether the two 
countries can steer their mutual relations and the relations with their respective 
regional ‘friends’, North Korea and Taiwan, in such a way as to produce 
regional stability (Beukel, 2008; Goh, 2005). Another determinant is the two 
countries’ abilities to handle bilateral crises with insight and knowledge of the 
other country’s specific political and societal characteristics. 
 
One obstacle is that the impact of both sides’ ideological traditions and 
proclivities may make the Sino-American relationship vulnerable to official 
miscalculations, mistrust, or populist emotions which may plunge the 
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relationship into new major crises (Zi, 2004). In China, the increasingly vocal 
patriotism and nationalism among intellectuals and in the general population, 
which is a result of pride in China’ recent economic achievements as well as a 
historical sense of cultural superiority, may confront the government with 
difficult choices when it feels it has to respond to nationalist protests and 
sentiments (Gries, 2004; Shen, 2004, Wong & Yongnian, 2000). For pragmatic 
Chinese leaders, the maintenance of good – or at least cool-minded, businesslike 
- relations with the United States in order to realize China’s economic 
modernization is a top priority and so they clearly worry about strong domestic 
protests against American actions even if they share some of the substantive 
attitudes as in the 1999 crisis. From this follows that there is a potential conflict 
between a pragmatic leadership’s preferences and bottom-up populist sentiments 
that China should strongly react to perceived offensive American actions (Miles, 
2000-01; Zhao, 2004).  
 
In basic American attitudes to the nation’s role and mission in international 
affairs there is an ideological urge to promote liberty and democracy and rid the 
world of undemocratic regimes. In relation to China, the confluence of 
conservative hawks and liberal human rights advocates, both invoking the image 
of China as the last “Red Menace”, may lead to a strong policy of containment 
which is difficult to distinguish from a policy of confrontation. The critical issue 
in the making of American China policy is whether a composite alliance of 
moderate conservative and liberal Realists, arguing that it is an American self-
interest to realize and consider the basic security interests of a rising China, can 
hold the line against another heterogeneous conservative-liberal alliance that 
advocates a confrontational China policy to defeat the last Communist threat. As 
dominating schools of thought that have shaped American foreign policy since 
the nation was founded emphasize a combination of the idea of an American 
mission with its moral duty to spread democratic principles throughout the 
world and the value of superior American military might as well as American 
populism, the result is that a moderate Realist alliance is generally 
disadvantaged in the American political process (Mead, 2002: 86f.). Besides, the 
challenge from China’s economic rise since the first economic reforms were 
introduced in 1979 has presented the United States with a number of intractable 
economic and political issues where different political answers and movements 
interact with traditional security issues. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the United 
States as the world’s only superpower and China as the strongest newcomer by 
focusing on important features of the 1999 bombing crisis. The bombing had an 
impact as a bomb upon a brittle relationship, and the following sections will 
elucidate the more exact character of this with a special view to the conflict and 
the interplay between dissimilar political systems in China and the United States 
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and different concerns and views of the bombing within each of the two 
countries and governments. In short, the purpose is to elucidate how and why 
neither China nor the United States in the bombing crisis can be considered as a 
unitary actor with a well-defined set of foreign policy goals. As to China, the 
focus is on the contrast between, on the one hand, the government’s desire to 
maintain a reasonably working relationship with the United States despite what 
also the leadership considered an offensive attack against China and, on the 
other hand, the protesters’ vehement reactions and protests. As for the United 
States, the focus is on the Clinton administration’s attempt to work out a line of 
conduct after the news of the bombing and the strong reactions in China, 
especially considering that the administration’s actual foreign policy 
preoccupation was continuing the bombing of Serbia. The point is that not only 
had the two governments highly contrasting views of the bombing of the 
embassy, but the concerns within the two capitals focused on very different 
aspects of the crisis, particularly in the first days, which provided important 
constraints on both governments’ ability to dampen the crisis (Goh, 2005: 230; 
Wu, 2007-08: 62f.). Considered in that context it is interesting to note the impact 
of differences between the two political systems. There is no determinism or 
one-to-one correspondence between political systems and foreign policies, but 
critical trends, factors, problems and dilemmas can be pointed out and analysed. 
 
 
Chinese responses 
Chinese responses to the Belgrade bombing can be analyzed as passing through 
two stages. The first stage, May 8-9, was marked by strong responses by the 
government and the state-controlled media as well as violent street 
demonstrations against the US and NATO. In the second stage, from May 10, 
the demonstrations lessened and the government became more in charge of all 
Chinese reactions. To be sure, the contrast between a confused government 
responding to unexpected foreign and domestic events in the first stage and the 
same government simply controlling the domestic situation in the second stage 
should not be exaggerated. Still, the difference between the overall pattern of 
Chinese responses during the first two days and after those days offers an 
important insight in some of the political dynamics of the Sino-American 
relationship. 
 
Government and demonstrations 
The complete astonishment and lack of information in the Chinese leadership 
through the morning of the bombing is critical to understanding initial Chinese 
responses. Damage to the fixed telecommunication equipment at the Belgrade 
Embassy meant that embassy personnel were unable immediately to report the 
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bombing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Beijing.1 The first person 
to report the bombing was a resident journalist of the People’s Daily who had 
survived the attack and reported the event to the MFA with his mobile phone at 
6:00 am, that is, 15 minutes after the bombing. Thereafter, the MFA tried to get 
in touch with the ambassador and other Embassy officials in order to have the 
information confirmed but they failed. A few minutes later, after 6:10 am, the 
Chinese intelligence services began to report the bombing, mainly based on 
news broadcasts by Agence France-Press (AFP) and Cable News Network 
(CNN). Only after 7:30 am did the Xinhua News Agency and China’s 
ambassador in Belgrade phone the MFA to confirm the bombing and the 
casualties. As the event came that sudden and was wholly unexpected, and 
communications and intelligence was inadequate, many details of the attack 
were incomplete during the first hours after the attack. Thus as it was very 
difficult for Chinese authorities to ascertain the nature of the incident and 
American intentions, it was not possible to formulate a clear-cut and 
comprehensive official response at the outset. There was no contingency 
planning for handling such an incident, and the government initially responded 
slowly to the bombing. Apparently, the senior Chinese leadership did not 
convene before 10:00 am (Swaine, 2006: 52; Wu, 2006: 358-9). 
 
After the meeting the Chinese government issued a strong protest pointing out 
that the bombing constituted a gross encroachment upon China’s sovereignty 
and flagrant violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 
the basic norms governing international relations. In the statement, the Chinese 
government and people expressed their utmost indignation and strong 
condemnation and lodged the strongest protest, demanding that the US and 
NATO assume full responsibility. The government presented four demands to 
the American government: a public and formal apology to the government and 
people of China and to the families of those who had been harmed; a 
comprehensive and thorough investigation of the bombing; a prompt public 
disclosure of the details of the investigation; and severe punishment for those 
responsible for the incident (Cheng and Ngok, 2004: 91). Moreover, the 
government reserved full rights for further reactions. In the afternoon of May 8, 
the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan made an emergency 
appointment with James Sasser, the US Ambassador to China, and made solemn 
representations with him. Also, China asked the UN Security Council for an 
emergency meeting to condemn the bombing (Strong Protest by the Chinese 
Government …). A task force was set up by the government to handle the 
bombing incident, and a 34-member delegation flew to Belgrade immediately 
afterwards to inspect the heavily damaged embassy compound. Moreover, the 
government decided to suspend the high-level exchanges between the armed 
                                                          
1  The account of the events early on May 8 in this section is based on Wu (2006: 354-6) 
who refers to interviews with Embassy personnel. 
62 
forces of China and the United States, and consultations on arms control and 
international security were postponed. In the same way, the two countries’ 
dialogue on human rights was suspended and a number of American visits to 
China were cancelled. Interestingly, however, the talks over China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) were not suspended (Campbell and 
Weitz, 2006: 332). 
 
Chinese television carried an extensive report on the bombing during its noon 
newscast on May 8. Television videos and the pictures of the rescue and 
recovery operation in the destroyed embassy in Belgrade imparted a sense of 
design and precision, among other because the surrounding buildings remained 
undamaged (Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 328-9). Demonstrations began after 
news of the bombing were published and in the early afternoon, thousands of 
protesters, organized by the Beijing City Student Association and university 
authorities, surrounded the American embassy with banners decrying American 
“Nazi murderers” and demanding “blood for blood” (Suettinger, 2003: 370-1). 
Hundreds of police lined the streets close to the embassy but they did not 
interfere with the protesters who, as the day wore on, became more threatening 
and began throwing rocks and breaking embassy windows. However, when 
protesters began smashing embassy cars late on May 9, the police moved in and 
blocked off access to the main embassy compound but let people gather in front 
of the ambassador’s residence (Pomfret and Laris, May 9, 1999). As crowds 
outside the American embassy became more rowdy, there also seemed to be a 
growing undertone of anger at the Chinese Government’s perceived weakness in 
responding to the bombing; demonstrators gradually shifted from supporting the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to making demands of it as they wanted China 
to take a tougher stand (Gries, 2004: 129-31; Suettinger, 2003: 371). Also in 
provincial capitals across China, tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the 
streets and marched on NATO, particularly American, consulates. Protests 
erupted in Changsha, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Shanghai and other 
cities. Altogether, the unrest spread to more than 20 cities and involved 
hundreds of thousands of people (Miles 2000-01). Residences were damaged, 
but no one was hurt, and Chinese police dispersed the protesters with tear gas. A 
specific point worth noting is that also Chinese students in America and Europe 
demonstrated on university campuses and outside American embassies (Gries, 
2004: 14 and 129). 
 
The demonstrators clearly believed that the bombing was a deliberate attempt by 
the American government to humiliate China and loudly expressed this in 
banners denigrating especially President Clinton. The demonstrations were 
partly spontaneous and overwhelmingly voluntary. They were not only allowed 
but also endorsed and encouraged by the government, for instance by the 
provision of transportation and the issue of demonstration permits, despite – or 
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maybe because of - its concern that a public protest could be used as cover by 
anti-government activists (Miles, 2000-01: 51f.; Shen, 2004: 126; Wong & 
Yongnian, 2000: 332f.; Wu, 2007-08: 62-3). Also, the police tacitly tolerated 
physical damage to the American embassy and other American facilities in 
China but only within some limits. The central point is that once under way the 
demonstrations were marshaled by the Chinese government who wanted the 
nationalist demonstrations to serve its own political goals. The protesters did not 
need encouragement to initiate the demonstrations, but the authorities 
determined early on that they needed ‘guidance’ (Hillman, 2004: 81; Strategic 
Survey 1999/2000: 199-200; Wong & Yongnian, 2000: 322-23). However, the 
authorities’ attempt to control and steer the demonstrations were only partially 
successful during the first stage because the Chinese government evidently did 
not anticipate the vehemence of the protests and became nervous about its 
ability to fully control the course of events. No doubt, the protesters expression 
of sometimes extreme nationalist views and sentiments challenged the 
leadership’s ability to maintain a prudent and pragmatic course of action. It 
could not afford to be indifferent to the strong nationalist demonstrations, but 
had to take part in the process of the strongly nationalistic demonstrations in 
order to manage it (Wong & Yongnian, 2000: 323). It is difficult to assess 
different aspects of the complicated situation, but the leadership in Beijing 
seemingly feared that efforts to suppress the demonstrations might provoke a 
strong public backlash which in turn could destabilize the entire Chinese society 
and ultimately undermine the regime (Swaine, 2006: 44; Wong and Yongnian, 
2000: 336f.).   
 
On the second day of the demonstrations, May 9, the leadership met in the 
afternoon and decided to take some measures in order to control the situation. At 
6:00 pm, Vice President Hu Jintao, in a highly balanced address to the nation on 
TV, was the first Chinese official to make a public response to the bombing.2 A 
few excerpts will show how the Chinese Vice President combined a strong 
condemnation of the bombing and a basic sympathy with the demonstrators’ 
cause with a call not to overreact, but proceed in accordance with the law, 
support the government and uphold the policy of reform and openness to the 
world as well as protecting foreigners in China. Hu declared: 
 
“people across the country have held forums and gatherings, and issued letters 
or telegrams of protest to voice their support to the solemn statement of the 
                                                          
2  According to Nathan and Gilley (2003: 83 and 195) this was the only time Vice President 
Hu substituted for President Jiang who had invested heavily in the improvement of 
China’s relations with the United States and did not want to denounce Washington 
publicly. See also Gries 2004: 131-32. A study “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese 
General Secretary” (Ewing, 2003: 28) mentions that Hu’s televised appearance was the 
first time most Chinese had ever heard him speak. 
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Chinese Government and to condemn the barbaric acts of the U.S.-led 
NATO. … All those activities have reflected their strong indignation at U.S.-
led NATO's attack on the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia and the keen 
patriotism of the Chinese people. The Chinese government firmly supports 
and protects, in accordance with the law, all legal protest activities. We 
believe that the broad masses will, proceeding from the fundamental interests 
of the nation and taking the overall situation into account, carry out the 
activities in good order and in accordance with law. We must prevent 
overreaction, and ensure social stability by guarding against some people 
making use of the opportunities to disrupt the normal public order. … We will 
uphold the policy of reform and opening to the outside world. We will 
protect, in accordance with relevant international laws and norms of 
international relations as well as relevant laws of China, foreign diplomatic 
organs and personnel, foreign nationals in China and those who have come to 
China to engage in trade, economic, educational and cultural undertakings, 
and reflect the civilization and fine traditions of the Chinese nation”.  
 
(Hu JinTao’s televised speech, May 9, 1999) 
 
Altogether, the speech was a remarkably judicious mix of extending government 
support to the protestors’ patriotism, and restraint by warning against extreme 
behavior (Ewing, 2003: 28-9). It demonstrated an awareness of the very delicate 
situation with the urgent need to handle divergent policy goals in an 
authoritarian system with state-controlled media. Considering that the policy of 
reform and opening to the outside world was and has been clearly maintained 
since, it is a central conclusion that the Chinese government’s manifested 
support for patriotic and nationalist feelings of the Chinese people after the 
bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy did not lead to a nationalist foreign 
policy (Shen, 2004: 129). 
 
The government in charge 
On the third day of large demonstrations, May 10, the protests differed markedly 
from those that exploded in anger during the first days when students 
dominated. Now protesters came from all walks of life and had to show proof of 
having secured permission to demonstrate from the Public Security Bureau. In 
this stage, the demonstrations were more organized into groups, given a 
designated route of marching as well as a schedule for completion of their 
protest and they were provided with bullhorns and a list of government–
approved slogans. But although the protests were choreographed by the 
authorities, the emotions – underscored by placards saying “Clinton is a Nazi” 
or “Kill Americans” - clearly were genuine. The following day, May 11, the 
number of protesters dwindled sharply and a day later the demonstrations were 
over (Pomfret, May 11, 1999; Suettinger, 2003: 372). The media continued to 
evoke nationalistic sentiments. On May 10, The People’s Daily, the official 
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publication of the CCP, had a front-page editorial titled “China will not be 
bullied”, which stated that if “people think they can use arms to scare Chinese, 
they have made a big mistake”. On May 11, the Chinese media began to disclose 
the apologies of high-level members of the Clinton administration which had 
been stated since May 8, cf. below (Pomfret, May 11, 1999; Wu, 2007-08: 63). 
  
The change in the Chinese media’s presentations was evidently caused by a 
concern in the Chinese government that the situation might escalate to a point 
where both domestic stability and a cooperative relationship with the United 
States would be seriously endangered. On May 11, President Jiang stated that 
life in China should now return to normal. The Chinese people had expressed 
their strong indignation and patriotism and now the whole country is determined 
to “work harder, so as to develop the national economy continuously, enhance 
national strength, and fight back with concrete deeds against the barbaric act of 
U.S.-led NATO” (Zhao, 2004: 80-1). In the same way, the government’s back-
to-normal line and the fact that it now seemed to be in charge of the Chinese 
responses was reflected in President Jiang’s speech at the reception held in 
honor of the staff of the bombed embassy on May 13 where the Chinese 
President emphasized the role of the government as defender of China’s dignity 
against foreign abuses, the government’ support for the popular protests, the 
necessity to restrict them to certain limits and the continuance of the policy of 
opening to the outside world (Esteban, 2006: 201). 
 
A specific point worth noting is that the Chinese leadership apparently decided 
to shift references to the CCP to the back seat during the bombing crisis. Usually 
the CCP is mentioned before country, nation or people. The CCP was clearly not 
absent from official manifestations, but it seems that the leadership used the 
opportunity to harness the people’s nationalistic fervour to supporting the 
government’s policy and the ruling regime (Hillman, 2004: 69 and 82). This 
meant that the bombing incident had the effect of consolidating the CCP’s hold 
on the Chinese society and a stronger government control with demands for 
democracy: when nationalism arises, popular demands for democracy decrease 
(Wong & Yongnian, 2000: 342-43). 
 
 
American responses 
Important aspects of American responses to the bombing and its aftermath can 
be reviewed in two parts: first, initial concerns in the Clinton administration and 
other parts of the American political system as the Congress and the media; 
second, the administration’s endeavours to convey the results of its investigation 
of the bombing to Chinese officials when a delegation visited Beijing in mid-
June. 
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Initial concerns  
The news of the embassy bombing in Belgrade reached Washington at a time 
when the Clinton administration was completely consumed by the diplomatic 
and military efforts of the Kosovo campaign. The leadership in Washington had 
for some time been heavily Balkan-focused, and for it the bombing and its 
repercussions in China was a complicating and tiresome issue at a highly 
unwelcome time. Therefore the most important preoccupation initially at the 
highest levels of the US government was not to lose momentum and 
international support for the bombing of Serbia to curb Serb atrocities in Kosovo 
rather than mending Chinese-American relations (Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 
335f.). Thus China experts in the Administration were not involved in the initial 
White House meetings after the bombing, indicating that Administration policy 
makers underestimated how intensely China would respond to the bombing, but 
an interagency working group also including China experts was formed at a later 
point in the crisis (Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 337; Shirk, 2007: 21-18). 
However, for different reasons various parts of the Administration were 
reluctant to share much information about the bombing in the high-level crisis 
management meetings. In the wholly unexpected and confusing situation all 
worked under extreme stress, bent on protecting their own organizational turf. 
The military brass and the intelligence services wanted to protect operational 
secrets and avoid all embarrassing exposures of defective working methods and 
procedures while the President as the supreme commander was occupied by the 
Kosovo campaign and didn’t care enough to order the uniformed military to 
provide the necessary information (Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 336).  
 
A number of official apologies from high-level members of the Administrations 
came through the first days after the bombing. The first came from the 
Ambassador in Beijing, James Sasser, who contacted the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry on the morning of May 8 to apologize for the “terrible mistake” and 
offer condolences. However, as the day wore on with no word from Washington 
(where it was the middle of the night) Chinese anger began to grow over 
Washington’s indifference, and so an initial chance for the United States to 
downgrade the crisis was missed (Suettinger, 2003: 370; Wu, 2006: 358). The 
second apology came the same evening when Defense Secretary Cohen and CIA 
Director Tenet issued a joint statement in which they deeply regretted the loss of 
life and injuries from the erroneous bombing. Faulty information led to the 
mistaken targeting, but they added that there was no such thing as risk free 
military operations. Secretary Cohen ended the press release by stating that 
NATO was determined to continue to strike military and related targets until 
Milosevic stopped the killing in Kosovo (Cohen and Tenet, May 8, 1999). 
President Clinton sent a letter to President Jiang Zemin on May 9, expressing 
“apologies and sincere condolences for the pain and casualties brought about by 
the bombing”. Talking about Kosovo to reporters, he emphasized that it was 
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important to draw a distinction: while the embassy bombing was an “isolated 
tragic event”, the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo was a “deliberate and systematic 
crime”. The following day he offered a personal, public apology to China: “I 
apologize, I regret this” the president said at the opening of a conference in 
Washington. (“Clinton apologizes … CNN.com., May 10, 1999; Campbell and 
Weitz, 2006: 338). Secretary Albright expressed “profound sorrow at the loss of 
life and injuries. … The people of China should know that NATO leaders, 
including President Clinton, have apologized for this tragic error”, and she 
added that NATO would provide China with a full explanation of how this could 
have occurred (Pomfret, May 11, 1999). The Secretary also carried a letter of 
apology to the Chinese embassy in Washington which emphasized the contrast 
between the accidental fall of bombs on China’s embassy in Belgrade and 
Milosevic’s crimes in Kosovo. Besides, the American embassy and consulates in 
China, as well as other Western countries in China, lowered their flags to half-
mast for condolences (Wu, 2006: 352). 
 
On May 14, President Clinton telephoned President Jiang, apologizing again for 
the bombing and telling Jiang that the US would conduct a thorough 
investigation into the incident and report the findings to the Chinese side. 
President Jiang had for some days refused to accept a phone call from President 
Clinton about the bombing, and the Clinton-Jiang talk after six days marked a 
mitigation of the tension between the two countries (Wu, 2007-8: 65). 
 
It was evident that the Chinese government considered the American apologies 
and explanations wholly inadequate and insensitive – quite apart from the 
demonstrators’ views. For mainstream American media, however, the Chinese 
responses to what everybody agreed was an accident came as a shock, and the 
huge public demonstrations were quickly portrayed as expressing the Chinese 
government’s manipulations. It was highly difficult to accept that people in 
China were genuinely angry with America, and so the predominant 
interpretation in American media and in Congress was that the outbursts of 
nationalism in Beijing were simply a result of a dictatorship’s propaganda and 
manipulation of public feelings in order to force US concessions on other issues, 
especially as to China’s membership of WTO which was the ongoing issue in 
the spring 1999. Many in the Congress with its Republican majority – who for 
years had criticized the Clinton administration for being soft and weak - were 
infuriated by the Chinese reaction to the bombing and particularly the riots 
outside the American embassy, and they blamed it on both the manipulations by 
the Chinese government and the weak American president. Actually, members 
of the administration had to reassure Congress that the administration would not 
yield to Chinese pressure (Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 340; Gries, 2004: 18-21).  
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US Delegation in Beijing 
The Clinton-administration ordered an investigation of all aspects of the 
decision-making process leading to the bombing. The investigation was layered 
with secrecy and many details and conclusions as to the faulty targeting remain 
classified (Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 339-40). In mid-June, after the Chinese 
had delayed the trip for three weeks, explaining that “public opinion” was still 
too inflamed, a report on the results of the investigation was presented to the 
Chinese government by a delegation led by President Clinton’s Personal Envoy 
and Under Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering. The delegation included 
representatives from the White House, the intelligence community, the 
Department of State, and the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Appointing the members of the delegation became a part of the bureaucratic 
politics of the whole bombing-affair in the American capital as the Defense 
Department declined to have a uniformed military officer in the delegation and 
provided only grudging cooperation and was very much opposed to sending a 
delegation (Suettinger, 2003: 374-5).  
 
The main conclusion of the report was that multiple factors and errors in several 
parts of the US government were responsible for the bombing. The errors 
included a CIA employee using a flawed technique to locate the Yugoslav 
military agency the US intended to strike, the military checking and double-
checking the target with outdated databases and not as independent of one 
another as they were supposed to be. The result was that a building assumed to 
house the Serbian Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement actually 
housed China’s embassy (Cambell and Weitz, 2006: 327 and 339-40; Shirk, 
2007: 218). The Chinese side pointed out that the explanations were anything 
but convincing and by no means acceptable to the Chinese government and 
people. It demanded that the US should make prompt, adequate and effective 
compensations for the Chinese loss of lives, injuries and loss of property. The 
day after Under Secretary Pickering’s presentation to Chinese officials Renmin 
Ribao (People’s Daily) published a lengthy refutation of the presentation. In 
connection with this it is interesting to note that the visit by the US delegation 
was not covered by the leading Chinese press until the Americans had departed 
from China. The Chinese government had instructed the concerned ministries to 
keep information on the visit confidential to prevent further complications from 
a public dissatisfied with the results of the investigation (Wu, 2006: 367-8). 
 
 
Conclusions  
China and the United States never came to an agreement on what actually 
happened in the American decision-making system and military bureaucracy 
before the two Air Force B-2 bombers launched their cruise missiles over 
Belgrade late on May 7, 1999. Most Chinese probably still believe that the 
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United States deliberately attacked their embassy. They can only guess about the 
reasons, but they are sure that these were nefarious. Some Western reporters 
share these suspicions (Gries, 2004: 171-72; Suettinger, 2003: 376). It is not the 
purpose of this paper to unravel the mystery and unanswered questions persist.3 
The purpose has been to elucidate and explain Chinese and American responses 
after the bombing and the other country’s first responses. The results of the 
study can be summarized in six points, the first focusing on the interplay 
between critical features of the two political systems and their ideational 
predispositions while the last five focus on important characteristics of Chinese 
and American responses: 
 
1. The initial neglect of China’s government-controlled media to report the 
Clinton administration’s apologies strengthened a traditional American 
inclination to interpret all social movements in non-democratic societies 
which strongly criticize the United States as manipulated by the 
government. 
2. The demonstrations in China involved a complex interplay of bottom-up 
‘social movement’ and top-down ‘statism’ characteristics. However, there 
was an evident change from the first- to the second-mentioned during the 
crisis. 
3. The Chinese leadership did not anticipate the scale and intensity of the 
public demonstrations and became concerned that they might get out of 
control – just as the administration in Washington and the American 
embassy personnel in Beijing.  
4. As the bombing triggered a strong outburst of Chinese nationalism, it 
consolidated CCP’s hold on the Chinese society and weakened popular 
demands for individual and democratic rights (Wong and Yongnian, 
2000. 342-43). 
5. The Clinton administration’s preoccupation with the campaign against 
Yugoslavia and the impact on its ability to understand and respond to the 
bombing crisis demonstrates that a superpower has a limited span of 
attention in crisis situations. 
6. American media and politicians did not realize the important bottom-up 
characteristics of Chinese demonstrations during the first days and only 
                                                          
3  To the author of this paper, the official American explanation as presented to Chinese 
officials at June 17, 1999, cf. above, at some points seems implausible. However, all other 
explanations – including a conspiracy by “rogue elements” in the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) or the Defence Department – are fare more implausible. Such activities 
would be rather impossible to carry out or cover up in an open American political system 
full of leaks and independent actors with their own agenda, cf. particularly Suettinger, 
2003: 376. Indeed, simple bureaucratic confusion or human muddle sometimes account 
for terrible mistakes and tragedies in military operations despite all kinds of magnificent 
pinpoint technology, cf. Campbell and Weitz, 2006: 338-39.  
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perceived a top-down, party propaganda spin of the protests as simply 
‘stirred up’ by the Chinese leadership. 
 
One consequence of these findings is that Western countries, hoping for and 
demanding greater respect for democratic values and norms in China, could be 
disappointed when realizing that a Chinese government, facing the citizens’ 
growing ability to organise and express themselves, may become more unable to 
contain damaging outbursts of public anger against Western policies and 
interests in China. The issue of popular movements is very sensitive in Chinese 
politics and Western observers should understand that this issue is never simply 
a matter of calling for China to become ‘like us’. Even if it is realized that 
Chinese nationalism is also shaped by the interplay with other countries’ 
policies, there is no guarantee that a policy of engagement with China will 
necessarily make China more responsive to Western values, norms or policies.  
 
In the first years of the 21st century both the American superpower and the rising 
China face serious challenges which may make some of these knots more 
difficult to face. The heavy problems of the American-led invasion in Iraq have 
certainly diminished a disposition that the United States will use its military 
power in other conflict areas for defending and promoting what it considers its 
vital interests. Also, some of the measures used in the war against terrorism 
(torture, Guantánamo, secret CIA-prisons) have diminished the standing and 
influence of the United States. However, American military power and political 
influence in world politics is still second to none, and an American imperial 
overstretch may by followed by American retractions which allies and friends 
may view as dangerous to some regional stability. As to China, it is confronted 
with a cocktail of domestic problems (corruption, weak institutions, increasing 
gap between rich and poor people, and serious environmental problems) that 
may diminish the ability of China to wield greater influence in foreign policy. 
Moreover, Chinese authorities’ secretiveness as to sensitive issues like prison 
camps, political dissidents or police abuse may continue to harm China’s 
reputation. Also China’s behaviour in relation to Tibet, not least the censorship 
on news from Tibet, may severely damage China’s international standing and 
have repercussions which are difficult to control for the Chinese leadership. Yet, 
the rise of China is still one of the seminal developments in the early 21st 
century. 
 
The findings in this paper should be supplemented by a study of the crisis in 
April 2001 when there was a midair collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a 
US Navy surveillance plane over the South China Sea. The Chinese pilot was 
killed in the collision, China held the twenty-four American crew members on 
Hainan Island for eleven days and the incident triggered another crisis between 
China and the United States.  
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“Washington Consensus” 
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Abstract 
In this paper I try to assess China’s reforms after 1978 and to categorize the 
results. After giving a short overview of the main reform steps, I introduce a 
model by János Kornai in which he identified the major system-specific 
attributes of a socialist and a capitalist system. Measured along these criteria, 
China has done a full-fledged transition to capitalism. I see this as a vindication 
of the proposition that a mixture of the systems, a state in between capitalism 
and socialism is not stable. If not politically driven back to socialism, the system 
will develop to full capitalism. Capitalism is, however, a very broad category; 
also e.g. the Nordic welfare states are capitalist in this definition. We should 
therefore restrict the use of the term “neo-liberal” to policies within capitalism 
and distinguish it sharply from policies of transition towards capitalism because 
these policies can as well lead to social democratic welfare states as to models 
with a low ambition as to redistribution and social security. 
 
Thereafter I discuss the 10 policy recommendations, which John Williamson 
presented under the heading of “Washington Consensus” which in his view has 
united the economists and policy makers at the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Williamson’s points have often been grossly 
misinterpreted. Nothing in them implies, for instance, a destruction of welfare-
state arrangements. Instead, they can be seen as containing a set of policies away 
from mixed systems, in the above-mentioned definition, to capitalism, without 
specifying to which type of capitalism. A closer look at the Chinese reform 
process under the perspective of Williamson’s list shows an almost complete 
adherence of China’s leaders to the Washington Consensus. Only the 
recommendation of directing more public spending to primary health care has 
not (yet?) been followed. 
 
China has become a very open economy with import and export shares above 30 
percent. If measured along this yardstick, China is the most open economy 
among the five biggest countries in the world, much more open than e.g. the 
United States. This openness has made China very dependent of the outer world, 
and very much interested in stability and cooperation. The Chinese transition has 
therefore not only produced strong growth and the fastest process of poverty 
reduction ever seen so far, it has also made peace more secure. 
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Introduction: The main questions addressed in this paper 
China’s astounding record of economic growth and poverty alleviation after 
1978 has provoked a vast academic debate all-over the world. Numerous 
questions have been discussed. In this paper I want to concentrate on a restricted 
set of problems.  
 
After giving a short overview over the reform process since 1978, I want to 
explore what the main characteristics of the new society are? Has it been a 
transition to a capitalist system, or is it a kind of reformed socialism, or is it a 
“Third Way” to something beyond the capitalism- socialism dichotomy? 
Assessing whether China is a capitalist, a socialist or a “Third-Way” country 
depends, of course, on the criteria by which you measure this. In my opinion, 
János Kornai has developed a very useful typology which I will apply to the 
Chinese case. In this perspective China has made a full transition to a capitalist 
system. 
 
The Chinese experiences vindicate the theorem that a state “in between” 
capitalism and socialism will not be stable. Given the functional 
interdependence between the various elements of the systems, a hybrid state 
which mixes elements of the two systems cannot produce growth over a longer 
period. Normally, systems “in between” tend to move towards capitalism. China 
has done so rather consistently.  
  
In the second part I analyze Chinese reform policies, using John Williamson’s 
ten points of the “Washington Consensus”. China has implemented them almost 
completely. Williamson’s list has often been misunderstood as containing an 
attack of welfare-state arrangements or social policy. Instead, it should be seen 
as a set of recommendations which bring a country out of a state in between 
socialism and capitalism. They do not indicate a specific type of capitalism and 
are completely compatible with e.g. Nordic welfare states. Much confusion can 
be avoided by distinguishing between transition policies towards a capitalist 
system and policy controversies within capitalist systems, and applying terms 
such as “neoliberal” only to the latter. 
  
After 1978 China has experienced rapid growth and the fastest progress at 
poverty reduction ever seen. But substantial problems such as rising inequality 
and ecological damages remain to be solved. An aspect perhaps sometimes 
overlooked: By becoming a very open economy, China has also become deeply 
dependent on the outer world, with a strong interest in stability and cooperation. 
China’s transition has therefore also made world peace more secure  
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China’s Transition: A short overview 
In the late 1970s, China laid largely waste after the convulsions of the Cultural 
Revolution, in an economic and a mental sense. Maoist ideology was profoundly 
discredited, and economic processes were in disarray, at low stagnant or even 
falling levels of standards of living or technical sophistication. At the same time, 
the neighboring countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore 
could register double-digit growth rates, “exposing China as a stunning 
economic disaster” (Åslund 1989, 189). The necessity of reform was perhaps all 
too obvious, but so was also the point where to start: About three quarters of the 
workforce were engaged in agriculture which in turn was mainly organized in 
large people’s communes, characterized by inefficiency and a de-motivated 
work force. Food availability was declining, the problem made itself felt in the 
relatively privileged cities, “something had to be done to raise farm output” 
(Ravallion 2008, 13). There were widespread demands to parcel out land, and 
accepting them and dissolving the people’s communes, the government could 
buttress its legitimacy and boost agricultural productivity. 
  
The communes became replaced by a ‘Household Responsibility System’, under 
which the land was formally leased to the peasants, in the beginning for 15 
years. They had to sell a quota of produce at fixed prices to state agencies, but 
could freely dispose of the production above the quota and sell it on private 
markets (dual track system). Under this system the peasants were “without 
formally private ownership of land, but practically close to such ownership” 
(Brus 1993, 7). We will return to this problem. Private ownership was 
sufficiently established to create completely new incentive structures. The 
peasants benefitted directly from higher production, and this implied a 
substantial boost to productivity. From this largely de-facto private family 
agriculture the government could continue reform by extending it by allowing 
private handicraft, small-scale rural industry and trading. A huge system of 
“simple commodity production” (to put it in Marxist terms)  could be installed 
within a short span of time. Wage labor employed by private enterprises played 
a minor role in the beginning. But it spread soon.  
  
The early reforms profoundly transformed work and life of hundreds of millions 
of people within a few years. The dissolution of the people’s communes 
essentially took place 1979-19981, and in 1983 they were formally abolished. 
“When the communes were dismantled, nearly three-forth of the Chinese 
workers found themselves outside the socialized economy and subject to hard 
budget constraints with little social protection” (Sachs and Woo 1994, 104). As 
Stanley Fischer once commented, “the Chinese agricultural reforms were truly 
shock therapy” (Fischer 1994, 134). When the government allowed local 
governments to establish rural industries outside central planning, a non-state 
sector outside agriculture could develop, in the beginning mainly in small towns. 
76 
So-called TVE, town and village enterprises, existed before, but under the new 
conditions they could expand substantially. Increasingly non-state firms spread 
also to the bigger towns. Many of these new companies were individually 
owned, others were driven collectively, while still others had the state as co-
owner. Consequently, many of them were not strictly private. But they behaved 
predominantly like private business, under hard budget constraints. This 
development can be seen as a huge process of “privatization from below” (Brus 
1993, 7). 
  
The new companies had good growth conditions in so far as there was a huge 
pool of “surplus labor” in the countryside, i.e. people who perhaps were engaged 
somehow in agricultural production, but whose participation was not strictly 
necessary (“hidden unemployment”), living at subsistence level. Prior to the 
reforms, restrictions on migration and bans on starting non-agricultural 
production condemned that to staying in poverty. When these restrictions 
became loosened, hundreds of millions of people could move and work in the 
new companies, at wage levels which were low by Western standards, but much 
higher when compared with the living conditions in the country side (Sachs and 
Woo 1994, 106). The existence of this huge reserve of labor force was a 
necessary, though in itself  not sufficient condition for China’s impressive 
growth rates. In the countries of the Soviet orbit, heavily industrialized and 
urbanized as they were, this condition was not in place. In e.g. Russia the share 
of the agrarian population was only 14 percent in 1985. 
  
The industrial state sector remained “intact” for many years. But in contrast to 
the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, it was never very important in 
quantitative terms. By 1978 only about 15 percent of the work force was 
engaged in industry, and only half of them in state-owned enterprises. And 
whereas Soviet planners tried to command the production of 25 million 
commodities, only 1,200 entered Chinese central planning (Sachs and Woo 
1994, 105 and 110). 
  
In 1984 the Chinese government extended the dual-track system from 
agriculture to the industrial sector: State-owned companies could sell the 
production above a quota of obligatory delivery on private markets. But whereas 
the dual-track system in agriculture meant a significant improvement, it did not 
do so in industry. In 1992 it became abolished. 
  
Most state-owned industrial companies have been a severe burden to the 
Chinese economy over the whole period. According to Gao Shogquan, the then 
Deputy Director of the State System Reform Committee of the central 
government, in the early 1990s one-third of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
were loosing money in an overt fashion and one thirds covered them by opaque 
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accounting (Sachs and Woo 1994, 118n15). Ten years later the situation had not 
improved (Economist 2000, 94). And given the point that about 80 percent of 
the bank loans were given to state-owned companies, their non-profitability 
implied a great burden on the banking system (Economist 2001, 75). Still today, 
non-performing loans to state-owned enterprises  are a heavy problem (see 
below). At any rate, it was decidedly not the state-owned sector which made 
China’s economy expand rapidly, it was the non-state sector whose space the 
government stepwise enlarged. 
  
Until today the heavy losses of the state-owned companies, to be covered by 
direct government support, by price subsidies or by non-performing loans by 
state-owned banks, implied a heavy drain on public finances, of approximately 
as high 8 per cent of GDP by the early 1990s. But the Chinese government has 
been able to keep overall deficits under control and, crucially, inflation at rather 
low levels. Chinese saving rates have been high and in the form of bank deposits 
because savers kept trust in the banking system and earned positive interest rates 
almost without interruption (Sachs and Woo 1994, 127-9). Also foreign 
indebtedness has been moderate. This basically prudent fiscal and monetary 
policy constituted a major difference to the Soviet Union, where deficits and 
foreign debts ballooned, and where inflation could reach levels of 2,800 percent 
(Russia) or even 10,000 percent (Ukraine).  
  
The reforms meant also a substantial decentralization of economic power and 
responsibility. The budgets of provincial and local administrations became very 
much dependent upon the profitability of their companies (Brus 1993, 8). 
Decentralization made them interested in abolishing many restrictions and 
regulations, so that they, for instance, could attract new capital, not the least 
foreign. But they did not necessarily become advocates of fair competition – 
which could endanger their companies. 
  
The internal reforms were accompanied by a stepwise but increasingly bolder 
opening to the outer world. Initially only in a special economic zones (SEZs), 
but then gradually extended, international trade and investment became 
liberalized. Foreign investors brought capital and technology to these free-trade 
zones and at low wages employed Chinese workers, who moved there from the 
country side. Within a few years an export boom began, initially based on labor-
intensive products such as garments, textiles, footwear, toys or electronics, 
designed and pre-fabricated elsewhere but assembled there. From 1980 to 2000 
exports of manufactured products jumped from a few billion dollars up to more 
than 200 billion dollars (Sachs 2005, 161). Today Chinese exports have become 
varied and much more sophisticated. 
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The opening of the economy meant that Chinese companies could buy cheaper 
inputs and they gained access to much wider and more profitable markets. And 
least not least, opening the economy meant also reducing monopolistic 
structures because it implied more competition. In 2001 China became member 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has since then liberalized foreign 
trade in a consistent manner, e.g. by reducing tariffs, abolishing import quotas 
and simplifying licensing procedures. Also the financial sector became partially 
opened for foreign investment (Bertelsmann 2008, 12). 
  
A necessary complement to the opening for trade and foreign direct investment 
was the reformation of currency policy. Prior to 1978 foreign exchange was part 
of central planning and steered by the state. In 1981 a dual exchange rate was 
introduced, a general one and another one for specific transactions, both rates 
being set by the authorities. Four years later the system changed anew, besides 
one official exchange rate the authorities introduced a second one, to be 
determined by the supply and demand for foreign currency from importing and 
exporting companies. In the beginning of the 1990s about 80 percent of all 
foreign-currency transactions were done at this market-determined rate.  
  
In 1994 China introduced a unified exchange rate, in principle to be established 
by market forces, but subject to interventions by the People’s Bank of China 
(“managed floating”). De-facto, however, the Chinese authorities pegged the 
renminbi to the US-dollar. The massive Chinese export-surpluses in relation to 
the USA created a systematic upwards pressure on the renminbi, which the 
central bank neutralized by large-scale buying of dollars (Herr 2008, 27f). In 
2005 the authorities pegged the renminbi to a basket of currencies and revalued 
it by 2.1 percent to the dollar. This upward trend continued, by 7 percent in 2007 
and by 4.5 percent in the first three month of 2008 (Hadas 2008). 
  
Some restrictions to international transactions are still in place, for instance 
when it comes to portfolio investments. Foreign investors are allowed only to 
hold minority stakes in Chinese banks.  Nevertheless, all in all today China 
belongs to the countries which are most integrated into the world economy. 
Imports and exports are each at levels of over 30 percent of GNI (see below 
table 3), record-high for a large country. This has created huge benefits, but also 
mutual dependencies. China and the ASEAN countries seem strongly committed 
to establish a free-trade zone by 2010, and also with the old rival India 
negotiations with such an aim are planned (Bertelsmann 2008, 22). 
  
All in all, the Chinese economic development has been impressing indeed. 
According to the official figures, from 1978 to 2005 real GNI rose by 9.6 
percent on average per year, or 8.5 percent per capita (Herr 2008, 27). These 
figures might overstate the progress somewhat, due, for instance, to heavy 
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ecological degradation. According to estimates by the World Bank, just the 
health costs of air and water pollution amount to 4.3 percent GDP (World Bank 
2008 a, 4). Furthermore, new and higher estimates of the Chinese price level led 
to a substantial recalculation of China’s GDP in Purchase-Power Parities, 
making the Chinese economy shrink by 40 percent. For the same reason, the 
World Bank also revised upwards its calculations of the extent of poverty, 
measured along a one-dollar standard.1 The estimates, old and new 
methodology, are as follows: 
 
Table 1: Estimates of poverty rates in China based on different poverty lines 
 
 1981 1990 2004 2007 
Poverty line based 
on costs of basic 
needs 
64 % 33% 10% 7% 
Poverty line of  
$ 1, using new PPPs 
71-77%  13-17%  
 
Source: World Bank 2008 b, 22. 
 
However, as the World Bank explains, “the choice of the PPP conversion factor 
does not change the conclusion that China has had the largest and fastest poverty 
reduction in history” (World Bank 2008 b, 22). 
  
We should perhaps conclude this section by pointing at the fact that the Chinese 
reform process has been steered internally. No foreign government could dictate 
anything to China. And never in this period, due to its prudent fiscal and 
monetary policy, did the country become dependent on foreign creditors; the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) had no opportunity to design a Structural 
Adjustment Program.  
  
And as all sources agree upon, the Chinese reformers from Deng Xiaoping 
onwards, did not have a master plan for reform. Maoism was profoundly 
discredited, Deng and many other reformers  were actually personal victims of 
the so-called Cultural Revolution, but there was no positive theory at hand to 
replace the old one. Chinese leaders looked for pragmatic solutions, 
experimenting on smaller scales before formulating general policies. Their 
often-quoted mottoes were “keeping in touch with the stones when wading 
through the ford”, or “the color of the cat is not important as long as it catches 
mice”, and the like. 
                                                          
1  The World Bank endeavored to estimate for most countries what was needed in order to 
provide 2100 calories and other basic necessities for a person day. In the case of the China 
this was almost exactly one US-dollar at purchase-power parities, the standard measure 
used by the World Bank in international comparisons. However, the Chinese price level 
was presumably calculated too low. This means, the purchase power has to be 
recalculated, the effect of which is that it is harder for Chinese to have the equivalent of 
one dollar a day (World Bank 2008 a, 1f).  
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Nevertheless, taking review of the thirty years after 1978, the process seems to 
have been of a remarkable sense of direction. I adhere to the hypothesis that 
exactly a pragmatic, non-ideological policy, which adapts to functional 
necessities, produces such an outcome. By “functional necessities” I mean 
measures which have to be taken, if a leadership is serious about economic 
growth. Certainly, a leadership may decide not to take them, for instance, if it 
assigns a higher importance to ideological concepts or tactical considerations. 
But the Chinese leadership was ready to drop ideological constraints and was 
serious about economic growth. We will return to this point. 
 
 
Capitalist and Socialist Systems: Kornai’s model 
The first problem we wanted to address is the question whether China’s system 
is still socialist, whether it has become capitalist or whether it is on some sort of 
“Third Way”. Such a question presupposes that we have criteria to assess the 
quality of a system. In this context I have found a model proposed by János 
Kornai to be very useful. The Hungarian Kornai, Budapest University and later 
also Harvard, has presumably been the scholar who has shaped the thinking 
among economists most when it comes to understanding the working 
mechanisms of socialist systems.  
  
In his view, “[t]wo systems can be said to have dominated the 20th century: the 
capitalist and the socialist system” (Kornai 2000, 27). As he points out, 
“system” is used here as a “comprehensive and aggregate concept”, and there 
have been “specific historical manifestations of various kinds” (Kornai 2000, 
28). However, the conceptual frame of thinking in terms of two overall-systems 
is admissible if the following three statements can be substantiated: 
 
1. The varieties of capitalism share some common characteristics so that they 
can be interpreted as variations of one system. Likewise the varieties of 
socialism have shared common attributes. These common characteristics 
Kornai called “system-specific attributes”.  
 
2. These system-specific attributes have been sufficiently important to influence 
the social realities in the countries in question deeply. 
 
3. They provide also the essential criteria for distinguishing the two systems. 
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The basic system-specific attributes are summarized in table 2: 
 
 
Table 2: The System-Specific Attributes of the Capitalist and Socialist Systems. 
 
SOCIALIST SYSTEM: CAPITALIST SYSTEM 
Undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist party Political power friendly to private property and the 
market  
Dominant position of state and quasi-state ownership Dominant position of private property 
Preponderance of bureaucratic coordination Preponderance of market coordination 
Soft budget constraint; weak responsiveness to 
prices; plan bargaining; quantity drive 
Hard budget constraint; strong responsiveness to 
prices 
Chronic shortage economy; sellers’ market; labor 
shortage; unemployment on the job 
No chronic shortage; buyers’ market; chronic 
unemployment; fluctuations in the business cycle 
 
Source: Kornai, 2000, p. 29. 
 
In Kornai’s view, the first three rows contain the fundamental features of each 
system; rows 4 and 5 are consequences, once the first three points are in place. 
  
The first and foremost distinguishing feature is in the political sphere: In the 
Socialist system the Marxist-Leninist party holds power without constitutional 
restraints, whereas capitalist countries are steered by governments which are 
friendly to private property, free enterprise and freedom of contract. 
Historically, capitalism has been compatible with both democracy and 
authoritarian or even totalitarian rule. The essential point is that the authorities 
refrain from mass confiscation or undermine private property in other ways. 
  
Row number two highlights the relative extent of private property and of state 
ownership. In a capitalist system private property is dominant. We might specify 
Kornai’s wording and underline: Ownership of the means of production. It was 
not the abolishment of ownership as such which has characterized socialist 
designs and socialist ideology, but specifically the ownership of the means of 
production. It is also exactly ownership in this sphere which triggers a lot of 
consequences. The type of ownership does not have to be in place to hundred 
percent. There were socialist countries where private property could have a 
substantial role in some segments, for instance in Polish agriculture. But the 
dominant type was also in Poland state ownership.  
  
The third row refers to the way in which economic activities become 
coordinated, through market processes or by bureaucratic coordination. 
“Bureaucratic” is to be understood in the sense of Max Weber, a bureaucracy 
being a specialized institution with the task of steering social processes. Again 
market or bureaucratic coordination does not have to have an absolute position. 
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Also in socialist countries markets could exist in some spheres. The essential 
point is whether bureaucratic steering is preponderant, or whether market 
processes are.  
  
The features pointed out in row number four and five “refer to regularities and 
lasting economic phenomena that are system-specific” (Kornai 2000, 30). Of 
utmost importance for the economic behavior has been the type of budget 
constraint. Under capitalism, budget constraints are “hard”. As a rule, companies 
have to balance expanses and receipts, otherwise they go bankrupt. It has 
happened that the state has subsidized companies and thereby made their budget 
constraints comparatively soft, but these have been exceptions to the over-all 
picture. However, in socialist systems the state-owned companies have worked 
systematically under soft budget constraints. Monetary flows have been of 
minor importance, instead companies have been directed at maximize 
production in physical terms (“quantity drive”). This has meant that production 
became extended to a point where it hit a physical constraint, for instance where 
it was not possible to procure more raw material, or energy, or man power. 
Given the low importance of monetary aggregates, companies could continue 
working in the same way for a long time; they did not have to respond to 
changing prices in their environment. Most prices were arbitrary, which implied 
that there was no proper instrument to calculate the profitability of investment 
decisions which instead came about by plan bargaining of ruling elites behind 
the scenes.  
  
Because every unit was permanently short of something; shortage became a 
pervasive characteristic of the system. This implied also that those who had 
something to offer outside the official distribution system where in a strong 
position, for those it was a sellers’ market. Under these constellations companies 
had also a strong incentive to employ as many people as possible. Whereas in a 
capitalist system, as a rule, the marginal productivity of a worker must be higher 
than the wage, in a socialist system every worker was welcome if his marginal 
productivity was higher than zero. Besides, the pervasiveness of shortage 
created an incentive to hoard all sort of things, man power as well as inputs. 
This way hoarding exacerbated shortage. This had the, at least at first glance, 
positive consequence that open unemployment became eradicated. Instead there 
was massive hidden unemployment “on the job”.2 
  
                                                          
2  A very instructive case in this sense has been East Germany after 1945. Initially all 
experts feared massive unemployment because industrial capacities were reduced because 
of war damages, whereas the population was much bigger, due to the massive influx of 
refugees and expellees from the former German territories east of Oder and Neisse and 
from the Sudeten. However, after a few years there was no open unemployment any more 
(Zank 1987). 
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In a capitalist system the actors have to behave systematically different. Because 
the companies produce under hard budget constraints, they have to exhibit a 
high responsiveness to price signals, be it on the input side or in the markets for 
their products. The constraint on production is demand, which implies that the 
buyers are in a strong position. Unemployment is a permanent feature of the 
system, and shifting and fluctuating demand creates business cycles.  
  
Kornai’s system-specific  features are comparatively few, but as he has 
convincingly shown in his books The Economics of Shortage and the Socialist 
System, they can indeed explain a multitude of phenomena, which could be 
observed in the socialist system, in spite of the diversities which socialist 
countries exhibited otherwise. In my view, it does indeed make sense to divide 
the economic history of the 20th century into these two systems.  
  
Before we are going to discuss China more concretely, a few words on the 
capitalist system may be appropriate: Also capitalist countries have exhibited 
many differences, suffice perhaps to mention the United States and the 
Scandinavian countries. But they all have had governments which have been 
friendly towards private property, the ownership of the means of production has 
been pre-dominantly private, and the coordination of economic processes has 
happened mainly through markets. Production has been restricted by demand 
constraints, there have been business cycles, and there has always been open 
unemployment. We may add more features which they have in common by now, 
for instance independent central banks or rather open trade regime on the field 
of manufactured products. 
  
However, also the important differences merit attention. The major ones, in my 
view, lie in the welfare-state arrangements, their quantitative extension and their 
types of institutionalization. In Denmark or Sweden, the public sector 
redistributes more than 50 percent of the GDP, inequality, as e.g. measured by 
the Gini-coefficient, has been rather low, around 0.253; the national health care 
systems or the universities provides their services for free for all residents, and 
all retired people receive at least a basic people’s pension, irrespective of 
whether they previously paid any pension contributions. By contrast, in the US 
welfare-state arrangements have been rather restricted, inequality is rather high.
  
As these cases demonstrate, countries with a capitalist system of production can 
have distributional outcomes which exhibit stark differences. We might see this 
as a vindication of John Stuart Mill who emphasized that there is a systematic 
difference between the principles which govern production and those which 
steer distribution. In his view, the “laws and conditions of the Production of 
                                                          
3  More precisely, in Denmark in 1997 0.247 and in Sweden in 2000 0.250 (Human 
Development Report 2007/08, 281). 
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wealth partake of the character of physical truths … The opinions or wishes, 
which may exist on these different matters, do not control the things 
themselves” (Mill 1987[1848], 199). However, this “is not so with the 
Distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution only. The things 
once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like 
… The distribution of wealth … depends on the laws and customs of society” 
(Mill 1987[1848], 200).   
  
There are certainly some limits to the possibility of redistribution in a capitalist 
system. But the space confined by these limits is evidently quite large. And 
while there has been a trend towards increased inequality in the US, in e.g. 
Denmark the Gini-coefficient has remained low. There is thus no unavoidable 
trend towards more inequality in capitalist systems. And rhetoric non-
withstanding, the general trend in OECD countries during the last decades has 
been towards higher levels of public spending, not less. And as again Denmark 
and Sweden show, ambitious welfare schemes are perfectly compatible with 
being an open capitalist economy. All Nordic countries have produced state 
budget surpluses for many years by now (2008). In economically developed 
countries, having an elaborate welfare state or not is essentially a question of 
political will. 
  
Within capitalist systems, we might as ideal types distinguish political forces 
which work for ambitious welfare state schemes, and those who work for lower 
taxes and a smaller role for the public sector. We might call the first policies 
“social democratic” and the second one “neo-liberal”. I put “social democratic” 
in inverted commas because this refers to orientations which can be found at 
more parties than just the Social democrats. 
  
However, we should sharply distinguish between policies inside capitalist 
countries and policies whose aim is the transition from a socialist to a capitalist 
system. This essential distinction gets lost when the term “neo-liberal”, as it 
often happened, becomes attached to transition policies too. But transition might 
as well lead to a social democratic version of capitalism. Supposed the 
leadership in a transition country aims at establishing a Nordic type of welfare 
state capitalism. One of the things to do is the opening of the borders for trade 
and capital flows because open borders are essential elements of the Nordic 
models. Would it make sense to call this “neo-liberal”? Then the distinction 
between social-democratic and liberal policies would evaporate. I therefore 
recommend applying the term “neo-liberal” only to policies inside a capitalist 
system, but not to transition policies. 
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Is a “Third Way” Feasible? 
It has been discussed for a long time whether a system which composes 
elements from both system could be feasible, a system which perhaps combines 
positive aspects from both systems. Kornai (and many others) were of the 
opinion that this is not feasible, “mixed cases tend to return eventually to the 
path of capitalist development” (Kornai 2000, 34). To avoid confusion, “mixed 
cases” are systems which combine the system-specific features in the 
terminology here applied. When many Western economists use the term “mixed 
economy”, with a private sector and a strong state and welfare state 
arrangements, this is again just a variation of capitalism according to Kornai’s 
definitions. Transition countries which move away from a socialist system are 
by definition countries with mixed systems, but only temporarily so because 
mixed systems, in Kornai’s and others’ view, are non-performing hybrids. 
  
The underlying idea of this view is the claim that the major elements of each 
system are mutually interdependent and have to form a consistent package if the 
system is supposed to be stable. More specifically as to the socialist system, 
Kornai spoke of the “affinity of the elements of the socialist system” (Kornai 
1992, 366):  
 
To apply a chemical analogy, the phenomena [of socialist systems, WZ] 
exhibit affinity, they attract and require each other. The monolithic structure 
of power, petrified ideological doctrines, almost total domination of state-
ownership, direct bureaucratic control, forced growth, shortage, and 
distrustful withdrawal from most of the world (to mention just the main 
groups of phenomena) all belong to each other and strengthen each other. 
 
To expand a bit on this line of reasoning: Supposed a government takes the road 
of massive confiscations of the wealthier strata, in order to get means for 
industrialization and/or to gain legitimacy through land reforms and other 
redistribution schemes. Then it destroys the incentives for private investment 
because the trust that the future fruits of investments will accrue to the investors 
is gone. This implies that the state has to replace private investment in general, 
and therefore it needs even more means. Historically it meant in the Soviet 
Union and China, among other things, the collectivization of agriculture, in 
order to give to the state the direct command of the agricultural produce. The 
borders must be strictly guarded in order to prevent capital flight. Also foreign 
trade must be closely regulated because it could otherwise be used for 
transferring wealth. Under those conditions markets become either destroyed 
completely, or they cannot function efficiently because price signals become 
hopelessly distorted. Planning and bureaucratic coordination must become 
increasingly comprehensive. Seen in this perspective, in the Soviet Union the 
move away from the Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Politytika (NEP), a case of 
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mixed system, to a Stalinist command economy was logical. A continuation of 
the NEP would have undermined the Bolshevik regime, economically because 
the government lost increasingly control over economic processes, and 
politically because growing markets brought with them the rise of a new rural 
and urban bourgeoisie. After 1949 Mao did his best to implant a Stalinist system 
in China – with even greater losses of life than under Stalin. 
  
The Stalinist system was stable for decades, albeit not as productive as 
capitalism. From the 1960s onwards various reform strategies became initiated 
in the countries of the Soviet orbit, beginning in the GDR in 1963. Hungary 
embarked on a rather steady reform course after 1968 (Kornai becoming closely 
involved). The Jaruzelski regime in Poland experimented with them in the 
1980s, and finally Gorbachov tried the same. The basic idea was in all cases to 
keep party rule and state property intact, but combining it with market elements, 
for instance by giving more independence to the leaderships of the companies, 
allowing them some buying and selling outside the rigid state distribution 
system. All these various reform efforts had one common result, they were not 
functioning. More independence to the company directors weakened planning, 
but it did not bring the companies under the discipline of the market forces. 
Budget constraints remained soft, the companies did not become more efficient. 
More independence for the directors was often detrimental because it allowed 
them to transfer resources for “spontaneous privatization”, or to put it simply, 
theft. In an influential article Kornai summarized the failure of the Hungarian 
immanent reforms and ended by advocating a transition proper (Kornai 1986). 
  
When communism collapsed in central and eastern Europe, many of the new 
democratic politicians (and most western advisors) advocated a rather rapid 
reform, whereas others preferred a more gradualist approach.4 The gradualists 
could argue, seemingly plausible, that any kind of “Shock Therapy” implies 
heavy social costs. The advocates of rapid reform argued that many reforms 
indeed needed a long time for implementation, but that it did not make sense to 
delay reforms which could be done rather quickly. And furthermore, market 
economies only function properly when a row of conditions are met, reforms 
therefore necessarily must proceed on several fronts at the same time in order to 
create these conditions. Furthermore, some countries such as Poland and the 
Soviet Union, experienced hyperinflation, with inflation rates of several 
thousand percent. This had to be brought under control quickly, otherwise 
markets and prices did not give any meaning; not to mention the horrible social 
consequences of hyperinflation and its concomitant large-scale transfer of 
wealth from the poor to the rich. 
                                                          
4  For an overview over these debates, with extensive reviews of many positions, see Zank, 
2001. 
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Practical policies varied to a high degree. Poland opted for rapid reform, 
whereas e.g. Ukraine hardly moved at all during the first many years. Other 
countries practiced some mix of policies. Russia, for instance, liberalized rather 
fast, but failed dismally at combating hyperinflation, i.e. the very first element of 
“Shock Therapy”. 
  
Jeffrey Sachs, in 1989 an advisor to the Solidarity movement, summarized the 
comprehensive package, which became implemented in Poland on 1 January 
1990, as follows (Sachs 1994, 54): 
 
The basic goal was to move from a situation of extreme shortage and 
hyperinflation to one of supply-demand balance and stable prices. For this 
Poland needed tight macroeconomic policies with the de-control of prices. To 
have a working price system, Poland needed competition. To have 
competition, it needed free international trade to counteract the monopolistic 
industrial structure. To have free trade, it needed not only low tariffs but the 
convertibility of the currency. To have convertibility of the currency at a 
stable exchange rate, it needed monetary discipline and a realistic exchange 
rate. 
 
When it comes to the outcomes, the picture is rather clear: Poland returned to 
growth after only two years, whereas e.g. slowly reforming Ukraine performed 
dismally until the end of the 1990s. In general, the connection between rapid 
reform and following growth is well established (Zank 2001). 
  
All these observations seem to confirm the position that a mix of the system is 
indeed not stable and not well performing. Countries tend to develop to the 
capitalist system, and normatively speaking, a stage in between cannot be 
recommended. 
  
More specifically as to China, also there the dual-track system in industry (as 
opposed  to agriculture) did not produce positive outcomes. This scheme seemed 
to have had quite an appeal to some Western scholars because it allegedly 
allowed for the “achieving of Pareto-improving gains from liberalization” and 
“maintaining past contractual obligations from the plan” (Roland 2000, 340). 
But in spite of such theoretical attractions, in the Soviet Union, introduced in 
1987 under Gorbachov, it did not work (Sachs and Woo, 120). Also in China, 
the institutionalized price differentials between state and market prices created 
one big incentive for profiteering and corruption: “Shrewd individuals” gained 
access to goods at cheap state prices, often by bribing officials, and then sold 
them at prices many times higher (Yan Sun 2005, 258). But also legal 
transactions were heavily distorted. Under the system exporters could buy 
commodities at low planning prices and then export them. Thus oil was a major 
export article until 1986 (Ravallion 2008, 7n19), generating high profits for 
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some individuals and heavy losses for others because the oil had to be re-
imported at high world-market prices – drastic examples of non-functionalities 
created by a system mix. 
  
We now try to assess the Chinese development in a systematic way.  
 
 
Assessing China: Bringing the system-specific attributes of capitalism in 
place 
If we now apply Kornai’s model to the Chinese case, the first question to ask is 
whether political power in China has become friendly to private property or not. 
As he specified (Kornai 2000, 29f): 
 
The minimum required of the political sphere [in a capitalist system, WZ] is 
not active support of private property and the market, but rather that 
authorities refrain from outright hostility. They must not carry out mass 
confiscation or undermine private property in other ways. They cannot 
introduce regulations that seriously, systematically and widely damage the 
economic interests of the property-owning strata. They cannot lastingly 
banish market coordination from most of the economy. Rhetoric does not 
count for much here. (Hitler, for instance, railed against plutocracy.) The 
essential factor is the actual behavior in the political sphere. 
 
The Chinese leadership has indeed changed profoundly in this sphere. The 
establishment of the People’s Republic and Mao Zedong’s rule was 
characterized by mass confiscation and outright hostility towards private 
property. Under Deng, while still adhering to socialist rhetoric, the leadership 
“refrained from outright hostility” and tolerated the spread of private ownership 
and market coordination. And according to amendments to the constitution in 
2004, private property is to be regarded as on par with public property 
(Bertelsmann 2008, 14). New legal requirements have been formulated to give 
private companies in practice equal treatment as state-owned ones. They 
facilitated market access for private companies to areas which previously were 
restricted and also mandated that enterprises should have equal access to capital 
markets, irrespective of their ownership (Bertelsmann 2008, 11). During the 
debates it became clear that the authorities want to protect the state-owned 
sector and at the same time encourage the private sector. 
  
In urban areas, property rights have been relatively secure for many years. Land 
could either be allocated by the authorities, or it could be acquired by long-term 
leasing contracts. The land could be used as a mortgage or rented to others, 
consequently already in the 1990s the urban land markets developed rapidly. 
Between 1993 and 1998 the land transacted rose from 11,000 to almost 1,1 
89 
million ha, and the land mortgages increased from 1,000 to 884,00 ha 
(Deininger and Jin 2007, 5). 
 
However, rural land matters have been more complicated. Given the enormous 
size of the agricultural sector, employing about three quarters of the workforce 
on the onset of reform and still more than half of it today, these problems have 
been very important. As mentioned above, when the collective farms were 
dissolved, the land was formally parceled out to families on a 15-years lease. 
The big successes of individual farming made the authorities in 1998 pass the 
Land Management Law according to which the time of the new using rights, 
after the expiring of the first 15 years, were extended to 30 years. Furthermore, 
the farmers should receive written contracts. Leasing or transferring land to 
others was forbidden in the early stages of reform, only administrative transfers 
were possible. But these restrictions were lifted, and currently market-based land 
transfers dominate the picture (Deininger and Jin 2007, 6f). 
  
However, the problem of conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses 
has given rise to substantial grievances. The rapid economic development and 
urbanization has made the demand for land for non-agricultural purposes rise 
rapidly; the price differentials between the two types of land became enormous. 
All rural land which was to be converted into non-agricultural land had first to 
be acquired by the local authorities; subsequently it could be sold to private 
investors. And the local authorities could expropriate rural land, giving no or 
only insufficient compensation. Their main instruments for expropriation were 
administrative redistributions of land, so-called “re-adjustments”. In a “big” 
reallocation, all land was transferred to the community, a part of it converted to 
non-agricultural purposes, and the rest given back to the farmers in equal sizes. 
“Small” readjustments involved only a limited amount of households. Selling 
land for non-agricultural purposes has become an important source of revenue 
for the municipalities, which, of course, has created an incentive for arbitrary 
decisions and outright corruption. In the years 1999-2002 more than half a 
million accusations of corruption in connection with land transfers were filed, 
against 3,800 officials  formal investigations were opened (Deininger and Jin 
2007, 6-8).  
  
Matters changed significantly with the introduction of the Rural Land 
Contracting Law in 2003. For the first time, the land rights of the farmers were 
given the status of property rights. This made it possible for the farmers to go 
courts in case their rights were violated. Expropriation is possible only if 
compensation is paid (however, calculated in the basis of the value of the land 
for agricultural purposes). Furthermore, the redistribution of land, the main tool 
for the communities to acquire land, has become precisely circumscribed. “Big” 
redistributions became forbidden altogether, and small ones are allowed only, if 
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higher levels of government ratify it and if a two-third majority in the village 
assembly accepts it (Deininger and Jin 2007, 8f). 
  
In their impressing econometric analysis, using data from 800 villages and 8,000 
randomly selected households, Deininger and Jin could show that the new law 
had a strong impact even in the short run, leading e.g. to increases of land prices 
by 30 percent. However, the new law seems to be effective only where the 
village leadership is elected. Also the mere possession of land-use certificates 
did not significantly reduce the risk of arbitrary redistribution. 
  
Consequently, many problems remain, the law of 2003 is hardly already the end 
of the story. However, the central point in our context is the policy stance of the 
Chinese leadership. As the Rural Land Contracting Law and many other 
initiatives document, the Chinese Communist Party has not only stopped being 
hostile to private property, it has become an active protector of private property 
rights.  
 
Looking at Kornai’s second criterion, private property is certainly in a 
“dominant position”. By now state property plays only a minor role, being 
relatively strongest in old industries and the banking system. All in all, the entire 
state sector employs only about 72 million people (Hussain 2005, 270). In would 
be misleading in our context to count the 133 million employees of the often 
collectively owned TVEs, town and village enterprises, under state property. 
The TVEs have been under hard budget constraints and their owners have acted 
as private owners. Economic processes are certainly pre-dominantly coordinated 
by markets and not anymore by bureaucratic decision. China is even to an 
outstanding degree integrated into international markets (see below). Also 
agriculture, in many countries insulated by high tariffs against the outer world, is 
quite open. This can be seen e.g. by the fact that Chinese food prices have 
become quite responsive to international prices (World Bank 2008 b, 5).  
  
The vast majority of the population has been working under hard budget 
constraints early on, and from agriculture they became continuously extended. 
Production has become constraint on the demand side, not a problem so far in 
the aggregate, but certainly a problem for millions of people who have been 
working in low-price markets. Open unemployment has become a problem. This 
became officially recognized in 1997 when the authorities introduced a 
Minimumn Living Standard Assistance (MLSA) for the urban population. Cash 
allowances of an equivalent between 17 and 44 US dollars (2005) helped to 
bridge the difference between the household income per capita and the local 
poverty line.  Previously, those who were able to work did not get assistance, 
but were provided with a job instead (Hussain, 269f). Business cycles, not the 
least on the export markets, have become an important problem for China. 
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Consequently, measured along Kornai’s criteria, China has made a practically 
complete transition from communism to capitalism. Therefore I cannot follow 
Athar Hussain (or others) who write: “The country has replaced a planned 
economy with a (socialist) market economy” (Hussain, 2005, 268). I do not see 
any reason to insert “(socialist)” in front of “market economy”. 
  
Rather on the contrary, if China has firmly become a capitalist country, it is a 
rather unsocial form for capitalism, decidedly not of social democratic type, at 
least not yet. Inequality, as measured by the Gini-coefficient, has risen 
dramatically, up to 0.469 in 2004. This is much higher than in the United States, 
0.408 in 2000 (Human Development Report 2007/08, 281f).   
 
Figure 1: The Gini coefficient in China from 1980 to 2005 
 
 
 
Source: Ravallion 2008, 28. 
 
Furthermore, the welfare state arrangements have been very moderate until now. 
The existing social security schemes comprise social assistance, means-tested 
and financed by taxation, and social insurance, not means-tested and based on 
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previous contributions. The schemes differ strongly between the urban and the 
rural population. Whether a person is rural or urban depends on the entries in the 
household registration system (hukou) which do not change automatically if a 
person moves. Millions of migrants to urban areas are still registered as rural, 
and as such not entitled to  urban social security. China’s “floating population”, 
i.e. migrants without local household registration, amounted in 2005 to 147 
million people (Bertesmann 2008, 10). Those registered as “urban” benefit from 
five insurance schemes (old-age pension, injury, maternity, health care, and 
unemployment). These insurances are financed by pay-roll taxes and exclude 
those outside the work force. In addition to these insurances there is the above-
mentioned Minimum Living Standard Assistance (MLSA). 
  
By contrast, there are almost no social insurance schemes for the rural 
population, not even for the employees of the TVEs. There exist, however, two 
contributory schemes which are organized on the basis of independent local 
initiatives, for pensions and for cooperative health care. The Chinese leadership 
has emphasized the need to build up a rural MLSA and rural health insurance 
scheme (Hussain 2005, 269f). A social security system is also a central part of 
President Hu’s project of a “harmonious society”, but it is still in its infancy. 
Currently social insurance covers only 10 percent of the population, and 
mismanagement and corruption reduce its efficiency further. Health care is a 
particular problem, where hospitals and doctors charge arbitrary fees or bribes, 
thus making medical treatment unaffordable for many (Bertelsmann 2008, 14). 
In 2004 public health care expenditure was at a level of only 1.8 percent of GDP 
(private expenditure added another 2.9 percent). By comparison, in “social 
democratic” countries such as Denmark or Sweden, public health care was at 7.1 
and 7.7 percent (Human Development Report 2007/08, 247f). True, this reflects 
to a high extent the difference in GDP, on average rich countries spend 
relatively more on public health and welfare than poor ones. Also the heavy 
urban bias in the Chinese system is a feature which can be met in many 
developing countries. Under the conditions of, for instance, rather inefficient, 
often arbitrary and corrupt bureaucracies it is extremely difficult to build up 
working welfare systems. Supporters of the Chinese government can also with 
good reasons argue that for developing countries the best social policy is 
creating high economic growth. China has, after all, reduced absolute poverty 
dramatically (see table 1). My point here is not a critique of the Chinese 
government, but simply to state the fact that China has got a rough capitalist 
system, with the majority of the population being exposed to the market forces 
with almost no social security at all, and with hundreds of millions of people 
being forced to migrate over long distances into tough and heavily polluted 
urban agglomerations where they are subject to often arbitrary and corrupt 
officials.  
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And going back to the question whether a mix of the systems is feasible: The 
Chinese development seems to strongly confirm the position that a mix of 
systems is not stable, that countries in such a position tend to make a transition 
to a fully established capitalist system. 
 
 
Beijing and the “Washington Consensus” 
The so-called Washington Consensus provides another set of criteria for 
assessing China’s policy. The term was coined by John Williamson who 
endeavored to identify “the lowest common denominator of policy advice being 
addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin America as of 1989” 
(Williamson 2000, 251). As we shall see, his 10 points were rather simple, and 
in themselves hardly able to cause much of a scandal. However, Williamson had 
to make the observation that it actually did. In his own words (Center for 
International Development 2008, 1f):  
 
Audiences the world over seem to believe that it signifies a set of neoliberal 
policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-
based international institutions and have led them to crisis and misery. There 
are people who cannot utter the term without foaming at the mouth … 
 
Some of the most vociferous of today’s critics of what they call the Washington 
Consensus, most prominently Joe Stiglitz … do not object so much as much to 
the agenda laid out above as to the neoliberalism that they interpret the term as 
applying. I of course never intended my term to imply policies like capital 
account liberalization … monetarism, supply-side economics, or a minimal state 
(getting the state out of welfare provision and income redistribution), which I 
think of as the quintessentially neoliberal ideal. 
 
We came already across the problem that the term “neoliberal” becomes used in 
an inflationary way. If we now have a simple look at the propositions, as 
Williamson formulated them (Williamson 2000, 252f): 
 
• Fiscal discipline 
• A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high 
economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as 
primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure 
• Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base) 
• Interest rate liberalization 
• A competitive exchange rate 
• Trade liberalization 
• Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment 
• Privatization 
94 
• Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) 
• Secure property rights. 
 
I wonder whether critical spirits such as Joseph Stiglitz ever noticed, that this list 
contains e.g. the advice to redirect public spending in order to improve income 
distribution. Anyhow, we will now simply go through this list and ask, whether 
Chinese policies have complied with the propositions or not. 
  
Fiscal discipline should be a banality. Not respecting fiscal discipline means 
spending more money than receiving for a long time. This implies piling up high 
debts, increasing interest payments and finally dependence on foreign creditors 
who can impose policy programs. Fiscal discipline does not exclude a carefully 
calculated Keynesian deficit-spending policy in times of recession because this 
is a rather short term event which could and should be corrected easily after 
recession has ended. By contrasts, lack of fiscal discipline has brought dozens of 
developing countries into bankruptcy, astronomic debts and misery, even oil-
rich countries such as Algeria, which in 1994, having no credit lines anymore, 
was forced to go to the IMF (Zank 2008).   
  
After 1978 China has managed to keep financial discipline all the time. In, for 
instance, 2004 public sector deficit was at moderate 2.1 percent of GDP 
(Bertelsmann 2008, 10f), the external debt service cost some 1.2 percent of GDP 
– and was more than offset by a staggering accumulation of foreign reserves. In 
2005 China had a balance of payment surplus of 250 billion US dollars (Herr, 
28). All in all, when it comes to financial discipline, China has been exemplary. 
If only other developing or transition countries had done the same. 
 
The picture is slightly more mixed when it comes to directing public spending 
towards fields which can stimulate growth and at the same time improve income 
distributions such as primary education, health care and infrastructure. China has 
indeed developed a good infrastructure in roads, rails, ports, power and telecom, 
mainly through a “cost recovery” policy which sets prices high enough to be 
attractive for investors (World Bank 2008 a, 1). China Rail has extended its 
network significantly in recent years, and major extensions are planned for the 
coming years (World Bank 2008 b, 24). Also the investments in education are 
high, if perhaps not so by the government, then by the Chinese people. Already 
at the beginning of transition the levels of literacy were rather high, also in rural 
areas, perhaps for once a positive legacy of communism (Ravallion 2008, 9 and 
14). The high educational level has certainly been an important factor behind 
China’s economic growth. However, as already mentioned above, public 
expenditure on health as percentage of GDP is rather low (1.8 percent), also by 
comparison to most other developing countries.  
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Williamson’s point three says reducing marginal taxes and broaden the tax 
bases. Such a reform aims at distributing the tax pressure in a more efficient, 
less distorting way. This is not a reform in order to reduce overall taxation and 
does not imply any reduction of the welfare state. It can also be engineered in a 
way that the social effects are neutral. The social democratic Swedish 
government, for instanced, implemented such a reform at the end of the 1980s 
(Zank 1989). In China the overall tax pressure has been comparatively low, 8.9 
percent in 2004 (Bertelsmann 2008, 11). A tax reform along the lines proposed 
is not a priority on the agenda, problems such as reducing corruption and 
assuring more elementary tax justice are much more important. 
 
Williamson has proposed to alter the formulation of the fourth proposition, 
interest rate liberalization into the more comprehensive term financial 
liberalization, interest rate liberalization being just one dimension of it 
(Williamson 2000, 253). This is a notoriously difficult field of reform, but China 
seems to be well on the way. In compliance with WTO requirements the country 
has opened the financial sector to some extent in 2006, substantial foreign 
investment flew into the banks. Major Chinese banks were also listed on foreign 
stock markets. However, most banks remain mainly state-owned, foreign 
investors are allowed only to hold minority shares. The domination by 
government or local-level politicians has often meant loans to loss-making state-
owned enterprises. According to rating agencies the sum of non-performing 
loans can be as high as 650 billion US dollars, in spite of repeated endeavors by 
the central bank to write off bad loans. But the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission is seemingly working hard to reduce the intermingling of local 
politicians and to improve accountability. But there are “indications that the 
Chinese banking sector is progressing towards international standards” 
(Bertelsmann 2008, 13). 
 
The background for the proposal to introduce a competitive exchange rate has 
been the observation that many developing countries insisted on a rate which has 
been too high. Algeria, for instance, kept the dinar at high levels in order to 
allow for cheap food imports, after government policies had practically 
strangled agricultural production. But the high exchange rate made it impossible 
to export anything except oil. Not surprisingly, the IMF-program of 1994 
contained a devaluation of the dinar. 
  
In the case of China this has not been a problem. After some years of 
experimenting (see above), the authorities introduced a marked-determined 
exchange rate in 1985, besides a less important official one, and introduced a 
single unified rate in 1994. They pegged it first to the dollar and later to a basket 
of currencies. China’s huge balance of payment surpluses, not the least in 
relation with the US, have shown that the renminbi rate has been truly 
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competitive, many US politicians even say: too competitive (“currency 
manipulator”). In spite of some appreciation of the renminbi China remains a 
very strong competitor on the world export markets. 
 
Trade liberalization, point six on Williamson’s list, began in the early 1980s 
with exchange rate and tax concessions for exporters and the creation of a 
Special Economic Zone near Hong Kong. From 1986 onwards the special-
economic zone principles became extended to the whole country (Ravallion 
2008, 7) Since accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) foreign trade 
became consistently liberalized, for instance by reducing China’s most favored 
nation tariffs and duty rates. Import quotas were abolished and import licensing 
procedures became simplified. China signed also bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements. If measured by the shares of export and import, no other big 
country has become as open to foreign trade as China: 
 
Table 3: Exports and imports as shares of GDP in the five biggest countries: 
 
 Imports of goods and services, % of GDP Exports of goods and services, % of GDP 
 1990 2005 1990 2005 
China 16 32 19 37 
India  9 24  7 21 
United States 11 15 10 10 
Brazil  7 12  8 17 
Russian Federation 18 22 18 35 
 
Source: Human Development Report 2007/08, 286f. 
 
On the export side Russia comes close to China, but this is due to huge oil 
exports. 60 percent of Russia’s export earnings come from oil, manufactures 
comprise only 19 percent. By contrast, 92 percent of China’s exports are 
manufactured goods (Human Development Report 2007/08, 286). A condition 
for China’s truly impressive export successes has been the corresponding 
opening to imports because this allowed for the inflow of cheap inputs. Since the 
1990s more than half of China’s exports have been goods which became 
imported, further manufactured and then re-exported (Herr, 29). 
  
Liberalization of the inflows of foreign direct investment began with the creation 
of the Special Economic Zone, from which it was extended. There exist still 
some limitations, for instance, as mentioned above, in the financing sector. But 
overall China is, as with trade, very open to direct foreign direct investment 
(World Bank 2008 a, 1). When it comes to short-term portfolio flows, China has 
(still?) some restrictions in place. However, openness to short-term capital 
movements has exactly not been on Williamson’s list. Nor has it, for instance, 
been part of the rapid-reform program which the Polish government 
implemented in 1990. Nor did it enter the reform recommendations which the 
Washington institutions gave to Eastern and Central Europe at that time. A very 
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instructive text in this respect is a paper by Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, in 
1991 chief economist and director of the socialist economies unit at the World 
Bank (Fischer and Gelb 1991). 
 
Privatization of state-owned enterprises has indeed been a standard 
recommendation by World Bank or IMF officials. The main argument has been 
that state-owned enterprises usually have been loss-makers because they were 
driven mainly not according to economic criteria, but with a view to political 
expediencies, such as providing leadership jobs for party comrades. Units which 
are loss-making beyond repair do not get closed because redundancies imply 
high political costs; instead, the bill is passed on to others, e.g. in the form of 
non-performing loans. As mentioned above, China is littered with such cases.  
  
The most important privatization step was the transition to individual farming, in 
the first place, as we have seen, “only” a de-facto privatization, with the legal 
formalities coming later. There after there was much “privatization from below”. 
Now, at least de facto, privatization is almost completed, state-owned 
enterprises playing a residual role in industry, and the banks being in a process 
of gradual privatization, at least partially.  
  
It should perhaps be emphasized that Williamson and others never 
recommended rapid privatization (as many critics erroneously have claimed). 
The recommendation to e.g. Eastern and Central Europe has instead been 
transforming the state-owned enterprises first into state-owned, independent 
corporations under hard budget constraints and aiming at privatization at a later 
point in time because many conditions must be in place before privatization 
makes economic sense ( Fischer and Gelb 1991, 101f). The Polish governments 
after 1989 have actually been very slow privatizers, the rapid growth of the 
private sector being mainly the result of “privatization from below”. True, the 
Russian government practiced very rapid privatization. But not, because 
Western advisors recommended it, but because politicians such as Anatoly 
Tchubais and others came to the conclusion that under the conditions of the 
rapidly disintegration Soviet economy privatization was the only choice; 
everything which would not be privatized officially would become so 
“spontaneously”, i.e. stolen (Zank 2001, 24f).  
 
Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) makes sense if the aim is 
making markets more efficient. Regulations which prevent new actors to enter a 
market work as barriers to competition; and if exit becomes impeded, people 
and resources remain locked in rather unproductive occupations. In pre-reform 
China the most important barrier has been the restrictions on internal migration 
which confined hundreds of million of people to rural poverty. These restrictions 
98 
became eased early on; the registration system (hokou) still works as a barrier in 
this sense, but a mild one if compared with previous times.  
 
In general, the institutional framework for market access has improved 
substantially. Legislation has passed with the aim to open activities for private 
enterprises where their access before was severely restricted, either by heavy 
regulations or by the dominance of state-owned enterprises. To these belong, for 
instance, defense, financial services or public utilities. According to legislation 
private enterprises should also have equal access to capital markets 
(Bertelsmann 2008, 11). In practice local authorities often interfere, in order to 
protect “their” SOEs, but the general direction of central policy seems to be 
clear. 
 
The complex of securing property rights, the last point on Williamson’s list, we 
have already discussed: Within some thirty years, the Chinese leadership has 
completely changed from hostility to private property over tolerating it to 
actively protecting it.  
 
All in all, Beijing has implemented the policies of the Washington Consensus 
practically completely, the major aberration seemingly being the 
underinvestment in public health care. But also this point will presumably be 
addressed soon. For those who view the Washington Consensus as an agenda of 
neoliberal imperialism, this conversion of the biggest country in the world, to 
whom the IMF never could dictate anything, must be incomprehensible. Within 
the theoretical framework discussed here, however, it becomes easily 
understandable.  
 
We have above considered the proposition that a mixture of a capitalist and a 
socialist system will not be stable. To quote Kornai again, “mixed cases tend to 
return eventually to the path of capitalist development” (Kornai 2000, 34). And I 
see the Washington Consensus simply as a set of recommendations for countries 
in mixed systems to go for capitalism consistently because mixed systems are 
non-performing hybrids. There is nothing in the ten points of the “Washington 
Consensus” which aims at a particular type of capitalism. An ambitious welfare 
state such as Sweden or Denmark is perfectly compatible with it. Reports by the 
IMF on these countries may contain punctual criticisms (e.g. the Danish policy 
of tax freeze being “overly rigid”), but are otherwise full of praise (“benign 
outlook”, “impressive decline in debt-to-GDP ratio”, “sustainable public 
finances in the medium and long term”) (IMF 2006, 16f). Slashing welfare state 
arrangements, when properly financed, is simply not IMF policy. 
 
The recommendations of the Washington Consensus are also implicit part of the 
policy advice which the European Union recommends for its neighbors in the 
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east and the south. There we still find countries with an uncompleted transition, 
be it from Soviet or from Arab Socialism (Zank 2008). So we might call the 
Washington Consensus also Brussels Consensus. Or Beijing Consensus. 
  
Markets can work efficiently only when a set of functional requirements are 
fulfilled. Not necessarily perfectly fulfilled, but at least to reasonable degree. To 
those belong e.g. private production in farming, the removal of internal barriers 
to migration, or the opening of the borders for trade and direct investment. In a 
pragmatic and experimenting way, the Chinese leadership tested these sets of 
theoretical propositions. They avoided dictating one model from above and gave 
instead producers and local officials a fairly broad set of options. As Du 
Runsheng, one of the architects of the agrarian reform, put it, the intellectual 
approach was “seeking truth from the facts” (Ravallion 2008, 15). In this 
context, a high weigh was put to demonstrable practical success. And it was the 
evidence of local experiments, for instance evidently higher agricultural 
production under private farming than under collectivism, which crucially 
lowered reform resistance within the leadership. But each reform step exposed 
other barriers to growth because prerequisites to growth are interdependent. 
These other barriers had consequently to be addressed, if growth should 
continue. This the leadership has done, remarkably consistently. It has been a 
condition for such a sequence that the leadership has been seriously about 
economic growth. This is far from everywhere the case, numerous despots in 
Third-World countries have repeatedly destroyed conditions for growth, for 
instance for reasons of tactical political maneuvering. Suffice perhaps to 
mention Robert Mugabe, who violated most of the points of the “Washington 
Consensus”, from practicing reckless fiscal and monetary policy over destroying 
markets by police intervention to confiscating the property of the most 
productive agricultural producers. It would of course be overly simple to 
attribute human development exclusively to the adherence of a certain policy 
agenda, but the discrepancies in the Human Development Index of China and 
Zimbabwe are indeed striking: 
 
Table 4: The Human Development Index in China and Zimbabwe from 1975 to 2005. 
 
 1975 1990 2005 
China 0.530 0.634 0.777 
Zimbabwe 0.550 0.654 0.513 
 
Source: Human Development Report 2007/8, 235f. 
 
The regime in Beijing has repeatedly been criticized for human-rights violations 
and for not beginning a democratization process. To me this criticism seems to 
be justified. I want, however, point out that China’s record also on this field is 
relatively speaking much better than, say 20 years ago. And when compared 
with the years of Mao Zedong, the progress in human rights is perhaps even 
100 
more striking than China’s economic growth. Suffice perhaps to mention the 
mass terror of the so-called Cultural Revolution, or the great famine of 1959-61 
with its almost 30 million deaths (Lin and Yang, 145), the worst famine in world 
history and the direct produce of Mao’s policy.  
 
When it comes to the world at large, I see two major consequences of the 
Chinese transition. In economic terms, China has become a strong supplier and a 
strong demander, and on balance, this has been very beneficial for every one. 
Perhaps even more important, the Chinese transition has made world peace 
much more secure. Under Mao, China was a closed, confrontational and at times 
outright aggressive country, from being accomplice at starting the Korea War in 
1950 to the assault on Vietnam in 1978.  Virtually all neighboring countries felt 
seriously threatened. This picture has dramatically changed. China has become a 
partner for her neighbors, with close economic ties and many agreements. Due 
to is economic opening and the high shares of exports and imports, China has, as 
all other open countries, become strongly dependent on the outer world. 
Therefore China has a very strong interest at stability and cooperation. To sum 
up, China’s transition has made the world richer and more peaceful. 
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Riget i Midten og verden omkring det: 
Kinas nationale identitet og udenrigspolitik 
 
 
Bjørn Møller 
 
 
Identitet, National Interesse og Udenrigspolitik 
Selvom nogle af de selvudnævnte “realister” indenfor studiet af international 
politik som f.eks. Kenneth Waltz (1979) hævder, at stater er “funktionelt ens” og 
derfor kun adskiller sig fra hinanden ved deres placering og størrelse, tilsiger 
almindelig sund fornuft, at stater faktisk er forskellige. 
 
Under den kolde krig gik hele den vestlige alliance f.eks. ud fra, at staternes 
styreform og økonomiske system spillede en rolle, og at kommunismen derfor 
var en trussel mod den vestlige verden. På samme måde opfatter vesten idag 
ultranationalismen i f.eks. Serbien og den fundamentalistiske islamisme i Iran 
som trusler, der bl.a. indebærer, at man ikke kan have normale forbindelser med 
sådanne stater. Som bl.a. påpeget af Stephen Walt (1987) opstår trusler altså 
ikke i kraft af andre staters militære kapabiliteter som sådan, men kun hvis man 
opfatter disse stater som fjendtlige. Der er m.a.o. ikke nogen vej udenom at 
antage, at stater faktisk er forskellige, og at stater kan forandre sig. F. eks. er det 
moderne, demokratiske Tyskland så integrationsorienteret, at det næsten kan 
betegnes som anti-nationalistisk, og det er derfor åbenlyst væsensforskelligt fra 
det autoritære og ultranationalistiske nazi-Tyskland (Duffield 1998) – og det 
kommunistiske Kina i Mao Zedongs æra var væsensforskelligt fra både det 
kinesiske kejserrige, det nationalistiske Kina i mellemkrigstiden, og det “nye 
Kina,” der er blev skabt efter formand Maos død af ikke mindst Deng Xiaping 
(se nedenfor). 
 
En måde at indkorporere denne type forskelle i studiet af staters udenrigspolitik 
er at antage, at både identiteter og nationale interesser som alle andre sociale 
fænomener er socialt konstruerede. Dette er illustreret i Fig. 1, der skal vise, 
hvorledes identitet via interesser og målsætninger danner baggrund for konkrete 
politikker – med perceptioner og indenrigspolitiske forhold som formidlende 
variable.  
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De udenrigspolitiske målsætninger hviler i sidste ende på en definition af, hvad 
den “nationale interesse” er, hvilket igen afhænger af  samfundets og statens 
kollektive identitet – og de er alle socialt konstruerede over tid Man kan således 
opfatte identitet og national interesse som “træge variabler,” idet de ganske vist 
kan forandres, men sjældent fra dag til anden. På et hvilket som helst givet 
tidspunkt udgør de derfor en slags spilleregler eller rammebetingelser for 
udformningen af konkrete politikker (Weldes 1996; Wendt 1999: 224-243; 
Chafetz, Spirtas & Frankel 1999; Kowert 1999; Jepperson, Wendt & 
Katzenstein 1996). 
  
Der er dog principielt altid forskellige identiteter at vælge imellem, ligesom der 
er grupper i et hvilket som helst samfund, der vil promovere bestemte identiteter 
– men mulighederne for at gøre dette med held afgøres dels af magtrelationerne 
i samfundet, dels af hvor meget disse gruppers foretrukne identitet adskiller sig 
fra den etablerede. En religiøst defineret national identitet er f.eks. en mulighed i 
visse lande – tænk bare på Iran, Pakistan eller Afghanistan – men næppe i et 
land med en så indgroet sekulær og grundtvigiansk kultur som Danmark. Mere 
almindelig er opfattelsen af staten som manifestationen af et  nationalt (i 
betydningen etnisk og kulturelt) fællesskab som i den traditionelle tyske “Blut 
und Boden” tradition – men som alternativ til denne identitet står det rent 
politiske nationsbegreb, hvor nationen (som f.eks. i Frankrig) defineres som 
summen af statsborgerne.  
 
Valget mellem disse muligheder er aldrig definitivt i den forstand, at det ikke 
kan ændres – og der vil næsten altid vare grupper i befolkningen, der sætter 
spørgsmålstegn ved den gældende identitet – men den er ikke desto mindre 
relativt varig og forandrer sig som hovedregel kun langsomt. Historien – eller 
rettere den dominerende fortælling (“narrativ”) om hvordan man blev, hvad man 
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er, spiller en stor rolle i både reproduktionen og den eventuelle forandring af den 
nationale identitet – jvf. vores egne narrativer om f.eks. Dybbøl Møller og 
besættelsen. På den anden side kan en nyfortolkning af historien også benyttes 
som grundlag for en ændring i den nationale identitet – jfr. statsministerens 
forsøg på en omfortolkning og forkastelse af besættelsestidens 
samarbejdspolitik. 
 
Selvom man accepterer realisternes påstand, at stater altid forfølger deres 
nationale interesse – enten i form af magt (Morgenthau 1960, p. 33) eller 
sikkerhed (Waltz 1979), er det langtfra givet, hvad denne nationale interesse er, 
bl.a. fordi det afhænger af  identiteten, der bl.a. bestemmer, hvad der i givet fald 
skal forsvares: kun være selve det nationale territorium eller også en diaspora, 
dvs. en del af nationen (som et “forestillet fællesskab”, jvf. Anderson 1991) der 
befinder sig udenfor statens grænser? Identiteten og den nationale interesse 
bestemmer også, hvilke overordnede mål, staten skal forfølge i sin udenrigs- og 
sikkerhedspolitik. Skal man stræbe efter uafhængighed – dvs. enten til at vægre 
sig mod andre staters forsøg på dominans -  eller være mere ambitiøs og 
tilstræbe dominans over andre, måske en stilling som global stormagt.   
 
Alle disse valg er naturligvis også påvirket af de ydre omstændigheder – eller 
rettere af opfattelsen (perceptionen) af disse. Hvor fristende det end kunne 
forekomme, vil småstater som f.eks. Danmark – og i virkeligheden hovedparten 
af verdens stater – ikke så meget som overveje at stræbe efter magt over andre, 
end mindre noget så flyvsk som verdensherredømme. Ikke fordi vi ikke gerne 
ville have det, hvis vi kunne, men fordi det ligger så langt hinsides mulighedens 
grænser, at det ikke er værd at overveje. For lande som USA eller for den sags 
skyld Kina stiller sagen sig dog anderledes. Vi skal i det følgende med 
udgangspunkt i Kinas definition af sin egen identitet og nationale interesser 
analysere nogle dominerende temaer i landets udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik. 
 
 
Kinas Identitet 
De fleste sinologer er enige om, at historien spiller en endnu større rolle for 
kineserne end for de fleste andre folkeslag. På forskellige tidspunkter kan det 
imidlertid være forskellige kapitler af historien, der især fokuseres på, og 
udvælgelsen foretages bl.a. ud fra deres implikationer for nutiden og fremtiden, 
som bestemte aktører ønsker at promovere. Der har tidligere foreligget 
autoritative versioner af  denne “konstruerede historie” – f.eks. i form af 
beslutninger fra kommunistpartiet fra hhv. 1945 og 1981, men  i dag er 
situationen noget mere åben, også hvad angår udviklingen siden 1949 
(Weigelin-Schwierzik 2006). Specielt Kulturrevolutionen (1967-1970) er dog 
stadig meget kontroversiel, dels fordi mange stadig kan huske den, dels fordi der 
stadig gemmes mange skeletter i skabene (Gao 2002; Wang 1999).   
105 
Et historisk tema eller “narrativ,” der ofte bliver bragt i spil, er det om “riget i 
Midten” (zhongguo), der stammer tilbage fra Chou-dynastiet (ca 1122-255 
f.Kr.). “I midten” er ikke så meget et geografisk eller geopolitisk begreb, men 
henfører til betydning og rangorden. Riget i midten var verdens centrum og lige 
under himlen, og dets hersker, Kejseren, derfor ”Himlens Søn” med en Gud-
given ret til at regere. Andre nationer havde efter kinesernes opfattelse ikke 
meget at byde på, men blev betragtet som barbarer, der dog skulle være 
velkomne til at vise deres respekt som vasaller og til at yde tribut til Riget i 
Midten og Himlens Søn (Zhang 2004). Denne periode var også en kulturel 
blomstringstid med tænkere som f.eks. Konfutse og Laotse (grundlæggere af 
hhv. konfutsianismen og taoismen), der stadig holdes i hævd og influerer på selv 
udenrigspolitikken (Hsu 1991; Pettman 2005). Temaet om Riget i Midten er 
aldrig helt forsvundet, og Kina har i lange perioder følt sig og reelt også været 
både kulturelt, teknologisk og økonomisk overlegent, f.eks. i forhold til Europa. 
Tænk blot på Marco Polos (1254-1324) rejsebeskrivelser fra slutningen af det 
13. århundrede, dvs. da den mongolske hersker Kublai Khan (1215-1294) 
regerede over Kina (Polo 1997, 64-202. For en kritik se Jackson 1998).  
 
Selv Chou-dynastiet oplevede dog også perioder af svækkelse, f.eks. under “de 
stridende staters periode” (Chan-kuo perioden, ca 475-222 f.Kr.), der for 
moderne kinesere er blevet set som en advarsel om, hvad splittelse kan betyde. 
Dette, kombineret med herskerens guddommelige adkomst til tronen, har også 
tjent som påmindelse om betydningen af en stærk leder, der kan drage nytte af 
den loyalitet overfor magthaverne, der er et centralt element i konfucianismen. 
Herskerens “mandat fra himlen” er dog ikke betingelsesløst, men kan forskertses 
ved et misregimente, der giver folket ret til – dog kun i ekstreme tilfælde – at 
vælte regimet og indsætte et nyt.  
 
Over for dette narrativ om storhed og dens forudsætninger står et andet narrativ 
om svaghed og rollen som uskyldigt offer. Dels er Kina historisk blevet løbet 
over ende talrige gange, både af  Mongoliet og Manchuriet, hvis herskere 
etablerede deres egne herskende dynastier, der dog blev sinificeret i udstrakt 
grad. Senere kom Japan, de europæiske stater og til en vis grad USA, der alle 
udnyttede den kinesiske svaghed og splittelse til med våbenmagt at påtvinge 
kejserriget ulige og ydmygende traktater, f. eks. ved at afstå havne (med 
ekstraterritorial status) både ved kysten og langs de store floder og handelsveje. 
De første skridt i denne retning var Opiumskrigen (1839-1842), hvor England 
angreb Kina for at sikre sig ikke blot retten til at sælge opium til kineserne, som 
Kejseren havde villet forbyde, men sågar et monopol på denne lukrative handel. 
Ikke just det mest glorværdige kapitel i den engelske imperialistiske historie! 
(Krasner 2001; Grasso, Corrin & Kort 2004: 37-71; Hsü 1975: 189-276). Hertil 
kom egentlige militære invasioner, som Kina har oplavet adskillige af, fra 
mongolerne og manchuerne til japanerne, senest i optakten til 2. Verdenskrig.  
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Til en vis grad har denne offer-identitet affødt andre og mere heroiske narrativt 
konstruerede identiteter, hvor man har fokuseret på og heroiseret de gentagne 
oprør mod overmagten, f.eks. i form af Taiping- og Boxeropstandene i hhv. 
1854-1860 og  1899-1901, hvoraf førstnævnte var umådelig blodig og i øvrigt 
inspireret af kristendommen (Hsü 1975: 277-315, 470-498; Boardman 1951; 
Kuhn 1977; Cohen 1992). Ikke desto mindre bliver i det nationalistiske narrativ 
begge disse fejlslagne opstande fremstillet som glorværdige og heroiske 
forløbere til den nationale revolution, der i 1911/12 omstyrtede kejserdømmet 
og bragte Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) til magten (Hsü 1975: 550-575; Hsue 1960). 
Hans form for nationalisme byggede paradoksalt nok bl.a. på konfutsianismen 
(Gregor 1981) og var tilstrækkeligt tvetydig til, at  hans minde som det moderne 
Kinas grundlægger den dag i dag kan holdes i hævd af både kommunisterne i 
Folkerepublikken og af det tidligere regeringsparti på Taiwan, Kuomintang, der 
blev grundlagt af Sun Yat-sen i 1912.   
  
Disse nationalistiske narrativer om storhed, uretfærdig udmygelse og befrielse er 
naturligvis ikke uden indbyggede modsætninger - men et effektivt “master-
narrativ” har ikke desto mindre formået at binde de forskellige ender sammen til 
en fortælling om storhed, fald og genoprejsning til fordums storhed, dog i to 
versioner. Taiwans master-narrativ var (i hvert fald indtil for nyligt) uforløst, 
idet de retmæssige forløsere, nu fordrevet fra fastlandet, stadig afventede det 
endelige slag, hvor de skulle besejre kommunisterne og indtage deres 
retmæssige plads som Sun Yat-sens arvtagere som hele Kinas ledere; mens det i 
Folkerepublikkens master-narrativ var kommunistpartiet, der havde løftet arven 
fra Sun Yat-sen og nu blot manglede at fuldbyrde den nationale opgave ved at 
genindlemme den opsætsige provins Taiwan i Kina (se nedenfor).    
 
I Folkerepublikken er dette nationale narrativ i det 20. århundrede for, hvad der i 
virkeligheden blot er en kort overgang, blevet suppleret af et  ideologisk – der 
dog var tæt sammenfiltret med det nationalistiske. Mens de øvrige narrativer 
søgte at konstruerede en kinesisk identitet som kinesisk (dvs. partikularistisk), er 
denne ideologiske identitet mere universalistisk, idet den går ud på at konstruere 
det kinesiske kommunistparti som spydspidsen i en verdensomspændende 
revolution mod kapitalistisk undertrykkelse. Denne tager udgangspunkt i Mao 
Zedong (1893-1976) som leder af Kinas Kommunistiske Parti, der ganske vist 
var tæt på udslettelse, men overlevede i kraft af et massivt tilbagetog til det indre 
Kina i “Den Lange March” (Wilson 1977; Guillermaz 1972: 147-263). Herefter 
lagde det for en lang periode selve revolutionen på hylden for at hellige sig for 
den nationale sag ved at udgøre spydspidsen i kampen mod den de japanske 
invasionstropper (Hsü 1975: 694-741; Guillermaz 1972: 267-361), hvilket havde 
den bekvemme dobbeltbetydning både at være en national opgave og angiveligt 
at fremme verdensrevolutionen. Efter en kort periode af  nogenlunde harmonisk 
samarbejde med Sovjetunionen under Stalin, hvor Kina måtte nøjes med rollen 
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som nr. 2, kom det hurtigt til rivalisering om rollen som lederen af den 
kommunistiske lejr (Claudin 1975: 271-295, 568-574).  
   
Denne rivalisering udkæmpedes i første omgang rent ideologisk, hvor den 
vigtigste ammunition var  påstande om, at de sovjetiske ledere var revisionister, 
mens Maos tanker var den ægte vare, dvs. den mest autentiske videreudvikling 
af Marx, Engels’, Lenins og Stalins tanker. Hertil kom forsøg på at overhale 
USSR i et økonomisk og politisk kapløb om først at nå frem til det forjættede 
kommunistiske samfund. Dette fik katastrofale konsekvenser, da det, der blev 
lanceret som ”Det Store Spring Fremad” (1958-60), slog totalt fejl og endte som 
en hungerkatastrofe med utallige millioner ofre for sultedøden (Peng 1987).  I 
slutningen af 1960erne og begyndelsen af 1970erne tog rivaliseringen en ny 
drejning, idet USSR blev omdefineret fra at være revisionister til 
”socialimperialister” og hermed hovedfjenden (Dillon, Burton & Soderlund 
1977). Dette åbnede meget bekvemt  muligheder for et taktisk samarbejde med 
et USA (Chang 1987; Lampton 1995), der på dette tidspunkt var ved at nå frem 
til den erkendelse, at man ikke kunne blive ved med at lade som om verdens 
folkerigeste nation ikke eksisterede, og som derfor var ved at være moden til en 
normalisering af forholdet (Segal 1980). 
 
Der var Mao. ikke længere nogen kommunistisk lejr at stræbe efter lederskabet 
af. Til gengæld var der hele den 3. Verden, som nu – af  bl.a. Maos designerede 
efterfølger, Lin Piao, og især under Kulturrevolutionen (1967-69) blev udråbt 
som verdensrevolutionens spydspids, samtidigt med, at  Kina blev defineret som 
en del af denne 3. Verden (Lin Piao 1965; Ginneken 1976; Ness 1993). Til 
sikring af den ideologiske kontinuitet kunne man heldigvis finde nogle skrifter 
fra 1920erne, hvori Mao selv havde peget på småbønderne som et aktiv for 
revolutionen (Mao Tse-tung 1927) – og den 3. Verden var jo i virkeligheden 
verdens småbønder i en eller anden vag henseende. Som  illustration af 
sammenfiltringen af det ideologiske og nationale blev Lin Piaos udrensning i 
1971 i øvrigt efterfulgt af en besynderlig ideologisk kampagne mod “Lin Piao 
og Konfutse” (Chang 1974; Goldman 1975). 
 
Selvom hele dette ideologiske narrativ naturligvis på behørig vis refererede 
tilbage til de marxistiske koryfæer (om nødvendigt dog til endog meget apokryfe 
skrifter), så havde man dog også med omhu sørget for foreneligheden med det 
nationale narrativ, det stadig spillede en rolle i baggrunden, nøjagtigt som det 
havde været tilfældet for Sovjetunionen siden Stalins overtagelse af magten. 
Logikken var som følger: Hvis det hele handlede om verdensrevolutionen, og 
Kina/Sovjetunionen var spydspidsen og den ultimative garant for denne, ja så 
var det at fremme Kinas/Sovjetunionens nationale interesser en vigtig (måske 
endog den vigtigste) forudsætning for verdens kommunistiske fremtid. Hermed 
var der skabt plads i det store kommunistisk/nationalistiske narrativ til både en 
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taktisk alliance med USA og til endog meget usædvanlige både inden- og 
udenrigspolitiske krumspring, som f.eks. det at støtte den samme part i 
borgerkrigen i Angola som både USA, apartheidstyret i Sydafrika og det 
gennemkorrupte Mobuto-styre i Zaïre støttede (Jackson 1995).       
   
Formand Maos død i 1976 fik et kort og kaotiske mellemspil, først med den 
såkaldte “4-bande” bestående af Maos enke, Jiang Qing, samt Zhang Chun-qiao, 
Yao Wen-yuan og Wang Hong-wen og herefter en udpræget overgangsfigur, 
Hua Guo-feng (Gomes 1977; Dittmer 1978). I 1981 kom imidlertid den tidligere 
(oven i købet to gange) udrensede Deng Xiao-ping (1904-1997) til magten, som 
han beholdt til sin død i 1997, hvilket ikke blot satte en stopper for 
magtkampene (i hvert fald de åbenlyse), men også reelt for de efterhånden 
meget skolastiske ideologiske mummespil. Deng var tidligere blevet skoset for 
sin pragmatiske vurdering af katte (det var lige meget med farven, bare de kunne 
fange  mus), og han gjorde nu denne pragmatik til rettesnoren for Kinas fortsatte 
udvikling, bl.a. med sine “fire moderniseringer” af hhv. landbruget, industrien, 
videnskab/ teknologi og forsvar (Baum 1994: 54-55; Faust & Kornberg 1995: 
113-116; Bachman 1986; Naughton 1993). 
  
Det er denne linje, der har været den dominerende indtil i dag, bl.a. takket være 
dens fantastiske succes, der sikret en lang ubrudt periode med en økonomisk 
vækst helt uden fortilfælde. Denne har været ledsaget af  en udstrakt 
privatisering, så man med betydelig ret kan tale om en kapitalistisk udvikling, 
der blot gennemføres med et parti ved roret, der stadig kalder sig kommunistisk 
(Guthrie 1999: 198-218 & passim). Siden denne de facto opgivelse af 
kommunismen har gjort nationalismen til det vigtigste legitimitetsgrundlag for 
kommunistpartiers fortsatte kontrol (Zheng 1999: 46-66). 
 
 
Konsekvenser for Udenrigspolitikken 
Af ovenstående kan man uddestillere nogle helt overordnede målsætninger, der 
har denne status fordi de enten er forenelige med eller truer statens og nationens 
identitet og nationale interesse. De kan sammenfattes til sikringen af et samlet, 
uafhængigt og stærkt Kina, der behandles med behørig respekt af andre stater. 
Der er historiske grunde til alle disse målsætninger, men de er ikke 
nødvendigvis altid forenelige. 
  
Et samlet Kina har ikke altid været en realitet, men staten har i flere perioder 
været delt op i indbyrdes stridende dele, senest i “krigsherreperioden” i 
mellemkrigstiden (ca. 1916-27), hvortil kommer de sidste levn fra 
imperialismens og de ulige traktaters periode. Det  engelske Hong Kong og det 
portugisiske Macao er omsider blevet forenet med moderlandet (Lo 2007), men 
tilbage står det tidligere japansk koloniserede Taiwan, som vi skal vende tilbage 
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til nedenfor. Hertil kommer Tibet, som Kina siden 1951har formået at bevare 
kontrollen over, efter den fejlslagne opstand i 1956-59 (Heberer 1995). Der har 
været mange spekulationer om, hvorvidt Kina har yderligere territoriale 
ambitioner, førend det vil opfatte samlingsprojektet som fuldbyrdet. Nabolande 
har f.eks. været bekymrede over offentliggørelsen i 1992 af kinesiske kort, det 
bl.a. omfattede Mongoliet (eller “Det ydre Mongoli,” som kineserne foretrækker 
at kaldet det) samt en række øer i det Sydkinesiske Hav (Harding 1993; Downs 
& Saunders 1998). Indtil nu har Kina tilsyneladende – bortset fra nogle mindre 
indsatser mht. Spratley-øerne (Møller 2002) og hele Taiwanpolitikken – ikke 
gjort meget for at indfri disse territorielle krav, men man kan på ingen måde 
udelukke, at appetitten gradvis vil vokse (Carlson 2003; Møller 1998). Man 
kunne også frygte, at Kina vil begynde at agere som moderland for den 
kinesiske diaspora, dvs. de mange millioner udlandskinesere i bl.a. Sydøstasien 
(Gungwu 1993; Thunø 2001), hvilket ville følge logisk af den ene af de to 
former for nationalisme nævnt i indledningen, nemlig den etniske,  men ikke af 
den anden og mere politiske. 
  
Bortset fra det territorielle aspekt vedrører spørgsmålet om det samlede Kina 
naturligvis også den indre sammenholdskraft, der bl.a. afhænger af styreformen. 
Der har tidligere været spekulationer om, at Kina var ved at falde fra hinanden – 
bl.a. som følge af kystregionernes mere intense samkvem med omverdenen 
(Segal 1994; White & Chang 1993), men konkrete studier af de enkelte områder 
synes ikke at give meget belæg for dette. Ganske vist er der visse centrifugale 
tendenser, f.eks. ved at de sydlige kystområder bliver rigere og mere liberale end 
det fattigere og mere “gammelkinesiske” nord, men kommunistpartiet synes 
hverken at være til sinds at afgive den overordnede kontrol eller på nogen måde 
at være tvunget til dette (Goodman & Segal, eds. 1994). Man kan derfor godt 
forestille sig en udvikling mod en mere føderal styreform med et vist selvstyre 
til de enkelte provinser – som Hong Kong allerede har opnået – men dette vil 
langtfra være ensbetydende med, at Kina falder fra hinanden. 
  
Et uafhængigt Kina har heller ikke altid været nogen selvfølge, jvfr. de 
ovennævnte “ulige traktater,” hvormed det formelt suveræne Kina blev 
påtvunget en reel afståelse af  suveræne rettigheder til vestmagterne og Japan - 
et klassisk eksempel på, hvad Krasner (2001) har kaldt “organiseret hykleri.” Så 
meget vigtigere er i dag de internationale normer om suverænitet og ikke-
indblanding i indre anliggender, hvor Kina også i forholdet til andre stater og 
bl.a. i FNs Sikkerhedsråd er meget påpasselig med ikke at skabe præcedens for 
indskrænkninger af suverænitet – hvor meget de end måtte være enige med 
vesten om selve substansen i en bestemt konflikt (Gill & Reilly 2000). At værne 
om suverænitetsprincippet er der dog ikke noget usædvanligt i, og  når Vesten i 
stigende grad taler om, at suverænitetsprincippet “ikke skal være helligt,” er det 
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som regel andres suverænitet, de vestlige lande hentyder til, mens de som oftest 
hæger nidkært om deres egen. 
  
Et stærkt Kina er i høj grad et spørgsmål om økonomisk styrke og vækst, som 
både er en forudsætning for indre sammenhold og for militær styrke. Selvom der 
i høj grad kan stilles spørgsmål til kommunistpartiets “procedure-legitimitet” (i 
hvert fra ud fra gængse kriterier om demokrati) kan et regime kompensere for 
mangler i denne henseende, hvis det kan opnå “præstations-legitimitet” 
(Huntington 1991:13; Gilley 2006). Det forekommer sandsynligt, at de i dag kun 
formelt kommunistiske styre kan bevare denne form for legitimitet, så længe det 
blot kan sikre, at hovedparten af befolkningen får det bedre og bedre år for år. 
Dette er lykkedes siden begyndelsen af 1980erne, næsten uanset hvordan man 
måler “præstationen”, f.eks. som “menneskelig udvikling” (UNDP 2005). Skulle 
denne gunstige udvikling imidlertid vende, kan man meget vel forestille sig, at 
befolkningen kan komme til den konklusion, at regimet har forbrudt sig mod 
“mandatet fra himlen,” og derfor kræve retten til at vælge et andet.    
 
Selvom der indgår andre elementer, forudsætter præstationslegitimitet 
utvivlsomt økonomisk vækst, der dog også skaber andre udfordringer for 
regimet. For det første betyder den eksportbaserede vækststrategi – og ikke 
mindst medlemskabet af verdenshandelsorganisationen WTO – at Kina må åbne 
sig for omverdenen, hvilket også er en forudsætning for at følge med i den 
teknologiske udvikling. Dette betyder dog næsten uvægerligt også, at man må 
sænke paraderne overfor alskens subversive ideer om f.eks. demokrati og 
menneskerettigheder, der kan snige sig ind f.eks. via internettet eller kinesiske 
studenters ophold i udlandet, (Reardon 1998; Xinbo 2001). For det andet 
indebærer den økonomiske udvikling et behov for ressourcer som f.eks. olie, 
hvilket bl.a. har afstedkommet mindre væbnede konfliktet med nabolandene om 
de ovenfor nævnte Spratlyøer, der i virkeligheden handler om retten til 
udnyttelse af de undersøiske olieforekomster i det Sydkinesiske Hav (Valencia 
1995; Kivimäki, ed. 2002). Hertil kommer en jagt på adgang til olieressourcer i 
resten af verden, ikke mindst i Afrika – der også er et vigtigt marked for 
kinesiske varer - hvilket undertiden har bragt landet på kollisionskurs med 
vesten (Jaffe & Lewis 2002; Alden 2005; Daojiong 2006).  
  
Det  ligger Kina meget på sinde at blive behandlet med den respekt, der 
tilkommer en stormagt - og ikke mindst ”Riget i Midten.” Omverdenen, og især 
vesten, har været med til at accentuere denne målsætning, dels gennem de ulige 
traktater, dels ved gennem mange år at formene Kina adgangen til FN 
(Quingguo 2005). Det er derfor næsten en rygmarvsrefleks af kineserne at sætte 
hælene i, hvis vesten f.eks. fortæller dem, hvordan Kina skal håndtere (hvad det 
selv opfatter som) dets indre anliggender, eller hvordan det skal håndtere dets 
relationer med tredjelande. Specielt kompliceret bliver det, når et tema af resten 
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af verden bliver opfattet som et udenrigspolitisk anliggende, mens Kina 
betragter det som indenrigspolitisk, således som det er tilfældet med relationerne 
til Taiwan, som vi afslutningsvis skal se lidt nærmere på.   
 
 
Hvad med Taiwan? 
Lige siden Generalissimo og leder af Kuomintang-partiet Chiang Kai-shek 
(1887-1975) i 1949 søgte tilflugt på Taiwan efter at have tabt borgerkrigen til de 
kommunistiske styrker, har denne mellemstore ø med i dag knap 23 millioner 
indbyggere stået i centrum for en af verdens længstvarende og mest 
komplicerede konflikter. Selvom der især har været tale om sabelraslen til 
forskel fra egentlige kamphandlinger, har konflikten manifesteret sig i gentagne 
kriser, hvoraf især  de to “Quemoy-kriser” i 1950’erne endog truede med at 
udløse en atomkrig (Halperin & Sou 1967; Chang 1990). Hele konflikten 
bringer i allerhøjeste grad identitetsspørgsmål i spil (for en uddybning se Møller 
1998). 
  
Fra 1949 og i hvert fald frem til begyndelsen af 1990erne (måske endda til i dag) 
har de to Kinaer paradoksalt nok været enige om én ting, nemlig at der kun er ét 
Kina, mens de til gengæld er fuldstændigt uenige om, hvem der har retten til at 
repræsentere dette noget luftige og næsten metafysiske “Kina.” For regeringen i 
Taiwan (dengang betegnet som Formosa eller Republikken Kina) var det 
indlysende, at den retmæssige regering var Kuomintang, der blot midlertidigt 
var blevet fordrevet af kommunistiske oprørere. Regeringen i Taipei opretholdt 
derfor (i hvert fald indtil 1987) formelt ambitionen om at generobre fastlandet 
med våbenmagt – og den Kolde Krig betød, at Vesten støttede i hvert fald den 
diplomatiske aspekt af dette projekt, hvilket bl.a. manifesterede sig i, at 
Formosa-styret  fortsatte med at repræsentere Kina i FNs Sikkerhedsråd og 
andre internationale fora samt gennem ambassader i andre lande (Garver 1997). 
 
Ét-Kina politikken betød så, at Folkerepublikken blev næsten totalt diplomatisk 
isoleret. Da USA under Nixon endelig besluttede sig til at anerkende styret i 
Beijing som repræsentant for “Kina” betød det til gengæld, at Taiwan blev 
isoleret – omend dets regering med meget ringe held forsøgte bogstavelig talt at 
købe sig til en slags diplomatisk status, f.eks. ved at yde rundhåndet bistand til 
en række meget fattige afrikanske og andre stater til gengæld for anerkendelse 
(Yang, ed. 1997; Henckaerts, ed. 1996; Taylor 2002). Eftersom det store Kina 
per automatik gengældte en sådan anerkendelse med at afbryde relationerne til 
de formastelige modtagere af taiwanesisk bistand, varede det sjældent længe, for 
disse kom på andre tanker og ”af-anerkendte” Taiwan for igen at blive taget til 
nåde af Beijing. 
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Hvad der gjorde dette diplomatiske spil endnu mere udsigtsløst var, at Taiwan 
ikke formelt erklærede sig som selvstændig stat, dvs. rev sig løs fra Kina. At 
anerkende et Taiwan, der allerede de facto var selvstændigt,  som en selvstændig  
stat, ville formentlig have været mere tillokkende for andre stater end at 
anerkende det som repræsentant for et fastlandskina med over en milliard 
indbyggere, som regeringen i Taipei tydeligvis ikke havde skygge af kontrol 
med. Hermed være dog ikke sagt, at diplomatisk anerkendelse ville have været 
noget let valg, da man jo måtte regne med kinesiske repressalier. Med den 
forsinkede indførelse af demokrati i Taiwan ville man imidlertid have haft en vis 
normativ basis for en anerkendelse, hvis f.eks. løsrivelsen havde været besluttet 
af en folkevalgt regering eller ved en folkeafstemning. 
 
At Kuomintang ikke tog dette skridt, skyldtes bl.a. at  partiet og dets væbnede 
styrker reelt havde invaderet øen og etableret et alt andet end demokratisk styre 
over den (Bullard 1997), der helt marginaliserede de oprindelige taiwanesere. 
Havde det opgivet rollen som eksilregering over hele Kina til fordel for en mere 
reel position som regering af Taiwan, ville det formentlig være blevet væltet til 
fordel for en regering, der faktisk repræsenterede den største befolkningsgruppe, 
nemlig de etniske taiwanesere og den store gruppe af Han-kinesere, der havde 
boet på øen i århundreder og følte sig mere som taiwanesere end som kinesere.  
 
Den gradvise indførelse og konsolidering af demokrati underminerede dog styret 
skridt for skridt. I 1988 blev således den første etniske taiwaneser, Lee Teng-
hui,  valgt til præsident (Jacobs & Liu 2007) og han blev i  2000 efterfulgt af en 
anden, Chen Shui-ban, der ikke engang tilhørte Kuomintang, men oppositionen, 
det Demokratiske Progressive Parti (DPP), som i princippet er tilhænger af 
løsrivelse. Ikke desto mindre lovede han i sin tiltrædelsestale at afstå ikke blot 
fra en formel uafhængighedserklæring, men også fra andre tiltag, der af Beijing 
kunne opfattes som løsrivelse (Bullard 2008).  
 
Det ser altså foreløbigt ud til, at status quo bevares. Trods sine mange ulogiske 
træk er den eksisterende situation da heller ikke så ringe endda. Reelt er Taiwan 
naturligvis selvstændigt med både en udstrakt udlandshandel og 
repræsentationer i de vigtigste lande, der ganske vist ikke nyder diplomatisk 
immunitet, men som sagtens kan underskrive kontrakter og andre aftaler. Kina 
tolererer også taiwanesisk deltagelse i mange internationale fora, når blot 
deltagerne betegnes som kommende fra f.eks. “Taipei, Kina” snarere end som 
repræsenterende “Taiwan” eller “Republikken Kina.” Der kommer desuden 
mere og mere økonomisk og andet samkvem på tværs af Formosastrædet, bl.a. i 
form af taiwanesiske investeringer på fastlandet, der er til gavn for begge sider 
(Leng 1996). Det diplomatiske spil, der konstant foregår mellem de to parter 
skal formentlig opfattes som netop et spil, med gentagne “næsten-løsrivelses-
erklæringer” fra Taiwans side og “næsten-trusler” fra Beijings. Sidstnævnte er i 
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øvrigt som oftest formuleret som dobbelte negationer à la “ikke at fraskrive sig 
retten til” at bruge magt, snarere end som utvetydige trusler, og det samme 
gælder de mere “muskuløse” skridt som opstilling og sågar affyring af missiler i 
retning mod Taiwan, men med vilje uden at ramme det (McDevitt 2004).      
 
Identitetsspørgsmålet kan blive afgørende for, om denne langtfra ideelle, men 
heller ikke helt utålelige, status quo kan bevares – men det er ikke helt klart på 
hvilken måde. På den ene side kunne man håbe på, at de (reelt) to Kinaer 
kommer til at ligne hinanden mere og mere, jo mindre kommunistisk og jo mere 
liberalt (om end ikke demokratisk), kapitalistisk og velstående Folkerepublikken 
bliver, og jo mindre den finder tilbage til den fælles konfutsianske arv. Måske 
kan Taiwan komme til frivilligt at acceptere en genforening – især hvis de finder 
udviklingen i Hong Kong tilfredsstillende og accepterer dette som en model for 
Taiwans plads i et forenet Kina (Cabestan 1996). På den anden side kan man 
heller ikke udelukke – og specielt ikke, jo mere demokratisk og dermed 
uforudsigeligt Taiwan bliver – at  presset for en løsrivelseserklæring bliver så 
stærkt, at den siddende regering bliver nødt til at udskrive en folkeafstemning på 
spørgsmålet (Zheng & Fook 2007; Ross 2006). I jo højere grad Kuomintang 
bliver trængt i baggrunden, kunne man f.eks. forestille sig, at taiwaneserne 
konstruerede nye identitets-narrativer ved at finde kapitler om deres ikke-
kinesiske fortid frem af historiens glemmebog (herunder perioden som japansk 
koloni fra 1895 til 1945). De kan herved komme til at opfatte sig som en 
selvstændig nation med samme ret til en stat som andre nationer (Rigger 1997; 
Shih 2007; Brown 2004; Hughes 1997: 95-104; Weiming 1996; Hsieh 2004). 
Hvis de to Kinaer kommer til at ligne hinanden ved at være nationalistiske kan 
der derfor opstå en konflikt ved at sammenstød mellem Folkerepublikkens 
inklusive og en eksklusive taiwanesisk nationalisme (Zheng & Fool 2007). 
 
 
Konklusion 
Vi har således set, hvordan en række gennemgående temaer om f.eks. Riget i 
Midten i kombination med et “offer-syndrom” præger Kinas definition af den 
nationale identitet og herved også konstruktionen af den nationale interesse, der 
langt hen af vejen udgør rammebetingelserne for de konkrete politikker i forhold 
til omverdenen – og ikke mindst i forhold til Taiwan. Der er dog ikke noget 
usædvanligt ved dette, da alle stater har en konstrueret identitet og heraf udledte 
nationale interesser som rettesnor for deres udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik. 
Med nationalismen som det centrale element er Kina en mere “normal” stat i det 
internationale system end da det definerede sig selv på grundlag af den 
maoistiske ideologi, og der er ingen grund til at antage, at Kina ikke skulle 
kunne indordne sig de almindelige regler for staternes indbyrdes samkvem i det 
internationale samfund. For Taiwans vedkommende er der dog grund til en vis 
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bekymring, men langtfra panik – og mange gode grunde for omverdenen såvel 
som den taiwanesiske regering til at træde varsomt.     
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The East Wind will not subside: Stormy Weather ahead? 
                                                                                                       
 
Jacques Hersh 
 
 
The evolution of East Asia after the demise of “real-existing socialism” has 
become a primary concern of social sciences and political strategists. Indeed, if 
there ever were a need to disprove the thesis of “The End of History” (Francis 
Fukuyama) a look to this part of the world would be sufficient to convince us 
that we may be witnessing the beginning of a new historical evolution. In other 
words, a shift of the centre of economic vitality from West to East or as implied 
by a return to normalcy in world history. (Andre Gunder Frank: ReOrient: 
Global Economy in the Asian Age, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998). 
 
Much thought had been given in the 1970s and 1980s to the shape of the world 
capitalist system as a result of the emergence of Japan as a leading economic 
power together with the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries. Regardless 
of the fact that the Japanese economy is only second to the United States, this 
challenge was successfully contained by US economic and financial strategy. 
(Jacques Hersh, The USA and the Rise of East Asia Since 1945, London: 
MacMillan Press Ltd. and New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1993). However, 
in recent years, the question of the future of East Asia’s position in the world has  
become an even greater  concern for Western strategists. The reason for this 
revolves around the impact China is having/will have on the international 
economic and political system.  Because of that nation’s size, population and 
potential this awareness was not only a product of the 20th and 21st century. In 
the beginning of the 1800s, Napoleon supposedly warned about the potential 
consequences of a dynamic China. “China is a sickly sleeping giant. But when 
she wakes the world will tremble”. (William Safire, Safire’s New Political 
Dictionary, New York: Random House, 1993). He is also said to have advised 
that the best course for the advanced countries would be to “let China sleep.” 
 
The 19th century stereotype portrayal of the Chinese socio-economic formation 
as being in a state of dormancy has the implication of depicting it as anaemic in 
comparison to the dynamism of the Western capitalist powers. This assumption 
can be ascribed to the “Orientalism” of Western thought in its appraisal of non-
European pre-capitalist societies. In fact, prior to the industrial revolution in 
England and before the “eclipse” of China in the 19th century, Adam Smith had 
considered  China as being ahead of Europe along the path of a similar 
trajectory. According to Andre Gunder Frank: 
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Smith… was the last major (Western) social theorists to appreciate that 
Europe was a Johnny-come-lately in the development of the wealth of 
nations: “China is a much richer country than any part of Europe,” Smith 
remarked in 1776. Smith did not anticipate any change in this comparison and 
showed no awareness that he was writing at the beginning of what has come 
to be called the “industrial revolution.” (Re-Orient: Global Economy in the 
Asian Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998, p.13; 
Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing - Lineages of the Twenty-First 
Century, (London and New York: Verso, 2007; 25-26). 
 
It is often forgotten that leading figures of the age of European Enlightenment 
such as Leibniz, Voltaire, and Quesnay, among others found inspiration in many 
aspects of Chinese society and political organization. They “looked to China for 
moral instruction, guidance in institutional development, and supporting 
evidence for their advocacy of causes such as benevolent absolutism, 
meritocracy, and an agriculturally based national economy.” (Michel Adas, 
Machines as Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989, 79; quoted in Arrighi, 
3). The historical achievements and advances of the Chinese socio-economic 
formation are important to understanding the relationship between East and 
West. This comprehension contributes also to the questioning of the Eurocentric 
interpretation of the so-called European miracle. Prior to the emergence of the 
domination of the Western wind, Asia was central to providing for the largest 
reproduction of people. Early on in the contact between Europe and Asia, 
“sixteenth-century Europeans had considered Japan and China to be the great 
hopes of the future,” according to the seminal work Asia in the Making of 
Europe by Donald Lach and Edwin van Kley. (Quoted in  Frank, 11).  The 
Chinese state –under successive empires—developed an administrative system 
of governance that facilitated the growth of economic resources and population. 
Before most governments in the world had even conceived of policies for 
preventing distress and death because of famines, the Chinese had implemented 
the strategies of procurement, storage, and distribution of grain in order to 
protect   the population against eventual ravages of famine through “ever-normal 
granaries”. During the Qing era, the state was proactively involved through an 
investment programme in agricultural improvement, irrigation and waterborne 
food transportation. (Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Perilous Passage – Mankind and 
the Global Ascendancy of Capital, London, Boulder, New York, Toronto, 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005, 141,142).  The urban 
centres were more developed than the corresponding contemporary European 
cities. The wealth of major cities and the level of craftsmanship amazed many 
first-time European travellers to China.  In the sphere of scientific discoveries 
and application to production processes, China was at the forefront of 
modernization.  The three inventions, which according to Francis Bacon 
changed the world: paper, gunpowder, and the magnetic compass, were of 
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Chinese origin. After a long time lag they spread to Europe and other parts of 
the world. (Joseph Needham et al., Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 1, 
London: CUP, 1954).   
 
Before the growth of machine-based manufactures in Britain, China and India 
were the two most important suppliers of manufactured goods to the world. “In 
1750 China produced 32.8 percent of world manufactures, India (meaning the 
subcontinent of South Asia) produced 24.5 percent, and today’s developed 
countries together produced 27.0 percent. (Colin Simons, 1985 quoted in 
Bagchi, op.cit. 135). Silk manufacturing from the cocoons to the major silk-
working machinery was pioneered by Chinese producers and the country was a 
major supplier to the world. The so-called “silk road” became a major route of 
export of Chinese textiles and porcelain wares to Europe and North Africa for 
more than two thousand years. (Ibid. 137). From the sixteenth century on, the 
Chinese economy became more closely connected to the formation of a global 
economy through the activities of Portuguese and Spanish merchants with the 
extension of ocean trade routes. The accumulation process that resulted from the 
economic relations established on the world scale after the incorporation of the 
Americas and Africa was essential to the later evolution of European capitalism. 
Without access to the resources from these continents and the products from 
Asia, Western capitalist development might have followed a different trajectory. 
Industrial capitalism was not an entirely home grown phenomenon. From 
different perspectives, both Adam Smith and Karl Marx recognized the 
importance of this historical period for the development of the world. In his 
magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations, written in 1776, Smith writes that: 
 
The discovery of America, and that of the passage to the East Indies by the 
Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest events recorded in the history of 
mankind. (Smith 1937: 557; Frank 1998: 13). 
 
Contrary to his present-day followers, Adam Smith was somewhat uncertain as 
to the benefits or misfortunes these great events would have on human kind. 
(Ibid. 189). Writing after the impact of the industrial revolution had revealed 
itself, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were more explicit about the importance 
of the geographical extension economic relations to other continents for the 
establishment of an international division of labour for the development of 
capitalism: 
 
The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground 
for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the 
colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of 
exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to 
industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby to the revolutionary 
element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development. … Modern 
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industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of 
America paved the way. (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the 
Communist Party” in Selected Works in Two Volumes, Volume I, Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958, 35; Frank ibid.).  
 
But contrary to the Eurocentric interpretation of history, it cannot be emphasized 
sufficiently that until late in the game Europe was the inferior part in the 
relationship to Asia. The trade balance to China was clearly in favour of the 
Chinese with the Europeans covering the deficit with the silver mined in the 
Americas. As Bagchi puts it: “… for two centuries after the discovery of the 
Americas, the Europeans were unable to compete on equal terms with Asian 
manufactures.” (Bagchi 142).  Consequently, neither Spain nor Portugal, the two 
powers that gained most immediately from the exploitation of the Amerindians, 
was able to impinge on the power of the big Asian or Eurasian empires of 
Ottoman Turkey, China, India, or Persia. (Ibid.). 
 
Western social sciences have had difficulties coming to terms with the 
comparative development of Europe in relation to these non-European entities. 
It has been difficult for mainstream sciences to admit that the level of 
development in extra-European regions of the world might have been more 
advanced than that of the Western socio-economic formations. According to this 
position, the reasons for the present disparity are to be found in the superiority 
of inherent European capacities to innovate in relation to the other cultural 
spheres. In this way of thinking, the “exceptionality” of European civilization 
was due to the internal dynamism of European culture. In recent years, the 
Eurocentric interpretation of world economic history has been challenged by 
scholars whose aim is to explain the timing and origins of the disparity between 
Europe and the rest of the world in relation to the divergent paths of 
development. It has been documented that human development, the two most 
populous countries of the world, India and China, were doing just as well as the 
best-performing regions of Europe down to the middle of the 18th century. In 
terms of commercialisation, craft production and agricultural growth, China, 
India and Japan were not behind contemporary major European countries. With 
the exceptions of  England and the Netherlands, there was little to distinguish 
most of early modern Europe from major states in Asia during the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries with regard to economic organization, property rights, or 
civil society –traits that according to Eurocentric historians had marked Europe 
out for its “manifest destiny”.(Bagchi ibid, 174; Goldstone, J.A., “The Problem 
of the ‘Early Modern’ World” in Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient, 1998, 41 (3), 249-84). 
 
There cannot be any doubt that the trajectory of Western Europe would have 
been different had it not been for the discovery of America and the subjugation 
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of its population and that of Africa. In economic terms Europe had been in a 
catching-up position vis-à-vis especially the Asian centres. The establishment of 
plantations of sugarcane, cotton and tobacco in the Americas with slave labour 
imported from Africa was critical for the development of European capitalism. 
The flow of precious metals extracted from mines in America was essential in 
settling Western Europe’s accounts with Oriental countries. In the words of 
Bagchi: “…the colonial edge was less a product of initial or technological 
superiority in civil production than of advantages won on the battlefield.”(Ibid. 
175 ) From this perspective, the industrial revolution in Britain had been 
contingent on the conquest of India and the reduction of China to a subsidiary 
position relative to the Western powers.  
 
What is being argued here is that the late development of Western Europe came 
about through the tribute of extra-European regions which contributed to the 
capital accumulation process of the continent and served to redress the trade 
imbalances with Asia.  
 
Recognition of this process is what differentiates the three schools of 
international political economy that have confronted each other in interpreting 
the development of capitalism in the past few centuries. While liberalism 
assumes that market relations with little state intervention as possible lead to a 
harmonious world economy, economic nationalism recognizes that late 
development is mainly a political project of industrialization which protects the 
national economy against the interests of the first developers’ control of the 
world market. The dependency school, which is an offshoot of Marxism - with 
its analysis of the creation of surplus value under capitalism - and Leninism - 
with its inclusion of the concept of imperialism, brings in the exploitation of 
other societies in the conceptualisation of capitalism. (For a discussion of the 
different perspectives see: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of 
International Relations, Princeton, New Jersey: Princton University Press, 
1987). 
 
Regardless of the fact that Marxism was the most antisystemic approach to the 
analysis of capitalism, it has had problems in coming to terms with the 
Eurocentric perspective. The dilemma is reflected in the fundamental 
assumption depicting capitalism as the most accomplished socio-economic 
formation in the history of mankind. In the pamphlet Manifesto of the 
Communist, which was published in London in 1848, K. Marx and F. Engels 
offered a problematic understanding of the functioning of European capitalism’s 
mode of expansion to other regions of the world:  
 
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it 
batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely 
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obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to 
introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois 
themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. (Marx and 
Engels, op. cit., 28). 
 
The supposition  that the competitive superiority of capitalist production is the 
explanation behind the European miracle became axiomatic for Euro-Marxism. 
This notwithstanding the fact, Marx and Engels had shown awareness that the 
success of capitalism was much more than the functioning of purely economic 
mechanisms. They recognized that the use of military power had been the 
midwife to breaking down opposition to the expansion of European capitalism. 
In an article published in 1853 in the New York Daily Tribune, Marx touches 
upon the Opium War whereby Britain broke down the resistance of China to the 
importation of opium in order to do away with the British trade deficit with 
China and ruined the Chinese society. He remarks that: 
 
Up to 1830, the balance of trade being continually in favour of the Chinese, 
there existed an uninterrupted importation of silver from India, Britain and the 
United States into China. Since 1833, and especially since 1840, the export of 
silver from China to India has become almost exhausting for the Celestial 
Empire. (Karl Marx, “Revolution in China and in Europe”, in K. Marx and F. 
Engels, On Colonialism, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, no 
date, 16). 
 
The narrative utilized by NeoMarxism, especially in the Dependency School 
version, to describe the ascent of Europe to its world hegemonic position, 
includes the tribute that non-European social formations paid to the process. In 
this respect the conquest of the Americas by the Spaniards and Portuguese, 
following the “discovery” of that part of the world, led to the establishment of 
plantations of sugarcane, cotton and tobacco utilizing African slave labour. This 
together with the flow of precious metals, such as silver, extracted from mines in 
America became crucial in settling Western Europe’s deficit with Asia. The 
control of this flow of wealth became a source of contention between the leading 
contenders for  hegemony. The accumulation of capital resulting from this type 
of triangular trading pattern was critical for the societal transition of European 
capitalism and later evolution. In the words of Bagchi: “The role of colonialism 
did not cease with the end of the phase of merchant capital in Europe. The final 
conquest of India and the beginning of the reduction of China to a subsidiary of 
European powers played important roles in the facilitating the progress of the 
industrial revolution in Britain.” (Bachi 175). It can consequently be argued that 
the other side of the coin of European industrial capitalism was the triangulation 
of the industrialisation process in Asia. Protecting its own textile industries from   
cotton goods of Indian origin and denying these exports access to the European 
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continent, British cotton mills were able to develop without facing this 
competition. Duties on import of textiles were prohibitive until the end of the 
18th  century. Not only that but under British rule, Indian domestic production 
suffered reverse discrimination: they were made to pay higher duties on exports 
than English imports. “India was turned into the biggest consumer of products of 
the British cotton mills, which for a long time remained the industry employing 
the largest number of British workers. (Bagchi 176). 
 
China likewise was deindustrialized after the first Opium War (1839-1842). At 
the turn of the 19th century, the West imported silks, porcelain, and tea. China 
who had a diversified economy was not seeking to import Western goods. The 
Western nations –foremost Britain—were, as mentioned above, redressing the 
balance of payment with export of silver. By forcing China to import Indian 
opium the outflow of silver was reversed. British commercial expansion came to 
depend on this trading relation: “Though the First Opium War was launched to 
defeat Chinese attempts to ban the opium trade, the British also wanted to ‘open’ 
China to Western trade and commerce on terms acceptable to them.” (Victor 
Nee and James Peck, editors, Introduction in China’s Uninterrupted revolution, 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1975, 5). The international division of labour 
accompanying the expansion and extension of European capitalism was the 
result of the pattern of trade established during this period. The extra-European 
colonies of Europe’s powers became also important consumers of the products 
of the industrialization process in the North Atlantic realm. “Thus colonies 
played a critical part in the maturing of the first axial age separating Europe and 
its settler colony extensions from the rest of the world.” (Bagchi 176 ). 
 
With regard to China, the British victory in the Opium War was interwoven with 
a deepening internal crisis that was aggravated by the Western economic 
expansion in the country. Compared to previous invaders that could be absorbed 
in the vast nation, the Western nations not only had superior weapons but 
commanded a power unleashed by the Industrial Revolution which was able 
through a combination of military might and economic means to undermine the 
foundations of China’s self-sufficient agricultural economy and burgeoning 
industrialization as well as the country’s traditional culture and values. (Lee and 
Peck 4 ). 
 
The development of European capitalism, which enabled it to expand to the rest 
of the world, compared to the relative late-development of Asia is paradoxical to 
the extent that prior to the 19th century at least, the positions were reversed. In 
other words it was the West that had been  backward in relation to East and 
South Asia. This observation applies both to the level of economic activity as 
well as to that of societal organization. The attempt to conceptualise, what must 
have appeared as an anomaly to Eurocentric social sciences, has not been 
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successful in bridging the gap of misunderstanding. The question is of 
importance as it has a certain relevance to the present evolution of the different 
parts of the world. The divergence of trajectories that characterized the 
dynamism of European capitalism and the eclipse of the Asian socio-economic 
formations has still not been satisfactorily mapped.  
 
Evidence suggests that European social scientists of the eighteenth century 
realized the advanced position of China as compared to that of Europe. When 
Adam Smith wrote in 1776, “China is a much richer country than any part of 
Europe” he was echoing David Hume who had appreciated Europe’s relative 
underdevelopment. (Frank 13). But following the Industrial Revolution, a new 
perception of European superiority came to dominate the scientific community 
and the accompanying theory building. In the words of Frank: 
 
The coming of the industrial revolution and the beginning colonialism of Asia 
had intervened to reshape European minds, and if not to ‘invent’ all history, 
then at least to invent a false universalism under European initiation and 
guidance. Then in the second half of the nineteenth century, not only was 
world history rewritten wholesale, but “universal” social “science” was 
newborn, not just as a European, but as a Eurocentric invention. (Ibid. 14). 
 
The agenda of the paradigm shift focused on the assumption of a teleological 
dimension to the development of capitalism for the evolution of mankind. The 
question to be answered in relation to non-European social formations became 
one of conceptualising their inherent propensity to stagnancy and focusing on 
the conditions preventing the dynamism of capitalist social relations from 
emerging. The fundamental supposition that capitalism is most in accordance 
with human nature derives from Adam Smith’s often quoted adage that of the 
division of labour being an inescapable consequence of a “certain propensity in 
human nature … to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.” (Adam 
Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (1776), Middlesex, England, and New York: 
Penguin Books, 1974, 117). 
  
If this axiom of liberalism is applied to world history then, the need arises to 
explain the reasons why the modern world capitalist economy emerged in 
Europe and not in other social formations. It is the narrative that sees the rise of 
capitalism as an exclusive European phenomenon that contributed to creating 
the foundation of what has been called Eurocentrism whose basic tenet is that 
this was due to historical forces generated within Europe itself. Implicitly and 
explicitly this scientific approach came to give legitimacy to  the policies and 
strategies which European states followed in relation to  other cultures and 
civilizations. Biology and implicit racism was one explanation, demography, 
environment and climate, rationality, technology, society including the state, 
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religion, etc. have been used to construct an ideologically-determined discourse 
in relation to non-Europeans.1 Despite recognition of fundamental divergences 
between the West and rest, as well as diversity among different peoples and 
social formations, Eurocentrism nevertheless came to project a nonlinear 
societal development path whereby the rest of the world would duplicate  the 
European experience. As the historical sociologist Barrington Moore put it: 
“There was a time in the still recent past when many intelligent thinkers 
believed there was only one main highway to the world of modern industrial 
society…” (Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, London, 1967, 159). 
 
 
Advanced Europe, Backward Asia! 
Two explanations that came to stand out in the body of social sciences with 
regard to the passage from feudalism to capitalism are 1) The Asiatic Mode of 
Production and 2) The importance of the cultural dimension in Europe’s 
transition. While the first relies on an environmentalist-materialist approach, the 
second puts emphasis on a culturalist explication. 
 
1) Concerning the first, travellers to Asia in the 18th century, such as the 
physician Francois Bernier and the political thinkers Boulainvillier and 
Montesquieu portrayed these societies as centres of political despotism. In 
contrast to Europe, these formations were said to rely on slavery and to be 
characterized by the non-existence of private property –with the ruler in 
complete control of the land.2 The interesting aspect of the conceptualisation of 
the Asiatic Mode of Production was that it appeared to fit in the materialist 
frame of reference of Marxian societal analysis by combining the natural 
environment and climatic conditions with the form of political organization.  
 
In the final analysis, the explication of pre-capitalist Asian societies is based on 
a theory placing these formations in a status of inferiority to that of European 
feudalism. In the words of Blaut, “This theory has a number of variants which 
are known by various names, among them “the Asiatic Mode of Production,” 
“hydraulic society,” and “oriental despotism.” (Blaut 80-81). It is not entirely 
coherent to the extent that it seems split between a kind of environmental 
determinism and the assumption of a developed level of technology. However, 
in an evolutionary perspective, irrigation-based (“hydraulic”) societal formations 
                                                          
1  For a critical discussion of the mythology behind Eurocentrism see: J.M. Blaut, The 
Colonizer’s Model of the World – Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History, 
New York: The Guilford Press, 1993, Chapter 2. 
2  For a critical discussion of the question of the transition to capitalism, see: Jacques Hersh, 
“Some Problems Concerning the Concept of Asiatic Mode of Production”, in Marxistisk 
Anthropologi, 1977, vol. 3, nr. 1.  
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are seen as inhibiting development because of the overbearing state structure 
and bureaucracies. According to this approach, this type of organization was 
directly related to the need for adjustment to the environment and climate that 
made irrigation necessary. Thus the identification of river-valley civilization, 
from Egypt to China, with “oriental despotism” was common in the 19th century.  
Viewed from an evolutionary angle, these types of society were thus seen as 
being blocked in their progression towards capitalism. This was the dominating 
paradigm of the scientific community in the 19th century. The model of 
European capitalism determined the level and tools of analysis of other type 
societies following the Industrial Revolution and the rise and increasing use of 
science together with the spread of the political philosophy of evolution and the 
notion of progress deriving from the French Revolution. As pointed out by 
Teodor Shanin there was general agreement concerning the involved 
methodology among social scientists. “Central to it was evolutionism – the arch-
model of those times, as prominent in the works of Darwin as in the philosophy 
of Spencer, in Comte’s positivism and in the socialism of Fourier and Saint 
Simon. Evolutionism is, essentially, a combined solution to the problem of 
heterogeneity and change.” (Teodor Shanin, The Late Marx and the Russian 
Road – Marx and the ’Peripheries of Capitalism’, New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1983, 4). Based on the basic assumption of a structurally necessary 
development, it was the task of the scientific method to uncover the order and 
explanation of the various stages through which the diversity of forms, physical, 
biological and social would go through. In this optic, change was seen as a 
necessary part of reality while on the other hand it projected a narrative of 
unwarranted optimism and nonlinear determinism according to which  “… the 
progress through stages meant also the universal and necessary ascent to a world 
more agreeable to the human or even to the ‘absolute spirit’ or God himself. 
(Ibid.). 
 
Although Marx acquiesced to a certain evolutionism in his periodization of the 
history of civilization (the typology of historical development went through 
tribal society, primitive communism, feudalism and capitalism), he was 
disenchanted with the nonlinear reductionism of the evolutionist scheme.  
According to Shanon, Marx’s position on differentiating between feudalism in 
its European form and the corresponding pre-capitalist formations in the East 
was an attempt to define the background for surge of capitalism in Europe. “In 
consequence and already by 1853 Marx had worked out and put to use the 
concepts of Oriental Despotism and of the Asiatic Mode of Production, its close 
synonym, as a major theoretical supplement and alternative to nonlinear 
explanations.” (Shanin 5 ). This interpretation overlooks the fact that both Marx 
and Engels were products of their time, meaning that they were both influenced 
by and in opposition to the social theories in vogue. Besides their knowledge 
about the world outside of Europe was rather limited except for what they 
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learned in the press, in books and in official papers representing the colonial 
point of view. Consequently they did not seriously question the dominant 
perception of the Orient as being despotic and historically stagnant. However 
their position was not based on a culturalist  approach, but on the natural 
environment as the determining element for the societal form. As Blaut puts it:  
“…their scepticism about European social theory, with its elitist foundations, 
immunized them from the usual explanations for Asian despotism and 
stagnation. Asians were no less rational than Europeans, and no less willing to 
struggle against economic exploitation.” (Blaut 82).  The theory of the Asiatic 
Mode of Production was modified by Marx and Engels and was altogether 
rejected by the latter in his late writings. Karl Marx, not being exclusively a 
social scientist, who analysed reality wanted to change it as well. In the article 
on the revolution in China and in Europe, he touched upon the two ideas that 
were to constitute the core of the various Marxist imperialism theories a half 
century later. On the one hand, the development of European capitalism and its 
expansion on a world scale was creating a single world economic system and on 
the other, the resulting convulsions would influence the evolution of Europe 
itself. (Helene Carrere d’Encausse and Stuart Schram, Le Marxisme et l’Asie 
1853-1964, Paris: Armand Colin, 1965, 16). 
 
After the establishment of state socialist formations, the notion of Asiatic Mode 
of Production disappeared from the Soviet-controlled body of social sciences. 
However, at the height of the Cold War, a former Komintern specialist on Asian 
affairs revived the concept. In his book Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel  not 
only resuscitated the notion of the Asiatic Mode of Production, but elaborated its 
scope by maintaining that movement toward capitalist modernization could only 
be found in feudal societies (such as in Europe and Japan) while Asiatic 
formations were inadaptable to modern-type transformations because  in his 
words: “Hydraulic society is the outstanding case of societal stagnation.” (Karl 
Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism – A Comparative Study of Total Power, New 
Haven, 1957, 420). Accordingly, this condition predetermined the political 
totalitarianism of the state socialist formation. 
 
2) The culturalist explanation of the European advance and Asian backwardness 
owed most to the German sociologist, Max Weber. According to this 
interpretation of world history and specifically the development of capitalism in 
Europe, the main reasons are to be found in the cultural realm, and not least in 
religion. This thesis was expressed clearly in the book The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism published in 1905. On the occasion of the 100th 
anniversary of its publication Francis Fukuyama considers it to be the “most 
famous sociological tract ever written.” Whereas the sociology of Marxism was 
based on a materialist interpretation of social formations, Weber puts emphasis 
on the cultural background as the most important explicatory element. The 
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difference between the two approaches is in Fukuyama’s formulation: “It was a 
book that stood Karl Marx on his head. Religion, according to Weber, was not 
an ideology produced by economic interests (the ‘opiate of the masses,’ as Marx 
had put it); rather, it was what had made modern capitalism possible.” (Francis 
Fukuyama, “The Calvinist Manifesto”, in The New York Times, March 5, 2005). 
 
The point of entry for Weber to the understanding the great divergences between 
European capitalism and Asian underdevelopment was the difference in the two 
cultural backgrounds. The evolution of rationality among Europeans was seen as 
leading to a kind of “economic ethic” – a set of values, aspirations and logical 
thought processes that emerged in connection with the Puritanism of 
Protestantism—nurturing, in the last instance, capitalism. The point is that 
neither European capitalism nor assume Asian backwardness are  explained by 
an exclusive religious approach. As Blaut puts it: “Weber is not (as some think) 
explaining capitalism and modernity in terms narrowly of religion. He does 
invoke religion to explain many aspects of the supposed traditionalism of 
Asians, but here too a primordial irrationality is seen as underlying religion. (He 
writes, for instance, of the ‘magical traditionalism’ of Indians and Chinese)” 
(Blaut 103). 
 
The idea of inherent European rationality has taken an axiomatic position in 
social sciences such as history in its analysis of the past or in development 
studies Modernization theory, whereby the capitalist development is projected 
the model to be emulated.   A serious criticism of the culturalist theory arises 
when one considers the fact that in his study of the economic history of China 
and Japan, Weber concluded that these countries were condemned to remain 
backward because of their lack of the protestant ethic. The culturalist approach 
shows its inconsistency when applying it to East Asia. The underdevelopment of 
the societies of that region of the world was previously ascribed to their cultural 
background, while since the recent phenomenon of the East Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries is ascribed to their shared cultural heritage that 
combines Buddhism and Confucianism and traditional strong state 
interventionism in the economy. What was considered to be the explicatory 
element for the backwardness of these societies in the past was now put forward 
as the explanation for their dynamism. 
 
In the comparative study of different type societies it is necessary to attempt to 
develop an understanding of development based on the existing conditions. It 
can perhaps be said that because the conceptual tools of analysis have been 
developed in the European cultural sphere and thus makes it difficult to analyse 
societies with a different background. Perhaps Gunder Frank’s critique against 
the great social scientists for their lack of inclusion of the concrete societal 
arrangements outside of the Western sphere is valid. The shortcoming however 
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is related more to the lack of knowledge of the concrete case that is being 
investigated. The saying that when you have a hammer in your hand, there is a 
tendency to see nails all over! Writing about the “hammer” of economics, 
Robert Heilbronner states in unequivocal terms that “Economics is concerned 
exclusively with the study of capitalism. To presume that it applies to societies 
that do not possess the unique characteristics of capitalism will only lessen its 
capacity to illuminate the society to which it properly applies.” (Robert L. 
Heilbroner, “The nature of economics” in Challenge, Vol. 38, 1995) The 
implication being that economics has no relevance in the study of hunting or 
gathering tribes nor can it be applied to noncapitalist-stratified societal orders 
such as kingdoms, empires, feudalities, command societies, or self-styled 
socialism. (Ibid. ) Where the criticism of Eurocentric social sciences is 
appropriate is the attempt to project the European experience as the point of 
departure in the analysis of the past as well as of the future. As the 
anthropologist Daniel Thorner has put it: 
 
From our perspective, European feudalism of the high Middle Ages may be 
seen as embodying a particular form of peasant economy. Nothing is gained 
by trying to view all peasant economies as variations of that one rather special 
form. The time has arrived to treat European experience in categories derived 
from world history, rather than to squeeze world history into Western 
European categories. (Daniel Thorner, “Peasant Economy as a Category in 
Economic history” in Teodor Shanin (ed.) Peasants and Peasant Societies, 
Hammondsworth: 1971, 217). 
 
 
Development as a Political Process 
A related fundamental shortcoming of mainstream Eurocentric development 
scholarship is its failure to take the international dimension between the core 
countries and what is called the periphery. Thus even though the European 
experience is offered as the model to be copied by the non-European societies, 
the theoretical body of the  Modernization tradition is oblivious to the fact that 
Western capitalism itself has been a hindrance to the development of non-
European capitalism. Given the fact that European capitalism morphed into 
imperialism, this advice proved to be more than naïve. It can consequently be 
argued that the conceptualisation of development and international relations 
demands an approach that includes all aspects of the processes involved.3  
 
                                                          
3  International political economy by combining the different aspects of development and 
international relations seems to be the best suited methodology to break down the 
“compartmentalization” of social sciences that  accompanied the emergence of the modern 
capitalist state.  
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Like other parts of Asia, China in the 19th century became prey to the 
competition between imperialist powers. The unfolding of this systemic force 
contributed to the forging of the later evolution of this part of the world as 
political actors turned the imperialist danger into an opportunity for societal 
change! To a large extent it was the fate of China at the hands of the Western 
European powers and the emergence of the United States in East Asia that 
contributed to the surge of economic nationalism and anti-imperialism in the 
region. In this relation, Japan offers a classic example. The internal crisis of 
Japanese feudalism combined with the “opening” of the country to the West by 
Commodore Mathew Perry led to the Meiji Restoration of 18684. The resulting  
“feudal-merchant” coalition that initiated the abolition of feudalism and the 
beginning of industrial capitalism realised the importance of a strong state and 
intervention in the economy. (E.H. Norman, Origins of the Modern Japanese 
State, Chapter III: The Restoration).  Industrial strategy, protectionism and other 
aspects of state capitalism formed what has been called the “capitalist 
developmental state.” (Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 
Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 1982). During the second half of the 
20th century, variants of this model were implemented by the Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) in Eastern Asia. (See: Chalmers Johnson, “The 
Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan”, in Fredric C. Deyo, The 
Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca and New York: 
Cornell University Press, Second Printing 1988) and Hagen Koo, “The Interplay 
of State, Social Class, and World System in East Asian Development: The Cases 
of South Korea and Thailand,” in ibid.). 
 
Like other exemplars of late development  in the world system (such as the 
United States and Germany) had earlier demonstrated, the Japanese elite 
realized that economic development is not simply a function of the unfolding of 
market mechanisms as claimed by contemporary British “Cosmopolitan” liberal 
political economy. Late industrialization required protection for infant industries 
from the competition of the more industrialized states. Free trade was in fact the 
protectionism of the strong! The German political economist, Friedrich List, 
accused England of hypocrisy for having first  protected her  textile industry 
from the competition of Indian cotton and silk before achieving supremacy and 
thereafter having projected free trade on the world. (Friedrich List, The National 
                                                          
4  The usual English translation of the Japanese term shin by “restoration” is somewhat of a 
misnomer. “Renovation” would be a more accurate translation. According to J.A.A. Stock 
win: ”Given the root and branch character of the changes which the Japanese people 
subsequently underwent, the sum total of the changes may well be regarded as 
revolutionary.” (Governing Japan – Divided Politics in a Major Economy , Oxford and 
Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999,14 ). 
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System of Political Economy, Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelly, 1977, original 
English edition 1885 ).  
 
As an important incentive for the implementation of a development strategy 
based on economic nationalism, the Japanese elite could observe at close range 
the impact of Western imperialism on China. The project of catching-up was 
thus dictated by the concern of protecting Japanese society from foreign 
domination and the fate that befell China. After a period of isolation, a breathing 
space, from the world economy, the political elites of late developing societies 
rejoined the capitalist world system from a position of strength and competed for 
the benefits to be derived from the international division of labour. Thus far 
from representing an anti-capitalist force, they in fact gave capitalism its 
historical dynamism that is encapsulated in the Marxist concept of “uneven 
development.” The upshot of the relationship between first developers and late 
developers historically led to challenges to existing hierarchical order and 
changes in the hegemonic position of the system’s leadership. The two world 
wars could be explained in these terms, as competitive struggles between 
established imperialist powers and emerging powers. Japan’s attempt to conquer 
Asia that resulted in World War II was an attempt to dominate the region and 
exclude the Western colonial powers. 
 
The evolution of Chinese domestic politics was not unrelated to the geopolitical 
processes taking place in East Asia.  China’s relative isolation from the rest of 
the world was nearing its end with the emergence of Western imperialism in the 
area. But far from being a dormant society, Chinese politics were in ebullition. 
The 19th century had been characterized by widespread corruption within the 
body politics, the administrative apparatus was deteriorating, peasant rebellions 
were taken place and the vast public works projects were beginning to break 
down. The imperialist intervention following the opium wars accentuated the 
disintegration of the society: growing addiction, smuggling and official 
corruption. The Manchu political establishment was revealed as powerless. 
Peasant unrest had broken  out in dispersed and marginal ways already at the 
end of the 18th century and culminating in the Taiping Revolution between 1850 
and 1870. Although peasant uprisings had been part of China’s 2000-year 
history, the Taiping Revolution was different from previous struggles. Ideas 
concerning the relative superiority of Western power penetrated civil society and 
specifically the revolutionaries. There was rebellion against both the ideological 
hegemony of Confucianism and societal organization. The Manchu’s defeat of 
the Taipings with Western assistance weakened the country which was 
submitted to a number of conflicts including the Sino-Japanese war. While the 
Manchu government collaborated with the Western powers, these gained a 
vested interest in their survival. But below the surface, a debate was going on 
among traditional Confucian scholar-officials with regard of coping with the 
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imperialist challenge. The dependent development which the country 
experienced with the foreign intrusion and incorporation in the Western 
capitalist system led to a paradoxical situation. The imperialist powers advanced 
their interests by supporting the political conservative elements  in China against 
the forces trying to promote revolutionary change and the growth of indigenous 
Chinese capitalism. As students of students of modern Chinese history put it: 
“Imperialism, stimulating China’s social economy, was producing new groups 
and social forces which, though essential for its ongoing penetration of Chinese 
life, were also the basis for a growing opposition to it.” (Nee and Peck op. cit. 
10). 
 
By the early 20th century China had become a semicolony for all the 
international powers (including the latecomer Japan!).  The unequal treaties 
reduced the Chinese authorities to the role of a powerless administration.  In the 
wake of the Boxer anti-foreign uprising in 1900, a genuine fear spread among 
the Chinese people that their country would be partitioned and that they would 
disappear as an entity. A new political consciousness arose that realized the need 
for the creation of a modern centralized nation-state to force back imperialism 
and advance the Chinese nation’s regeneration. Although there was disputes and 
dissention among political forces in favour of drastic change, there was general 
agreement to look forward to the West and Japan as the models to be emulated. 
The idea was that China would be made over in the image of Western 
capitalism. For the reformers the predicament was: “how could the country free 
itself from foreign domination and gain independence while using the reform 
methods and ideology of Western capitalism?” (Ibid. 14).  
 
This has been the dilemma of all latecomers had had to face. Seen in this light 
the lesson of Japan had more value as an example than the Western discourse. 
However, even after the establishment of the Chinese Republic, no group or 
class rose to power, as had been the case with the Japanese Restoration, with the 
capacity of directing the transformation of the country by regaining national 
independence and creating a strong state to resist the imperialist incursions. The 
1911 revolution collapsed and the new republic floundered in the morass of 
warlord politics and aggression and occupation by Japanese imperialism. The 
peace following World War I exerted a political influence on the evolution of 
Chinese politics. The new generation of Chinese intellectuals and nationalist 
militants, had been dismayed by the results of the Versailles Peace Conference. 
In order to punish Germany and reward Japan for its participation in the war on 
the winning side the German concessions in the Shantung Peninsula were ceded 
to Japan.  This was in fact a betrayal of China’s  national sovereignty. For many 
Chinese, this revealed the hollowness of the idealism of President Woodrow 
Wilson and the hypocrisy of the Western democracies. Together with the 
nascent appeal of the October Revolution in Russia this exerted influence on the 
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formation of new generation of Chinese nationalists and socialists. The May 
Fourth Movement of 1919 unleashed a massive wave of anti-imperialist 
nationalism culminating in widespread political turbulence i.e., workers’ strikes, 
demonstrations, riots and nationwide boycotts. The movement became a 
watershed in Chinese history and would affect the future evolution of the 
country. The success of the radical intellectuals of the May Fourth Movement 
translated in succeeding in putting the question of national regeneration on the 
political agenda. 
 
Both the Kuomintang nationalists and the Communist Party arose out of this 
movement but were however unable to unite in the anti-Japanese struggle and 
the building of an independent national economy. Nevertheless the defeat of 
Japanese imperialism and the victory over the Kuomintang by the CCP opened 
the road to the modernization of China.  On September 21, 1949, perhaps 
echoing Napoleon’s remark on the “sleeping giant,” Mao Zedong signalled 
China’s resurgence when he declared on Tienanmin Square, “The Chinese 
people have stood up!” This was also a wake-up call to the world. The 
communist victory had political consequences and changed the prospects for the 
regional and global politics. The failure of the Chinese nationalists under Chiang 
Kai-shek to gain power was considered as a defeat by the American political 
class and affected the Sino-US relationship.  
 
The dilemma facing the communist regime upon was the questions of economic 
development internally and the trading relations with the external world in the 
context of the Cold War. The slogan launched by Mao that “only socialism can 
save China!” reflected both a choice as well as an adjustment to the imposed 
realities of international relations. Paradoxically, the implemented strategy of 
self-centred development represented a variant of the model of economic 
nationalism (mobilization of internal resources and isolation from the capitalist 
world economy) and adherence to an alliance with the socialist countries with 
the expectation that they would succeed in defeating the capitalist West. During 
a visit to the Soviet Union, Mao made some remarks to Chinese students in 
Moscow on November 17, 1957 predicting an end to Western domination of the 
world. According to this way of thinking, the balance of forces in the conflict 
between the two socio-political systems  was shifting in favour of socialism. “In 
the struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps, it was no longer the west 
wind that prevailed over the East wind, but the East wind that prevailed over the 
West wind.”5 
 
Of course the international socialist project didn’t materialize as the forces of 
nationalism truncated the vision and practice of socialism. What took place was 
                                                          
5  http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-
7/mswv7_480.htm 
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that priority in all socialist states was given to their country’s national interest. 
Given the potential and real strength of a nation the size of China, the USSR was 
not at ease in having such a neighbour whose struggle for independence had 
culminated in the formation of the People’s Republic of China. It is worth 
mentioning that the Soviet Union had given support to Chiang Kay-shek during 
the anti-Japanese struggle.  The Chinese Communist Party itself was not a 
monolithic entity. It comprised two main political projects with each their 
adherents. The socialist left, around Mao Zedong, was dedicated to the project 
of socialism in China, while another tendency envisioned a catching-up project 
of late development in order to accede to the core status of the world economic 
system. The coexistence between these two projects exploded with the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution whose primary intention on the part of Mao had 
been to purify the party of the so-called “capitalist roaders” and mobilize the 
youth. The left in China had recognized that socialism was not predominantly 
the result of the development of productive forces, as a mechanical 
understanding of the Marxist vision promoted, but the continuous struggle 
“between the two lines”. 
 
Seen in a historical context, the success of Chinese socialist construction 
influenced the regional evolution of East Asia, which in turn would impact on 
the internal political struggle within the CCP. This aspect is important for  
understanding the present and future constellation of forces on the world scale. 
Much literature has been produced in analysing the so-called East Asian 
“miracle.” The argument can be that the fear of the spread of socialism outside 
the Asian socialist countries contributed to  the creation of the conditions for the 
NICs’ late-industrialisation and the reconstruction of the Japanese economy as a 
powerhouse on the world market. The revolutionary movement in East Asia 
predetermined the acceptance by the United States of social reforms and 
economic nationalism that would lead to late development. Not only did 
Washington accept this evolution, but it also opened its markets to the exports of 
these countries in the attempt to isolate China. (Hersh 1993). 
 
Combined with the internal “two line” political struggle in the CCP, the 
increasing Soviet antagonism and the pressures of the United States culminating 
in the war in Vietnam, the modernising nationalist faction within the party 
became aware of China’s relative economic weakness relative to the NICs 
(especially South Korea and Taiwan). The Cultural Revolution - launched in 
order to purify the party from rightist influence --  resulted in the weakening of 
the leftwing of the party and after the demise of Chairman Mao, the path was 
opened for the imposition of a strategy of authoritarian modernization similar to 
what had been experienced in the cases of the NICs. This opened a new chapter 
in Chinese history and affected the world. A former US ambassador, Chas W. 
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Freeman, describes how the post-Maoist leadership reflected on what was 
happening:  
 
In the late summer of 1981, Deng Xiaoping remarked in my presence that 
when the history of the Twentieth Century was written, Mao’s revolution 
would be described as the prelude to the real Chinese revolution, that which 
Deng himself had initiated in December 1978. But Deng made it clear that his 
was a revolution in methodology, not a change in national objectives.”  
(Chas W. Freeman, Mao Zedong: Nationalist in spite of himself. 
http://www.mepc.org/whats/MaoZedong.asp). 
  
The “real revolution” was the reform movement away from the embedded 
socialism of the period until the defeat of the leftwing of the Communist party 
and the introduction of a “socialist market economy”. This evolution was in part 
due to both internal causes (expectation of higher economic growth) but also a 
readjustment in the Sino-US relationship. From a felt need to constrain or 
diminish the power of the Soviet Union, symbolized in the Richard Nixon-Mao 
Zedong summit in Beijing, the two countries came to realize that they both 
could benefit from a less antagonistic relationship. As Immanuel Wallerstein 
notes: “The U.S. sought to tame China, to bring it out of its Maoist cocoon and 
into the market whirl of the capitalist world-economy. China sought to buy 
technology, trade, and above all time in which to strengthen its economy and its 
military, and enable it to become a superpower.” (Immanuel Wallerstein:  China 
and the U.S. : Competing Geopolitical Strategies, in Commentary No. 151, 
Dec.15, 2004, http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/151en.htm).  In other words, the 
two countries were willing to sleep in the same bed but having different dreams! 
 
Influencing the relationship were the changes taking place in the world economy 
with the ascent of China and on the other hand the relative decline of the U.S. 
hegemonic position in the hierarchical system of nations. Geoeconomics and 
geopolitics converged in a manner probably not foreseen at the time. 
Economically speaking the reforms based on the release of market forces on 
society were impacted by the simultaneous transformation in the world of 
geoeconomics. 
 
For the Chinese economy, the globalization of neoliberalism opened a window 
of opportunity export-led growth which  China could take advantage of. As 
David Harvey notes: “The spectacular emergence of China as a global economic 
power after 1980 was in part an unintended consequence of the neoliberal turn 
in the advanced capitalist world.” (David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 121). It is highly 
improbable that the post-Maoist leadership expected China to become a major 
creditor of the U.S. debt, a large recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), an 
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important world market actor –both as a leading exporter and importer of raw 
materials, a main polluter of the global environment, etc. Domestically, the 
economic growth has contributed to great inequalities between regions and 
groups. The internal dilemma for the political leadership is to find a way to 
reduce the negative impacts of the growth model that has been implemented. 
Although China does have a large potential internal market, the export-led 
economic development has become dependent access to the world economy. 
The way the polity resolves the contradictions will have worldwide 
consequences. As the economist Andrew Glyn notes: …there is nothing 
inevitable about China continuing along its present trajectory. If it does, the 
problems of adapting to this major shift in the structure of world trade and 
output will be correspondingly severe.” (Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed –
Finance, Globalization, and Welfare, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 
90). 
  
Geopolitically, lurching behind the disturbances on the international plan, what 
the world is experiencing  is a crisis of the U.S hegemonic order and the 
gestation  of a multipolar world system. Whether intentionally or not, China will 
become a leading actor in the promotion of the new order. The country’s size 
and the strength of its economy are of the utmost significance. At the time of its 
admittance to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China was rated as the 
fourth leading economies in the world. Furthermore it is calculated that 
assuming the Chinese economy continued its dynamism, it could surpass that of 
the United States and become the first economic power of the world. This could 
not avert having major geopolitical consequences. (Ignacio Ramonet, 
Mégapuissance, in Manière de voir, nr.85, February-March 2006, 5).  
 
The ascent of China to the core nation status will certain influence the 
hierarchical order of the world system and especially menace the leadership of 
the United States. Assuming that the relative decline of the American 
geoeconomic and geopolitical positions continues the critical question whether 
this transformation will take place peacefully or violently. The only strong card 
left has in recent years been its military power. However, even this card has 
shown its limitation in dealing with asymmetrical conflicts as in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. According history, as pointed out by imperialism theory, World 
System Analysis and Realism, challenges to the hegemonic position of a world 
power results in conflict. In US think tanks, the ascendancy of China has been 
considered as a strategic menace. It is forgotten now that the United States is 
involved in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, that already in the beginning of 
the 1990s, the influential political scientist Samuel Huntington had warned in his 
thesis of “The Clash of Civilizations”, that a Confucian-Islamic connection 
could potentially threaten Western interests, values and power. In an interview 
in Newsweek, under the headline “Watch Out for China”, Huntington implicitly 
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contradicting his view of culture as the driving force for future conflicts he 
states that: “History shows that as countries industrialize rapidly they tend to 
become much more assertive…. The Chinese feel humiliated. So naturally they 
want to resume what they view as their natural place in the world. And that will 
have destabilizing consequences.” (Newsweek, November 21, 1994, 558). 
 
Two interesting views have emerged on the future of the relationship to China 
among American political scientists within the Realism tradition. In a 
confrontation in the journal Foreign Policy, John L. Mearsheimer and 
Zbiegniew Brzezinski propose two different perspectives. The first opines that 
the only tool we have in the discussion is theory because  “we cannot know what 
political reality is going to look like in the year 2025.” Basing himself on the 
assumption that China will become a military power in the future, theory tell us 
to expect that she will “try to push the United States out of Asia, much the way 
the United States pushed the European powers out of the Western Hemisphere. 
We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe 
Doctrin, as Japan did in the 1930s. (John L. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful 
Rise,” in Current History, Vol. 105, No.690, April 2006, 162). To complete his 
vision of the future he sees the United States as seeking “to contain China and 
ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of dominating 
Asia…” much in the same way as the US behaved toward the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. (Ziegniew Brzezinski and John L. Mearsheimer, “Clash of 
the Titan,” in Foreign Policy, January-February, 2005, 2 and 3).   
 
Brzezinski in contrast gives priority to reality over theory as in international 
relations it is mainly retrospective. Nuclear weapons in his opinion have 
transformed power politics and as in the case with the Soviet Union prevented 
direct conflict between the two superpowers. Furthermore in contradistinction to 
Huntington, he finds that “the Chinese leadership appears much more flexible 
and sophisticated than many previous aspirants to great power status.” (Ibid. 3) 
Mearsheimer contends that the growing economic power of China will translate 
into political and military power which can only develop in contradistinction to 
U.S. power. Brzezinski on the other hand maintains that China’s desire for 
continued economic growth will make conflict with the United States unlikely. 
(Ibid. 4 & 3). The weakness of the economistic approach, which Brzezinski 
seems to project, is that it does not take into consideration the fact that the world 
will be characterized by increasing competition for access to markets, capital, 
and raw material in the future. 
 
While US strategists discuss whether the ascendancy  of China will lead to 
conflict or not,  their Chinese colleagues also debate whether the United States 
will “allow” the rise of China and the consequences thereof. Official policy 
circles attempt to mask present issues and conflicts between the two countries in 
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the interest of a façade of good Sino-US relations. (Joshua Ramo, The Beijing 
Consensus, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, 40). The strategy 
followed by the Chinese political elite in its external relations lies in the process 
of emerging as the largest asymmetric superpower. This translates into a foreign 
policy paradigm based on the example of its development model, strengthening 
its economic interests in the world, and upholding the Westphalian system of 
national sovereignty. (Ibid. 37). Defending the national state system is in 
contrast to strategy of the United States which is pushing for a post-modern 
world order of uneven and unequal sovereignty through the democracy 
discourse and neoliberalism.6 The guiding principle for Chinese strategic 
thinking is based on the historical experience of humiliation imposed on the 
country by the Opium Wars, and nationalism is the modality around which the 
polity can mobilize the population. At the same time the Chinese foreign affairs 
planners are positing a new world order. This has been conceptualised in the so-
called “New Security Concept” introduced at an ASEAN meeting in 1997 and 
endorsed publicly by President Hu Jintao in 2004. It comprises “ the Four No’s” 
and implicitly is a document in favour of multipolarity in the world system: No 
hegemonism, no power politics, no alliances and no arms races. (Ramo 41).  At 
the same time, there is a tendency in the academic world in China to project a 
relationship with the United States based on harmony. Basing themselves on 
pragmatism as an analytical tool Chinese experts on the United States operate on 
what may be called wishful thinking. The idealism of a peaceful Sino-US 
relationship is propagated by Chinese scholars with little understanding of the 
dynamics of the American system. (See: Henry C K Liu: China’s misguided 
’experts’ on the US, Asia Times Online, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IE02Ad01.html). 
 
 
Conclusion 
Scholars belonging to the  dependency tradition have in recent times analysed 
the movement in international political economy, the world is experiencing, as a 
return to normalcy, i.e. the centrality of the Asia after a few centuries of Western 
dominance of the world. The hierarchy of the West over the rest was 
accompanied by a scientific paradigm in the social sciences in Europe and the 
United States that proposed an interpretation of this dominance based on 
Eurocentrism. (Blaut 1993; Frank 1998; Arrighi 2007; Bagchi 2005).  
 
In this paper the attempt was made to look at the economic history of the 
relationship between Europe and China from a developmental perspective and 
explain the shift that occurred with the European aggressivity and Asian 
                                                          
6  For a discussion of the projected differences between the old and the new world order, 
see: Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern World Order, London: Demos, 1996. 
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regression. The importance of economic nationalism as a determinant in the 
problematique of catching-up that is encapsulated in the theory of  uneven and 
unequal development deserves greater attention on the part of international 
political economy. The prophecy of Napoleon concerning the “awakening” of 
China is in the process of being realized as the preconditions for Western 
hegemony in the world system are being challenged by the ascendancy of China 
and other Asian nations. The East wind does seem to be stronger than the 
Western wind, but not in the way Mao predicted.  The paradox related to the 
return of China to its historic status as the global centre of gravity is that this 
will pose a greater challenge to the West than the Maoist model of development 
–based on a self-sufficient and self-centred economy. From a historical 
perspective the post-Maoist market orientation –a development welcomed in the 
West-- cannot but contribute to the transformation of the global economic 
division of labour as well as the hierarchical order in the nation-state system. 
The US-Sino relationship will dominate world geoeconomics and geopolitics in 
the coming decades. As of now, the American attempt to weaken the role of the 
states in all other countries is counterbalanced by the strategy of the Chinese 
leadership to promote state power and a multipolar state system.  
 
Whether the transformation process leads to a zero-sum-game situation as 
theorists belonging to the imperialism tradition or Realism predict, or to a win-
win outcome for all parties concerned as adherents of (neo)liberalism propose is 
a fundamental issue for the coming decades. What can be said with certainty 
though is that we are at an open-ended phase of history characterized by 
potential dangers and new possibilities. As the Chinese saying goes: “Prepare 
for the worst and hope for the best”.  
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The New Cultural Revolution 
Renegotiating identities in a market-oriented China 
 
 
Poul Duedahl 
 
 
Introduction 
The post-Mao gold rush, the sudden moral meaning of intellect, 
entrepreneurship and commodities, and the fast modernization of the major 
cities – where consumption rather than production now shapes social life – have 
made consumerism an ideology of its own in China, replacing the passionate 
socialism once characterizing the country. Such a fundamental and rapid change 
has consequences for people’s behavior, life-style and self-perception, and is 
definitely worth studying. This paper contains my initial and very provisional 
thoughts of what can be described as the New Cultural Revolution. 
 
 
You Are What You Buy 
It is a stereotype, but not without a basis in reality, that the three main things 
every Chinese ought to own in the 1970s to pride themselves on their modern 
modalities was a watch, a radio and a bicycle. In the 1980s the list would 
include a washing machine, a color-TV, and a refrigerator, and in the 1990s the 
list expanded considerably and was different according to age, gender, region, 
and occupation. 
 
The improving economic capabilities of the growing urban middle-class, the 
overwhelming amounts of glittering goods, the sudden myriad of material 
options, and the just as sudden lack of a common cultural doctrine emphasizing 
a uniform and unified national culture, have simply made it possible for millions 
of Chinese to pursue their own desires, passions and appetites after years with 
consumption being limited to the reproduction of everyday life. The economical 
situation has in other words been a liberating force because the commodities 
contributes to a feeling of extended personal freedom – a way to escape from the 
anonymity of the masses, and invent more individualistic notions of identity 
(Rofel 2007: 111-115 and Hsu 2007: 155-156). 
 
One must of course be careful not to take the life of the upper middle-class and 
the new rich as representative of the whole country. It most certainly is not. The 
availability of goods is not paralleled with equal access to them, and for a major 
part of the Chinese population, the peasants and migrant-workers, prestige items 
still represent unfulfilled dreams out of reach. Even for those with access, there 
are definitely limits for their ability to buy them. This “social discourse of 
143 
objects” that is so central to commercialism has in other words become what the 
French sociologist Jean Baudrillard once called a “mechanism of 
discrimination” (Baudrillard 1981: 30). 
 
There is also a great divide between the so-called popular or mass culture still 
hiding behind a certain degree of uniformity and anonymity, and what one could 
call an elite or avant-garde culture, where changes happens first and in a more 
visible manner. However, identity in a consumerist society is not so much a 
matter of, who you belong to, as it is a matter of identification – of what you 
will work hard to be a part of. And the single ideal that fascinates and attracts a 
majority of the population is the one formed within the borders of large and 
prosperous cities like Shanghai – a city that tries to re-vitalize its cosmopolitan 
past and sell itself as China’s fashion centre – as well as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
the country’s capital Beijing, and of course Hong Kong. 
 
The urban lifestyle has been a major force in identity change in the post-Mao 
era, because the cities are where the commodities are, and because cosmopolitan 
identity is consumption. You are what you buy! This mantra is slowly 
converting China from a politically, economically, socially and culturally 
homogenous society into a complex, multidirectional society, with various, 
fragmented and dynamic practices for well-being and interpretations of the good 
life, with all the advantages and problems such a transformation necessarily 
causes (Dirlik 2000: 6-10 and Chen 2001: 125-127, 225-228). 
 
Especially the appeal of the “urban white collar” identity is prevalent, and was 
already some years ago identified by a survey of the popular, Beijing-based 
magazine Shishang (Trends) as the most popular feature for its readers. The 
readers find this lifestyle desirable not only because is convenient but also 
because it is closely linked to social status, and reflects their own strive for 
positional superiority in the new social hierarchies appearing in the Chinese 
consumerist society (Chen 2001: 126). 
 
The appeal of the urban life-style is also reflected in the eyewitness-reports of 
the growing number of migrant workers. Even if they can rarely support their 
families, and live in ghettos – the so-called “Chinatowns of China” that 
symbolizes the caste-like character of the rural-urban divide – they will still 
occasionally return to their villages and tell about the urban mystique. At the 
same time they will deliberately or un-deliberately have lost some of their local 
habits and peripheral identity and appear “foreign”, and they will therefore gain 
in symbolic and social capital what they might never gain economically. 
 
The fascination of urban life is in total contradiction to the way urbanism used to 
be identified by the Communist Party, and efficiently condemned in wake of the 
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first Cultural Revolution as the embodiment of evil modern capitalism – and 
image held alive through periodic mass campaigns and social movements and 
rituals. Now peasants, once surrounded with deep respect, symbolize 
backwardness, while the city has become the center stage of invention and 
circulation of new commodities, and normative in cultural orientation – which 
make it the cradle of the New Cultural Revolution (Chen 2001: 1-9, 243-245). 
 
The center of attention from social scientists, international corporations and 
Chinese citizens is a young, energetic and colorful urban generation. Not simply 
because a lot of money is spent on them, and that they spend a lot of money, but 
because this group of people, from the first post-Mao fashion show staged by 
Pierre Cardin in 1979, have been the most self-aware consumers and the new 
trendsetters. They are daily promoted and exposed through internet and 
commercials, in the glossy prints of lifestyle magazines, in fashion, music, art, 
literature, and interior design – even in food. That makes them an economically, 
socially and culturally powerful group. So for exporters to China this particular 
group is worth keeping an eye on. There are simply money waiting to be made 
by hiring sociologists, people with ethnographic insight, and market specialists, 
to trace the sprouting signs of new trends, new demands and new sign values 
here, when it comes to showing off wealth, status and exquisite taste (Tang 
2000: 273-294). 
 
And there are a lot of questions to be asked: Will the consumers be going in the 
direction of a less-is-more search for quality, exclusivity and comfort as a 
replacement for quantity, well-known brands and volume? Will we see an 
increase of people, also in the smaller cities, searching for individual rather than 
common preferences? Will the initial commodity fetishism and material self-
realization be replaced by new status symbols such as mental well-being, self-
development and reflexivity? 
 
 
The Chinese Mirror 
Chinese social scientists as well as foreign ethnographers and market analysts 
have made several studies of the urban lifestyle based on observation analyses. 
Another thing is systematized knowledge of people’s own experiences, and my 
lack of possibilities – and capabilities – of doing that kind of research, has made 
me turn to contemporary urban literature to find a mirror of the present Chinese 
self-perceptions. Literature contains the same value-laden language and 
reflections on behaviors, lifestyles and self-perceptions as the one you find as a 
result of questionnaires and interviews. It is even well-written, full of clever 
reflections, and available in translations! 
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Literature that reflects consumerism and urban life, rather than collective themes 
and rural idyll, emerged alongside China’s opening towards the outside world, 
and it has definitely been a major focus for avant-garde writers the last 15 years 
or so. As long as the writers don’t pose a treat to the political establishment and 
the social order, they can freely express their views in minor literary magazines, 
even if they portray the darker and more controversial sides of consumerism 
such as prostitution, drug-abuse and organized crime. Wide-spread publications 
have more frequently been banned as “spiritual pollution”, but they still manage 
to get out in great numbers. 
 
One of the first well-known contemporary urban writers was Wang Shuo (b. 
1958). His bestseller, Playing for Thrills, was published in Chinese in 1989 and 
was the first of his novels to be translated into English. The book was a crime 
novel in which he provided a cityscape that was dazzling and exceedingly 
boring – his reflection of the new era of disorderly extravagance! The way he 
dealt with Chinese socialism and commercialism, was groundbreaking. Just the 
fact that Wang Shuo’s hero, or rather antihero, was touring Beijing while 
drinking beer and having sex, was totally unlike anything ever published in 
China. His account was by no means representing the entire country; on the 
other hand it reflected how lives could also be lived in China, and Wang Shuo’s 
lifelike style included a language as it was used by people in the streets (Wang 
1997). 
 
The book sparked much controversy but also paved the way for a new 
generation of Chinese urban writers telling the story of their consumerist urban 
lives. If one takes a closer look at the literature that followed, they seem to be 
full of names of foreign brands and expensive products that symbolizes success 
in life – often without glorifying or demonizing them, often with no compassion, 
moralizing or indignation, just telling about the busy and directionless lives in 
the Chinese urban areas. The literature reflects a perception of being modern, 
which is to consume rather than produce, to perform rather than simply practice, 
to be urban rather than rural, and to do things with machines rather than with 
one’s own body. Often the main characters are self-made businessmen or self-
confident young women exploring and consciously using their money or 
sexuality to obtain something, none of them fully satisfied with what they get. 
They are unconsciously expressing a desire for a more spiritual self-
transformation, but they end up buying additional, expensive consumer-goods 
that shows that they possess at least some kind of well-being (Dirlik 2000:325-
335 and Huot 2000: 185-186). 
 
Through a couple of short stories from 1993, I will now exemplify how similar 
and yet how different these stories are: 
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The first story is written by He Dun, and describes a man whose physical 
commodities compensates for the lack of a socialist utopia, hence living a poor 
and uneventful though optimistic life because he has to save each and every 
penny to purchase that color-TV that was a symbol in the 1990s of putting the 
money on display – just to discover that the TV gives him the events, but 
doesn’t make him any happier. 
 
The other example is a short story by Wang Anyi, in which she describes an 
affair in Hong Kong between an aging and wealthy Chinese-American 
businessman and his a beautiful mistress, who is an immigrant from Shanghai 
that desperately wants to go to the United States – not only for obtaining 
consumer goods but also because of “the West” being a symbol of hope, 
compensating for the lost paradise. 
 
As in He Dun’s story, Wang Anyi deals with dreams of the good life, and she 
even shows how exchanges of favors – money for sex – are used in order to 
obtain it. But unlike He Dun, she doesn’t tell if her main characters get the life 
they were longing for; rather she focuses on how different the expectations can 
be, with the Chinese woman heading for Australia several years later, leaving 
behind her old “foreign” lover that, in her absence, finds himself much more 
attracted to the sparkling city of Hong Kong! (Tang 2000: 284-292) 
 
 
Shanghai Baby 
In this paper I will, however, focus on yet another piece of literature – the semi-
autobiographical novel Shanghai Baobei (Shanghai Baby) from 1999, written by 
Zhou Weihui – in Europe and USA known as Wei Hui.  
 
When the book first came out, Wei Hui, born 1973, was hailed in China as the 
voice of the new Chinese generation being young in the 1990s. Within half a 
year the book had sold in more than a 100.000 copies, but as a result of claims 
by Wei Hui to speak on behalf of this new generation, her book was banned by 
the Chinese authorities due to its intimate description of sex. 
 
Chinese critics now described the book as “decadent”, “debauched” and 
“pornographic”, and the author was labeled as a “slave to Western culture”. That 
made its way to the world market, and Shanghai Baby immediately became an 
international bestseller with more that six million copies sold in 45 countries – 
making it the best selling piece of Chinese literature since Chairman Mao’s so-
called Little Red Book. 
 
Shanghai Baby is about the life of a 25-year old, well-educated, attractive and 
self-confident woman with the nickname Coco – after Coco Chanel. Coco 
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desperately wants to be a famous writer by making a book about turn-of-the-
century Shanghai and the new generation it has nurtured. “There’s nothing 
worth reading in the bookstores these days, just empty stories” one of the 
characters says, which makes Coco even more confident that there will be a 
space for her book on the shelves (Wei Hui 2001: 6). 
 
Despite Wei Hui’s claim of being a representative of her generation, the main 
character – Coco – is aware that her circle of “artists, real and phony, foreigners, 
vagabonds, greater and lesser performers, private entrepreneurs of industries that 
are currently fashionable, true and fake linglei [the official term for people with 
an alternative life-style], and Generation X types” is probably not representative, 
rather the avant-garde of her generation, a part of the few that gains a lot of 
attention: 
 
“My friends and I, a tribe of the sons and daughters of the well-to-do, often used 
exaggerated and outré language to manufacture life-threatening pleasure. A 
swarm of affectionate, mutually dependant little fire-flies, we devoured the 
wings of imagination and had little contact with reality. We were maggots 
feeding on the city’s bones, butter utterly sexy ones. The city’s bizarre 
romanticism and genuine sense of poetry were actually created by our tribe. 
Some call us linglei; others damn us as trash; some yearn to join us, and imitate 
us in every way they can, from clothes and hairstyle to speech and sex; others 
swear at us and tell us to take our dog-fart lifestyles and disappear.” (Wei Hui 
2001: 235). 
 
It is, however, this small circle of bohemian and exclusive avant-garde friends in 
the hectic city of Shanghai that are the front-runners of everything new and 
innovative. And in the book Wei Hui celebrates the busy pace in the diverse and 
cultured city, and depicts how the new world-weariness involves new standards 
of beauty, and new practices that has to be trained into the body, including daily 
practices of hygiene, fitness, dress, gestures, postures, manners and ways of 
speaking and eating, before the “legitimate” body can be publicly displayed and 
performing. So it is not surprising that she finds, that the present lifestyle is best 
reflected in the sound of high heels: “High-heeled shoes walk down mossy 
alleys, down streets with lined with skyscrapers …  The clack of high heels is 
the perfect echo of materialism ringing in the city’s ears…” (Wei Hui 2001: 
187). 
 
The reader definitely gets the impression that Coco wears high heels through 
most of the book, just as she knows how to smoke Mild Seven cigarettes, go to 
cafés and nightclubs, and dance to “yesterday’s decedent music” – pop, rock, 
punk, acid jazz, hip hop and techno – also if the many options can overwhelm 
even the most trendy Shanghai-girl: 
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“I agonized for a long time over what to wear. My wardrobe is divided into two 
distinct styles: One is androgynous, loose-fitting, and of quiet colors and makes 
me look like something out of a medieval painting; the other is tight-fitting, foxy 
clothing, like some cat-woman. I tossed a coin and went for the latter. I chose 
the 1960s retro look from the West – purple lipstick and eye shadow, and my 
leopard-spotted handbag – very chic in Shanghai just then” (Wei Hui 2001: 71). 
 
Her description of a new China with purple-lipsticked teenagers is sensual, 
funny and brutally honest, and Coco is a female whose habits are flagged in the 
text by lists of famous foreign brand-names, labels, price tags, and imported 
fabrics, films, authors and songs – from Van Morrisson, Calvin Klein and the 
beat generation to Quentin Tarantino, Sonic Youth, IKEA, Christmas 
celebrations and Kentucky Fried Chicken, not to forget the Japanese brands. 
 
But the book is not all about materialistic values – it is also about their 
consequences. Not only does she tell about drug-abuse, people’s obsession with 
money, and going to the West while leaving behind their loved ones, she also 
reveals sides of consumerism that have consequences for an even wider range of 
people. Especially the generation-gab between the post-Socialist urban youth 
and their self-sacrificing, diligent and concerned but also frugal, confused and 
rarely tolerant parents, who are still marked by decades when the social 
organization valorized communality, age-based hierarchy, and ideological 
homogeneity. A generation that finds it hard to understand why the young 
urbanites have independent attitudes, why they emphasize the self as something 
that is allowed to desire, why they demand privacy, and why they prefer to live 
in the moment in stead of living in the future, not to mention that their way of 
living can ultimately be at the cost of marriage and children. The young 
urbanites, on the other hand, find it hard to understand their parent’s 
unwillingness to accept that personal responsibility is also about enjoying life, 
and that love can be expressed in other ways than through slight pressure and 
high expectations. “The way we think is just too different. We’re separated by a 
hundred generation gap”, Coco declares as she moves in with her boyfriend 
without her parents approval (Wei Hui 2001:19), wishing that they could be just 
a little more selfish, worry less about her, take better care of themselves and get 
out more. But they cannot, and the result is that the two generations distance 
themselves from one another. 
 
What Wei Hui describes here, seen from a broader perspective, is a divide made 
by consumerism – the divide between people that can handle the speed in which 
modernization occurs, and the ones it leaves behind, helpless to understand what 
is happening, unable or unwilling to adapt to it, and hesitating when it comes to 
making decisions and render judgments after decades with others doing it for 
you. 
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Another interesting aspect of the book is that it is centered round the life of a 
young woman. Not only for the reason that women literarily embody 
Chineseness as consumers, which makes it possible to transcend what is to be 
Chinese today, but also because the question of gender relations and gender 
inequalities are reflected through the “oppressed” Chinese woman’s perspective. 
 
The book shows how consumerism has affected the views of gender, family, 
marriage and sexuality, because it has created a generation with the courage to 
confront the existing norms and push the parameters of “acceptable” behavior 
and the accompanying guilt. Just the fact that the book treats the once repressed 
and highly politicized taboo of sex gives the impression that a revolution has 
taken place. 
 
How has that happened? Is the new urban youth so powerful, that the Chinese 
authorities are loosing their control of these once so delicate issues? Some 
theorists suggest that’s not the case. Instead the Chinese authorities have 
deliberately loosened the grip on the female body, sexuality and definitions of 
right and wrong, by allowing writers – to a certain extent – to describe a new 
and sexualized femininity. If the purpose of promoting the socialist model of 
womanhood, which emphasized the asexual woman, was to turn the sexual 
desire against the party, the promotion of the sexualized femininity should then 
be the opposite – to turn the focus away from potentially dangerous political 
passions. The argument being that the political enthusiasm expressed during the 
demonstration at Tiananmen in 1989 and later the Falun Gong movement was 
followed by a wider tolerance in the representation of the female body. This was 
to be seen by the increasing number of female fashion models occurring in 
commercials on state-controlled TV, allowed in trendy lifestyle-magazines and 
put on stage in large-scale public events such as the supermodel contests of 
which the first was held, by the blessing of the authorities, in 1991 (Chen 2001: 
132-141 and Rofel 2007: 118-119). 
 
So even though many people in China, according to Coco, still devalues the 
needs of women and doesn’t support the efforts to recognize their self-worth – 
by seeing the street-smart girl as crude and the gentle as “empty-headed flower 
vessels” – the women of her generation have still obtained a lot. As she puts it: 
“They have more freedom than women of fifty years ago, better looks than those 
of thirty years ago, and a greater variety of orgasms than women of then years 
ago” (Wei Hui 2001: 87). 
 
It cannot surprise that Coco’s spiritual father is the American writer Henry 
Miller. She mentions it a couple of times, and it is definitely reflected in the way 
she describes every single detail of her sexual escapades with her German lover. 
In that respect Coco does whatever she can to break out of any common Chinese 
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perception of women by enjoying all sides of life. This open-minded attitude is 
also reflected in the description of her friends of which a few are homosexuals. 
But the overall idea – despite of the obvious shocking effects, and the efforts of 
pushing the sensibilities of the Communist Party and the general limits of 
tolerance – is to give an insight into a young woman’s life as it can in fact be 
lived in the new urban China. 
 
 
China Will Be China 
By entering the sexual sphere, the influence of consumerism seems almost total. 
But for everybody that likes the distinct Chinese, whatever that is, I will finish 
this paper by giving some sort of comfort: It isn’t! 
     
The political system, for one, has hardly changed. And the cultural 
empowerment that is a consequence of consumerism is after all a matter of free 
will, and very often the choices made by the Chinese consumers turn out to be a 
mix of the wide range of global trends combined with pre-Socialist perceptions 
of Chineseness. 
    
Just go to China and have a look 
The many skyscrapers of glass, steel and concrete replacing the old hutongs and 
suburban wastelands in a seemingly never ending construction boom, still leave 
plenty of space for Chinese forms and shapes, and features like the unique 
Chinese roof tiles and ancient ornamentations, which creates a Chinese urban 
landscape not to be seen anywhere else. And in between the many American 
fast-food shops – where people go, not because of the food, but to be seen and to 
distant themselves from everything that appears antiquated – there are ten times 
as much space and demand for the varieties of Chinese cooking, and the bodily 
experience of the Chinese cities still begins with the stomach and all the local 
flavors. 
 
Even though most young people don’t appreciate Chinese opera, the highly 
popular song contests – a concept imported from the US accompanied by 
electric guitars and saxophones – is dominated by Chinese love songs, just as are 
the mainstream pop and the blooming rock scene. Even though the new 
supermodel contests often presents a range of sophisticated cosmopolitan 
women with short hair, direct glance, expressiveness, a self-secure, energetic 
attitude, and transcendent desires, you also find a re-invention of the “traditional 
oriental”, often reflected in long hair, downcast eyes and a quiet, mannered and 
a non-threatening, protective-conservative and sometimes even melancholic 
attitude. 
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Even though consumerism is now the dominating philosophy, some people find 
an analogous satisfaction in pre-Socialist Chinese philosophy as a way to add a 
meaningful dimension to the often superficial consumption of goods. Even 
though you hardly find a person today dressed like the once much romanticized 
soldiers, workers, and peasants, ancient Chinese textiles do in fact experience a 
re-vitalization to be seen in between the many Western-style shirts and denim 
jeans worn in the streets. Even the famous Mao-jacket has experienced a revival, 
just as the icon himself plays a major role in the vibrant avant-garde art scene, 
still in a stylized and almost socialist realism, but now in a more playful, 
kitschy, nostalgic and reflecting manner – as a retro figure, an important one, of 
a bygone era. 
 
Even though the Party promotes Western-style nationalism for gluing people 
together where consumerism divides, this nostalgic project still promotes China 
and its distinct history. Even though the concept of “civilization” – abused in 
Europe to an extend that it is political incorrect – figures prominently in this 
nostalgic project, it is still done to characterize a process that binds the Chinese 
people together with Beijing as the city whose citizens should exercise a 
civilizing influence on the periphery by being the spiritual and moral exemplary 
centre. And even though Beijing is only one of the many urban ritual centers in 
wake of consumerism, the consumerist moral is still controlled by Chinese 
consumers. Because China will still be China – just changed to something 
almost unrecognizable compared to what is used to be one or two decades ago. 
All the imported brands and commodities are after all just foreign air that has 
been adapted for Chinese tastes, similar to what has been going on for centuries 
in other countries. It is consumerism “with Chinese characteristics”! 
 
The only difference is the one of time. For several Western European countries 
the consumerist transformation has been an evolution so slow that you should be 
at least three generations old – or a historian – to notice the big differences.  In 
China it has been a rapid New Cultural Revolution! 
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China’s System and Vision of Innovation: 
Analysis of the National Medium- and Long-term Science and 
Technology Development Plan (2006-2020) 
 
 
Bengt-Åke Lundvall and Ju Liu   
 
 
China has been characterized by extremely high rates of economic growth for 
the last several decades. This growth has originates from a transformation of the 
institutional set up giving more room for regional initiative, private ownership 
and use of market mechanisms. Regional political resources have been aligned 
to globally oriented market resources and this alignment has established a very 
specific and unique mechanism of capital accumulation resulting in extremely 
high savings and investment rates. 
 
The downside of this growth model is its intensive exploitation of human and 
natural resources. While the rate of capital accumulation is extremely high (40-
50% of GNP takes the form of gross savings and investment) non reproducible 
natural and social capital are suffering in the process of growth. Social and 
regional inequality has reached critical levels and so have ecological 
imbalances. The central leadership of China are aware of these problems and 
recent policy documents put strong emphasis on ‘harmonious development’ and 
‘independent innovation’ (Gu and Lundvall 2006). In China the transformation 
of the national innovation system is now regarded as a major step toward a 
necessary renewal of the growth model. This paper presents a general 
framework for the analysis of national innovation system, a historical overview 
over the development of China’s production and innovation system and ends up 
with a discussion of the National Medium- and Long-term Science and 
Technology Development Plan (2006-2020).  
 
We conclude that the plan represents steps forward in important respects. This is 
true for the emphasis on need driven innovation policy with focus on energy and 
environment, the stronger role for enterprises as hosts of R&D-efforts and 
innovation, a more active role for public procurement and a more realistic 
understanding of the limits of science as source of innovation.   But the plan has 
some weaknesses and needs to be complemented with other initiatives. There is 
exaggerated technology optimism and the need for institutional and 
organizational change at the level of the enterprise is underestimated. In some 
cases the policy instruments and tools seem to be inadequate when related to the 
very ambitious targets set by the plan. Especially problematic is the absence of 
an explicit analysis of the regional dimension and the need to upgrade working 
life in terms of skills and organization. The fact that a knowledge based strategy, 
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if left to itself, leads to further social and regional polarization is not taken into 
account. Finally how the idea of ‘indigenous innovation’ will be implemented is 
crucial both for the success of the plan and for China’s relationships with the 
rest of the world. 
 
 
The National Innovation System1 
The interest for the innovation system approach has grown remarkably over the 
last decade in China. The long term plan to be discussed in section 4 of the 
paper uses the national innovation system concept as explicit framework for 
presenting analysis and prescriptions. In the wake of this growing interest 
several of the ‘classical’ contributions (Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 
1993 and Edquist 1996) have recently been translated into Chinese. But as will 
be demonstrated in this section the concept may be given different 
interpretations that are more or less broad. A common weakness of much of the 
policy making that refers to innovation system is that it builds upon an implicit 
assumption that science is the major if not the only source of innovation. It is 
neglected that much competence-building crucial for innovation takes place 
within enterprises and in the interaction with customers. This kind of bias leads 
to policy strategies that underestimate the need to upgrade skills and to introduce 
elements of what may be referred to as learning organizations. 
 
Innovation system – a focusing device 
Theories in the social sciences may be regarded as ‘focusing devices’. Any 
specific theory brings forward and exposes some aspects of the real world, 
leaving others in obscurity. That is why a long lasting hegemony of one single 
theoretical tradition is damaging both in terms of understanding and policy-
making. In the field of economics, the dominating neo-classical paradigm puts 
its analytical focus upon concepts such as scarcity, allocation, and exchange, in 
a static context. Even if these concepts reflect important phenomena in the real 
world, they only bring forward some aspects of the economic system. The 
innovation system concept may be seen as signaling an alternative focusing 
device since it puts interactive learning and innovation at the centre of analysis.2 
 
Table 1 illustrates how the analytical framework connected to innovation 
systems relates to mainstream economic theory. The theoretical core of standard 
economic theory is about rational agents making choices to which are connected 
                                                          
1  This section draws upon Lundvall (2007). 
2  While the leadership in China is dominated by experts with engineering background a 
growing number of returnees from the US are economists with a strong training in neo-
classical economics. The marriage between dogmatic Marxist economics and neo-
classical economics in academic training does not make it easy for students to understand 
soft concepts such as social and natural capital.  
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well-defined (but possibly risky) alternative outcomes and the focus of the 
analysis is on the allocation of scarce resources. As illustrated by the following 
table the emphasis is different in the innovation system approach.  
 
Table 1: The two-dimensional shift in perspective 
 Allocation Innovation 
Choice making Standard neoclassical  Project management 
Learning Austrian Economics Innovation systems 
 
The analysis of innovation systems is based upon a two-dimensional shift of 
focus toward the combination of innovation and learning. While standard 
economics is preoccupied with specifying the institutional set-up that results in 
an optimal allocation of existing resources we are concerned with how different 
institutional set-ups affect the creation of new resources. While standard 
economics analyze how agents make choices on the basis of given sets of 
information and competences, we are interested in how the knowledge – 
including both information about the world and know-how of agents – change in 
the economic process. 
 
This double shift in perspective has implications for innovation policy. Just to 
take one example, a policy analysis of patent races where ‘winner takes it all’ 
will, as far as it neglects the learning and competence building that takes place 
during the race, end up with too restrictive conclusions regarding the role of 
government in stimulating R&D. 
 
The NSI-perspective is more complex – not less theoretical – than standard 
economics  
What has been said obviously implies a more complex theory than standard 
neoclassical economics where it is assumed that all agents have equal access to 
technologies and are equally competent in developing and utilizing them. But it 
would be wrong to conclude that the theory behind innovation systems is ‘less 
theoretical’.  
 
Basically, the theory underlying innovation system analysis is about learning 
processes involving skilful but imperfectly rational agents and organizations. It 
assumes that organizations and agents have a capability to enhance their 
competence through searching and learning and that they do so in interaction 
with other agents and that this is reflected in innovation processes and outcomes 
in the form of innovations and new competences.  
 
The methodological dictum within neo-classical economics that theory should 
be both general and abstract sometimes takes Occam’s razor to far leading to 
negligence of the concrete and historical. But the most important weakness of 
neo-classical theory is not that it is too abstract. It is rather that it makes the 
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wrong abstractions. In a context where knowledge is the most important 
resource and learning the most important process neo-classical theory tends to 
abstract from the very processes that make a difference in terms of the economic 
performance of firms and for the wealth of nations. 
 
Processes of competence building and innovation are at the focal point in 
innovation system analysis. The focus is upon how enduring relationships and 
patterns of dependence and interaction are established, evolve and dissolve as 
time goes by. New competences are built while old ones are destroyed. At each 
point of time discernable patterns of collaboration and communication 
characterize the innovation system. But, of course, in the long term these 
patterns change in a process of creative destruction of knowledge and 
relationships. A crucial normative issue is how such patterns affect the creation 
of new resources and to what degree they support learning among agents. 
 
Standard economics favors narrow interpretation of innovation systems 
Standard economics tends to stick to the idea that only quantitative as opposed 
to qualitative concepts can be accepted as scientific (Georgescu Roegen 1971). 
One reason for the bias toward narrow interpretations of innovation systems is 
that it is much easier to develop quantitative analysis of R&D and patents, than 
it is to measure organizational forms and outcomes of organizational learning. 
 
Standard economics will typically focus on potential market failure and on 
choices to be made between different alternative uses of scarce resources. In the 
context of innovation policy the concern will be, first, if public rates of return 
are higher that private rates and, second, if the rate of return of public money is 
higher in investing in R&D than it would be in other areas of public investment.3 
The very idea that there might be organizational forms that are more efficient 
than the ones already in use cannot be reconciled with the basic analytical 
framework where it is assumed that agents, including firms, are equally rational 
and competent. 
 
Standard economics will tend to see the market as the ‘natural’, if not optimal, 
framework of human interaction and economic transaction. This leads to biased 
conclusions when considering how to organize the economy (Nelson 2006). The 
concept ‘market failure’ reflects this bias since it indicates that other 
institutional set-ups should be considered only when it is obvious that the market 
cannot do the job. 
 
In this section we argue that during the process of diffusion there has been a 
distortion of the concept as compared to the original versions as developed by 
                                                          
3  Within this narrow logic the neglect of learning effects from engaging in innovation will 
underestimate both private and public rates of return. 
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Christopher Freeman and the IKE-group in Aalborg. Often policy makers and 
scholars have applied a narrow understanding of the concept and this has gives 
rise to so-called ‘innovation paradoxes’ which leave significant elements of 
innovation-based economic performance unexplained. Such a bias is reflected in 
studies of innovation that focus on science-based innovation and on the formal 
technological infrastructure and in policies aiming almost exclusively at 
stimulating R&D efforts in high-technology sectors. 
 
Without a broad definition of the national innovation system encompassing 
individual, organizational and inter-organizational learning, it is impossible to 
establish the link from innovation to economic growth. A double focus is needed 
where attention is given not only to the science infrastructure, but also to 
institutions/organizations that support competence building in labor markets, 
education and working life.  This is especially important in the current era of the 
globalizing learning economy (Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Lundvall and Borràs 
1998; Archibugi and Lundvall 2001). 
 
We see one major reason for this distortion in the uncomfortable co-existence in 
international organizations such as OECD and the EC of the innovation system 
approach and the much more narrow understanding of innovation emanating 
from standard economics (Eparvier 2005). Evolutionary processes of learning 
where agents are transformed and become more diverse in terms of what they 
know and what they know how to do are not reconcilable with the rational 
‘representative agents’ that populate the neoclassical world (Dosi 1999). 
Actually, we regard the neglect of ‘learning as competence-building’ as the 
principal weakness of standard economics and the narrow definitions of 
innovation systems as reflecting a negative spill-over from this misdirected 
abstraction. 
 
Both Mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons et al 1994) and the Triple Helix 
approach focus on science and the role of universities in innovation. When they 
present themselves or are applied by policy makers, not as analyzing a 
subsystem within, but as full-blown alternatives to the innovation system 
approach (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1995; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000), 
these approaches contribute to the distortion. These perspectives capture 
processes linking science and technology to innovation – below we refer to this 
as STI-learning. The fact that science and codified knowledge become 
increasingly important for more and more firms in different industries – 
including so-called low-technology ones – does not imply that experience-based 
learning and tacit knowledge have become less important for innovation. To 
bring innovations, including science-based innovations, to the market 
organizational learning, industrial networks as well as employee participation 
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and competence building are more important than ever. We refer to these 
processes as DUI-learning. 
 
The weak correlation between strength of the science-base and economic 
performance 
Over the last century there has been a certain focus on the European Paradox 
referring to the assumed fact that Europe is strong in science but weak in 
innovation and economic growth.4 Similar paradoxes have been argued to exist 
in countries such as The Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. In a recent OECD-
report a general result is that for the countries included in the study it can be 
shown that those that ‘perform well’ in terms of STI-indicators do not perform 
well in terms of innovation (OECD 2005, p. 29).5 This indicates that what is 
registered is not so much a paradox as it is a systematic weakness in the 
theoretical analysis and the indicators upon which it is built.  
 
We would argue that these apparent paradoxes emanate from a narrow 
understanding of the innovation process. They demonstrate that heavy 
investment in science in systems where organizational learning within and 
between firms is weakly developed and where there is a weak focus on user 
needs has only limited positive impact upon innovation and economic growth. 
 
This can be illustrated by data on innovation performance at the firm level – see 
table 2. In a series of recent papers based upon a unique combination of survey 
and register data for Danish firms we have demonstrated that firms that engage 
in R&D without establishing organizational forms that promote learning and 
neglect customer interaction are much less innovative than firms that are strong 
both in terms to STI- and DUI-learning (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall 
2007).6 
 
Table 2 refers to the outcome of an analysis of survey and register data for 
almost 700 Danish firms and it presents different variables related to the 
propensity to introduce new products or services. We use sector, size and form 
of ownership as control variables but the focus is upon a variable indicating the 
mode of innovation in the firm. We distinguish between firms that are strong in 
science-based learning, firms strong in organizational learning, firms that are 
                                                          
4  This debate has triggered strong efforts to link universities to firms in Europe sometimes 
going as far as seeing the ideal university as ‘innovation factory’. Dosi, Llerena and Sylos 
Labini (2006) raise doubts about the basic assumption behind the paradox that Europe is 
strong in Science.  
5  After comparing the performance of six countries it is stated that ‘A striking feature is the 
apparent missing link between indicators A-E and the overall performance indicators in F. 
This suggests that priorities and biases in the STI-policy system are weakly linked to 
general economic performance and policies.’ (OECD 2005, p.29, italics by us). 
6  The data in table 2 are from Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall (2007). 
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strong in both respects and we use those firms that are weak in both respects as 
the benchmark category. To construct this variable we pursue a cluster analysis 
grouping the firms in the four categories. 
 
As indicators of strong science-based learning we use the R&D expenditure, 
presence of employees with academic degree in natural science or technology 
and collaboration with scientists in universities or other science organizations. 
As indicator of experience-based learning we take the use of certain 
organizational practices normally connected with learning organizations such as 
‘interdisciplinary workgroups’ and ‘integration of functions’ together with 
‘closer interaction with customers’ – to signal learning by interacting and a 
focus on user needs.  
 
We use firms that only make weak efforts to support science-based and 
experience-based learning as benchmark and the odds ratio estimate indicates 
how much higher the propensity to innovate is among firms strong in 
respectively one or both of the modes of learning. The results reported in table 2 
show that firms that combine the two modes are much more prone to innovate 
than the rest. It shows that the effect remains strong also after introducing 
control variables related to size and sector. 
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Table 2: The probability that firms develop a new product or a new service 
 
** = significant at the .01 level  
* = significant at the .05 level  
 
The analysis and results reported above point to the need to develop our 
understanding of how different forms of knowledge and different modes of 
innovation are combined in different national innovation systems. The analysis 
also explains why narrow definitions of national innovation systems that focus 
only upon science-based innovation are of little relevance for the economic 
performance of firms and national innovation systems. This is not least 
important when it comes to analyze the barriers and opportunities for economic 
development in poor countries, another challenge for innovation system research 
(Arocena and Sutz 2000b; Cassiolato, Lastres and Maciel 2003). 
Variables 
Odds ratio 
estimate 
Coefficient 
estimate 
Odds ratio 
estimate 
Coefficient 
estimate 
STI Cluster  3.529 1.2611** 2.355 0.8564** 
DUI Cluster  2.487 0.9109** 2.218 0.7967** 
DUI/STI Cluster 7.843 2.0596** 5.064 1.6222** 
Business services  1.433 0.3599 
Construction   0.491 -0.7120* 
Manuf. (high tech)   1.805 0.5905* 
Manuf.(low and med. tech) 
h)
  1.250 0.2229 
Other services   0.747 -0.2923 
100 and more employees   1.757 0.5635* 
50-99 employees   0.862 -0.1481 
Danish group   0.859 -0.1524 
Single firm   0.521 -0.6526* 
Customized product   1.378 0.3203 
Pseudo R2 0.1247 0.1247 0.1775 0.1775 
N 692 692 692 692 
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National systems of innovation and economic development 
While the modern version of the concept of national systems of innovation was 
developed mainly in rich countries (Freeman 1982; Freeman and Lundvall 1988; 
Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Edquist 1997) some of the most important 
elements actually came from the literature on development issues in the third 
world. For instance the Aalborg version (Andersen and Lundvall 1988) got some 
of its inspiration concerning the interdependence between different sectors from 
Hirschman (1958) and Stewart (1977). Other encouragements came from 
Myrdal (1968). Applying the systems of innovation approach to economic 
development brings into focus other research issues of general interest such as 
the need to understand how innovation relates to sustainable development, 
economic welfare and the role of government in commodifying knowledge.  
 
Most analysis of the innovation system regards it as an ex-post rather than as an 
ex-ante concept. The concept refers to relatively strong and diversified systems 
with well-developed institutional and infrastructural support of innovation 
activities. The perspective is one where innovation processes are evolutionary 
and path dependent and systems of innovation evolve over time in a largely 
unplanned manner. The system of innovation approach has not, to the same 
extent, been applied to system building. When applied to a country in transition 
such as China focus needs to be shifted in the direction of system construction 
and system promotion – something that was central in List’s ideas for catching 
up – and to the fact that public policy is a conscious activity that needs to 
stimulate and supplement the spontaneous development of systems of 
innovation (Muchie, Gammeltoft and Lundvall 2003; Lundvall, Interakummerd 
and Lauridsen 2006). 
 
Another weakness of the system of innovation approach is that it is still lacking 
in its treatment of the power aspects of development. The focus on interactive 
learning – a process in which agents communicate and cooperate in the creation 
and utilization of new economically useful knowledge – may lead to an 
underestimation of the conflicts over income and power, connected to the 
innovation process. In a global context where the access to technical knowledge 
is becoming restricted not only by weak ‘absorptive capacity’ but also by more 
and more ambitious global schemes to protect intellectual property this 
perspective gives a too rosy picture. The current focus on ‘independent 
innovation’ may be seen as making the global power game regarding access to 
knowledge explicit. 
 
Furthermore, the relationships between globalization and national and local 
systems need to be further researched. It is important to know more about how 
globalization processes affect the possibilities to build and support national and 
local systems of innovation in developing countries (Lastres and Cassiolato 
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2005). In China the opening of the economy has taken place at a very high speed 
and one of the major effects has been regional polarization. It is thus clear that 
the innovation system approach proposed here needs to be adapted to the 
situation in developing countries, if it is to be applied to system building. It is 
also clear that what is most relevant for developing economies is a broad 
definition of the NSI including not only low-tech industries but also primary 
sectors such as agriculture.  Activities contributing to competence building 
needs to be taken into account and narrow perspectives that focus only on the 
STI-mode needs to be avoided.7 
 
Welfare and inequality in the context of innovation systems 
A promising line of research is to link the perspective of Amartya Sen (1999) on 
welfare and inequality to the national system perspective. Sen presents a 
capability-based approach where development is seen as an expansion of the 
substantive freedoms that people enjoy. Substantive freedoms are defined as the 
capabilities people have to live the kind of lives they have reason to value. They 
include things like being able to avoid starvation and undernourishment, 
diseases and premature mortality. It also includes the freedoms of being literate, 
able to participate in public life and in political processes, having ability and 
possibility to work and to influence one’s work conditions, having 
entrepreneurial freedom and possibilities to take economic decisions of different 
kinds. Enhancement of freedoms like these is seen as both the ends and means 
of development.  
 
This way of looking at development refers to the capabilities people have to act 
and to choose a life they value, rather than to their level of income and 
possession of wealth. Poverty, for example, is in this perspective more a 
deprivation of basic capabilities than just low income. Human capabilities rather 
than resource endowments are the fundamental factors of development. Sen’s 
approach fits well into a system of innovation approach. It is noteworthy 
however that learning and innovation capabilities generally do not seem to be 
explicitly included in this capability-based approach to development. Extending 
capabilities may be the result of changing the setting in which the agent 
operates, but even more important in the learning economy is whether the 
                                                          
7  Several authors analysing the situation of less developed countries have been critical to 
the use of the concept ‘national innovation system’ and have preferred to work with 
concepts such as national technological systems (Lall and Pietrobelli 2003) or national 
learning systems (Matthews 2001;Viotti 2002). To some degree we see their alternative 
conceptual proposals as reactions to the use of narrowly defined innovation systems with 
focus on STI-learning. We strongly support the idea that understanding processes of 
experience based learning is a key to the understanding of the specificities of national 
innovation systems (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall 2007; Arundel, Lorenz, 
Lundvall and Valeyre 2007). 
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setting gives access to and stimulates a renewal and upgrading of the 
competence of agents.  
 
We would argue that the learning capability is thus one of the most important of 
the human capabilities and it is conditioned by national institutions and forms of 
work organization. It does not only have an instrumental role in development 
but also, under certain conditions, substantive value. When learning takes place 
in such a way that it enhances the capability of individuals and collectives to 
utilize and co-exist with their environment, it contributes directly to human well-
being. Furthermore, to be able to participate in learning and innovation at the 
work place may be seen as ‘a good thing’ contributing to a feeling of belonging 
and significance. 
 
China has developed a strongly meritocratic system where university education 
has become the key and almost the only legitimate entrance point for advancing 
in the social hierarchy. To offer wider segments of the adult population access to 
vocational training with theoretical elements might be a key both to reduce 
inequality and to enhance the capacity to innovate within enterprises. A more 
balanced understanding of the importance of experience-based knowledge in the 
education system as in society as a whole would benefit the efforts to build 
‘endogenous innovation capacity’. 
 
On the sustainability of innovation systems 
National Systems of Innovation may be regarded as a tool for analyzing 
economic development and economic growth. It aims at explaining how 
systemic features and different institutional set-ups at the national level link 
innovation and learning processes to economic growth. 
 
But such a perspective may be too narrow. As pointed out by Freeman and Soete 
(1997) the ecological challenge ought to be integrated in any strategy for 
economic development and here we will argue that in the learning economy not 
only intellectual capital but also social capital is an important element in the 
development process. The extended perspective can be introduced as in Table 3 
below. 
 
Table 3: Resources fundamental for economic growth – combining the tangible and 
reproducible dimensions 
 Easily reproducible resources Less reproducible resources 
Tangible resources 1. Production capital 2. Natural capital 
Intangible resources 3. Intellectual capital 4. Social capital 
 
The diagram illustrates that economic growth is faced with a double challenge in 
terms of sustainability and that there is an immanent risk of undermining not 
only the material basis of material production (Segura-Bonilla 1999), but also 
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the knowledge base. The creation of tangible capital may be threatened by a 
neglect of environmental sustainability. We will argue that the production and 
efficient use of intellectual capital is fundamentally depending upon social 
capital (Woolcock 1998). A development strategy that focuses only on 
production capital and intellectual capital is not sustainable. 
 
This has become a key issue in China where the conflict between the current 
model of growth and sustainability has become obvious. But also in the rest of 
the world, including EU, there is a growing insight that linking innovation to 
environmental problems and energy shortage is fundamental for the future of the 
global economy. The fact that China has the potential to initiate major nation-
wide strategy to establish this connection offers a major opportunity for China. 
But as we shall see in the following section radical change in this direction 
might not be easy to implement from the centre. The current governance model 
where local/regional alliances between political and economic agents are 
committed to the old accumulation model needs to be transformed through the 
introduction of new incentives and new forms of governance. 
 
 
China’s Production system and Growth trajectory8  
Observers around the world are impressed by the rapid growth of China’s 
economy. While outside observers tend to focus on the success story of 
unprecedented growth policy documents and recent domestic debates in China 
have pointed to the need for a shift in the growth trajectory with stronger 
emphasis on ‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’.  
 
In this section we make an attempt to capture the current characteristics of 
China’s production system and its mode of accumulation; how they were shaped 
by history and what major challenges they raise for the future. We show how the 
shift in policy toward decentralization, privatization and openness around 1980 
established an institutional setting that, together with other factors such as the 
presence of a wide ‘Chinese Diaspora’, has resulted in extremely high rates of 
capital accumulation especially in export-oriented manufacturing. 
 
The transition of China’s economy 
It is useful to distinguish between two periods in China in the second half of the 
20th century. The crucial shift takes place in 1978 when DENG Xiaoping took 
over the political leadership after Chairman MAO and initiated economic reform 
and the opening of the economy to international trade. The first was a period of 
development under a centrally planned economic regime and the second a 
period with market-oriented reforms and economic transition.  
                                                          
8  This section as well as section 3 below draws upon Gu and Lundvall (2006b). 
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Figure 2 GDP Structure of China's economy   at constant prices
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Source: Maddison 1998: 56, Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
 
At the time of the revolution the economy was still dominated by agriculture; in 
1952 about 60 percent of GDP was generated by the agricultural (primary) 
sector, as shown in Figure 2. Both the first and the second period were 
dominated by industrialization, rather than “post-industrialization” that took 
place after WWII in developed and most less developed countries. As a result, 
China ends up being highly “industrialized” by the end of the century. In 2003, 
the GDP structure of China was 12.5 per cent primary, 46 per cent secondary 
and 41.5 per cent tertiary. The growth in manufacturing and the relative 
shrinkage of agriculture went on also in the 1990s, and the value added-share of 
the service sectors remained almost unchanged until the second half of the 
1990s. 
 
But as we shall see below the economic structure looks quite different when the 
focus is employment rather than value added. The proportion of the labor force 
working in agriculture remains as high as 50% in the beginning of the new 
millennium. The growth in manufacturing value added reflects more than 
anything else a very high rate of accumulation of fixed capital accompanied by 
high rates of growth in labor productivity. 
 
Behind the high growth rates and the restructuring of the economy in the second 
period lay extraordinary rates of savings and capital accumulation. In order to 
understand how these could be realized in a poor country like China it is 
necessary to look at the institutional changes that took place with the shift in the 
political climate.  
 
Reforms and development performance in the 1980s and 1990s 
The policies transforming the economy from a centrally planned towards a 
market-oriented regime may be seen as following two parallel and mutually 
reinforcing lines of action aiming at decentralization and privatization (Wu 
2003, Chapter 2).  
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The first line of action, “bureaucratic decentralization”, began with increasing 
the autonomy of firms in decision-making on production planning, investment 
and acquisition of technology, marketing, pricing and personnel and with more 
autonomy to local governments in financial, budgetary and administrative 
issues.  
 
The second line of action loosened the restrictions first for township and village 
enterprises in the early 1980s and later also for private initiatives in the mid-
1990s. It included the creation of “Special Economic Zones” for FDI related 
investment with various favorable regulations. In provinces like Zhejiang this 
led to private initiatives by entrepreneurs.  
 
But most importantly it gave the local governments bigger opportunities to 
engage in initiatives promoting the local accumulation of capital. They did so 
through establishing and expanding TVEs (Township and Village Enterprises) 
sometimes owned by the local governments, sometimes representing joint 
enterprises with private capital or through initiatives attracting private capital 
from local, national or international sources.   
 
“Diaspora networks” played an important part in re-enforcing the rapid capital 
accumulation from foreign investment. Throughout the 1980s, the opening to 
FDI and international trade attracted partners mainly from the Greater China 
area—Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Singapore, and overseas Chinese from other 
continents. It was not until the second half of the 1990s that multinational 
companies from North America and West Europe came into China on a large 
scale  
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Figure 3 Ownership structure: Industry by 2003
Source: based on China statistical yearbook Table 14-2 
2004http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm
Note: the calculation is for all the firms which have annual turnover 
higher than 500 million 
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The second line of action, also called “incremental reform”, opened up new 
spaces for economic activities outside the entities inherited from the central 
planning era.  As a result, the ownership structure of industrial enterprises 
changed rapidly. As can be seen from figure 3, by 2003, each of the three types 
of ownership—the state-owned, FDI related and other domestic - were 
responsible for roughly one third of output.  
 
Export led growth 
International trade was initially pushed by favorable policies and gradually 
pulled by FDI and intra-trade within global value chains. Today China’s 
economy has reached a much higher level of openness than all other large 
economies in the world, developed or developing (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Openess to Global Economy
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Export structures have been upgraded (Figure 5). The share of primary products, 
such as foodstuffs, agricultural products and mineral fuels, have been reduced 
from half of the total in 1980 to less than 10 percent by 2002, while the share of 
manufactured goods increased to more than 90 percent. In manufactured 
exports, electric and machinery products including electronic products, 
demonstrated the fastest growth rate. But light and textile products and apparel 
increased considerably as well.  
 
Beyond quantitative growth, qualitative or structural change has been radical but 
the most strongly knowledge based activities take place in the foreign-owned 
firms. In industries such as computer and IT products exports are mainly 
manufactured in factories owned by Western and Taiwanese investors. For 2003 
it is reported that 61.9 percent of high-tech export was produced by fully 
foreign-owned and 21.4 percent by partly foreign-owned firms; altogether FDI-
related manufacturing produced more than 80 percent of high-tech export from 
China (China S&T Indicators 2004). This reflects overall trends of the 
innovation system of China characterized by easy access to foreign technology, 
while remaining weak in local and domestic clustering. 
 
A unique pattern of economic growth 
In about a quarter of a century China’s economy has been characterized by high 
rates of economic growth and capital accumulation. Some of the mechanisms 
behind that growth pattern are unique while some have parallels with the 
institutional set up that promoted capital accumulation in England in the 18th 
century (Qian 1996). 
 
The reforms that were initiated more than 25 years ago unleashed restrained 
material needs. It was explicitly argued that getting some concentration of 
wealth among the few was a first step toward making everybody better off; this 
made the strife for material wealth ideologically legitimate. Slumbering 
entrepreneurship was awoken to engage in production and trade both within and 
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outside the public sector. The most important driver behind capital investment 
and economic growth was a specific local fusion of political and economic 
interests. 
 
Foreign direct investment initially emanating primarily from overseas Chinese 
investors and subsequently from wider sources should be added to this as an 
important factor. Joint ventures offer good opportunities for public and private 
rewards for local policy makers. The same is true for attracting direct investment 
in purely foreign-owned enterprises to the locality. Building infrastructure and 
supplying cheap labor, energy and land has become a key concern for local 
administrators.  
 
The dynamics of reform has also been driven by the competition between 
localities to offer the most attractive framework conditions. This sometimes 
takes the form of offering cheap resources and lax regulations in relation to 
environment and workers’ safety. But there are also examples of forward-
looking ideas developed locally and then spread nation-wide. 
 
Limits to growth 
The development trajectory behind the high speed of growth is now confronted 
with barriers for further growth. Some of these are external and refer to potential 
trade conflicts. Others reflect domestic problems with social and ecological 
sustainability. There are indications of serious weaknesses of the innovation 
system. The call for ‘harmonious development’ may be interpreted as an attempt 
to give new direction to the recognized unsustainable growth patterns.  
 
Gaps between the urban and the rural, between regions, and between the rich 
and poor in the same region are widening. Working conditions and workers’ 
safety have been largely neglected. Negative externalities also include 
environmental degradation such as pollution of air and water and exploitation 
and wasteful use of other non-renewable resources. The current development 
mode entails intense consumption of non-renewable raw materials and energy 
sources. Especially when these inputs are under the control of local groups with 
vested interests there may be a tendency to set prices too low and to be lax in 
terms of safety regulations.  
 
The industrialization process has not resulted in building a widespread and 
robust indigenous innovation capability in Chinese firms. After twenty years of 
being the origin of manufactured goods “made-in-China”, China’s economy has 
not been able to embark upon the track of competence upgrading. This contrasts 
with the catch-up history of the US and Japan where “made-in-US” and “made-
in-Japan” were preludes to the two countries, within a time span of one 
generation, reaching the world frontier in innovativeness and competitiveness. 
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China remains specialized in low value-added products with profit margins 
trapped at meager 2-5 percent, or in some areas even lower. 
 
Recent policy documents and the general debate have pointed to these problems 
and contradictions, and to the need for a shift in the development strategy with 
stronger emphasis on ‘harmonious development’ and ‘endogenous innovation’. 
What adjustments of the development strategy are needed to realize the 
intentions signaled by these concepts? Does the new long term plan represent an 
adequate response to the current problems? 
 
Before we discuss this issue in Section 4, it is necessary to analyze the reform of 
the innovation system that accompanied decentralization and privatization. The 
analysis of the reform and its outcome points to weaknesses of the current 
innovation system and it helps us to specify what reforms are required in order 
to make innovation endogenous and to make it contribute to harmonious 
development. 
 
 
The Transformation of China’s Innovation System 
China is an old civilization and historically it has made important contributions 
to global science and technology (such as the compass, gunpowder and paper). 
In the older history of China, however, science and technology as it evolved in 
Western Europe was not regarded as important or as carrying social status. 
While Confucious’ heritage gave high prestige to intellectuals, it was to those 
engaged in humanistic science and in political and administrative affairs. 
Scientific and technological knowledge was seen as based upon practical 
experience, rather than as a modern type of scholarship. Whereas Research and 
Development (R&D) establishments started to be organized in the 1920s to 
1930s, China only began the process of institutionalization of modern science 
and technology nationwide in the 1950s.  
 
The weakness of sector institutes 
The R&D system established in the first period of development was designed in 
accordance with the centrally planned regime. One prominent feature was the 
huge size that was a reflection of the Marxist idea of science as a societal force 
of production and also a result of the self-reliance development strategy in the 
centrally planned period (see Table 4).  
 
The second feature was the separation of industrial R&D centers from 
productive enterprises. The centrally planned regime had introduced particular 
mechanisms to link up R&D activity with production: All the R&D institutes, 
except those belonging to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (which was 
assigned to be the national top organization for comprehensive natural and 
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engineering science) were organized under the jurisdiction of sector specific 
ministries or bureaus, independently outside enterprises. The ministries or 
bureaus took the responsibility for planned production tasks as well. They were 
hence in command of both R&D and production (Gu 1999: 151-176).  
 
The institutional setting was reflected in innovation characteristics. For example, 
the machinery industry of China was apt at “general purpose” machinery, and 
weak in technologies fulfilling particular machining tasks since these could only 
be developed through interactive learning and close producer-user 
communications (Gu 1999 127-135). The low degree of effectiveness of the 
centrally planned institutional settings was well acknowledged at the end of the 
1970s. This became one important motive for the launch of reforms. 
 
The 1985 reform 
The crucial event for R&D system reform came in 1985, slightly lagging the 
agricultural and industrial reforms, which were started in 1978 and 1984 
respectively. A 1985 Decision made by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China initiated the reforms in Science and Technology 
System Management. The central theme for the reform was to rearrange the 
relationship between knowledge producers and users and their relationships with 
the government. In a context where demand, supply and coordination factors 
were changing, reform of the S&T system was seen as essential.  
 
The then Prime Minister Mr. Zhao Ziyang interpreted the reform as the 
following:  
 
The current science and technology institution in our country has evolved 
over the years under special historical situations. …………. One of the 
glaring drawbacks of this system is the disconnection of science and 
technology from production, a problem, which is a source of great concern for 
all of us.... 
 
By their very nature, there is an organic linkage between scientific research 
and production. ………. The management system as practiced until now has 
actually clogged this direct linkage, so that research institutes were only 
responsible to the leading departments above, in a vertical relationship, with 
no channels for interaction with the society as a whole or for providing 
consultancy services to production units. ………..This state of affairs can 
hardly be altered if we confine ourselves to the beaten track. The way out lies 
in a reform (Zhao Ziyang 1985). 
 
The adaptive policy process and the recombination of competences  
For reforming the S&T system, a two-pronged policy was designed. On the one 
hand, “technology markets” were established to function as distributive 
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institutions for R&D outputs (Decision: Section III). On the other hand 
excellence-based allocation mechanisms were introduced for the allocation of 
public R&D funds (Decision: Section II). It was expected that by push and pull, 
the previously publicly funded R&D institutes would move to serve their clients 
via regular and multiple linkages.9 
 
The actual process of S&T system reform, as the reforms of the overall 
economic system, unfolded through trial and error and entailed continuous 
adjustment of policies (Gu 1999). The technology market solution, central in the 
initial design, was soon recognized as being difficult to realize in its original 
form. The users were not capable of absorbing transferred technology, and the 
market was too small to secure R&D institutes with enough earnings. As a 
response, in 1987 reform policy began to promote the merger of R&D institutes 
into existing enterprises or enterprise groups.  
 
In the next year (1988) the Torch Programme was launched to encourage 
organizations akin to spin-off enterprises — called NTEs (New Technology 
Enterprises) - from existing R&D institutes and universities. And by the early 
1990s, reform policy included another solution to change individual R&D 
institutes into production entities. This, as well, was an adaptation to an actual 
evolution already realized by many industrial R&D institutes.  
 
Adaptive policy evolving though trial and error characterized the “gradual 
reforms” in the process of economic transition in China. The great uncertainties 
associated with foreseeing the impact of major political reform made adaptive 
policy learning necessary. Only policy-making that was responsive and adaptive 
to the feed-back information on the impact could preserve the feasibility for 
success of any radical social innovation program (Metcalfe 1995, Gu and 
Lundvall 2006). 
 
Remaining weaknesses 
The transformation was constructive in safeguarding and recombining 
technological capabilities in the context of market reform and opening to the 
global economy. It has supported the rapid growth in the economy as a whole. 
For example, a number of NTEs like Huawei, Datang and Linovo, grew to 
                                                          
9  Note that the Decision recognized the diversity of R&D institutes in terms of their 
function. It divided them into “technology development type”, “basic research type”, and 
“public welfare and infrastructure services type”. The reduction of public funds was 
mainly applied to the technology development type and it was done gradually to be 
complete in a time span of five years. Consequently by 1991, the 2,000 plus, out of the 
4,000 in total, technology development institutes had had their public “operation fees” 
entirely or partly cut. Roughly the sum of the reduction accounted to slightly less than 
RMB 1 billion (or USD 200 m), or about one tenth of the overall government S&T budget 
in 1985. 
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become key ICT enterprises and this led to a fundamental restructuring of 
China’s ICT industry (Gu and Steinmueller 1996/2000). The achievements are 
especially impressive when comparing with Russia where scientific and 
technological capabilities were destroyed on a huge scale. It nonetheless leaves 
the system with some prominent weakness. 
 
First of all, the resulting system developed weaker domestic links and 
interactions than international links, although the mastery of the latter links 
remains rather passive, dominated by the import of foreign technology 
embodied in machinery and other process equipment. The capital goods 
industry has not played a role as an innovation centre for the whole economy by 
providing appropriately advanced production means for various users; they were 
instead largely integrated into the respective global value chains. In general 
potential local or domestic links along and between value chains have been slow 
to develop and hard to expand. Small firms in traditional manufacturing sectors, 
and agriculture and rural development have received inadequate support from 
national and regional technological infrastructure, showing a separation between 
the modern and the traditional part of the system (Tylecote, this issue). 
 
Second, the transformation ignored the development of technological 
infrastructure and supportive institutions. The remarkable aspect of the reform is 
that the initial intention - to establish markets for technologies for existing R&D 
institutes and existing enterprises - was not realized. Instead other unforeseen 
adaptations ‘saved’ the reform. A general tendency was vertical integration of 
R&D and design with production activities - either through merger into 
enterprises or through the establishment of downstream production. This has 
resulted in a weak capability to provide S&T inputs and supportive services to 
innovation in firms; a capability that is fundamentally important for knowledge 
based growth (Nelson 2004, David 2003).   
 
There were several reasons for the drive toward vertical integration. One reason 
was the peculiar pattern of division of labor for R&D institutes inherited from 
the centrally planned system in which they had already been involved in many 
“down-stream” activities. Weak absorptive capacity and less developed social 
capital were other reasons for the difficulties in establishing markets for 
technology. 
China’s technology policy has yielded impressive results in a number of areas, 
such as telecommunications and nanotechnology. International scientific 
publications have increased significantly, as have patents, the latter of which 
grew by around 40 % in 2005 (albeit from a low level), even if they still account 
for a small share of total patents registered with the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Compared to the Soviet Union the Chinese 
transformation of the innovation system has been highly successful. While the 
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scientific and technology infrastructure in Russia has been ruined by the crude 
transformation toward a marked economy this has not been the case in China. 
The transformation has resulted in a strong infrastructure with stronger 
couplings to the production system. The policy has been pragmatic and involved 
on-going adjustments when original approaches did not work out as expected.   
 
Nonetheless the major source of growth has been intensive use of physical 
capital, natural resources and labor. Productivity growth in the manufacturing 
sector has not been linked neither to an upgrading of the production structure 
nor to a growth in the service sector. A special problem has been the reluctance 
of the big state-owned enterprises to become active in terms of building R&D 
and innovation capacity in house. Easy access to capital and low-priced labor 
and - until recently - foreign technology has led to passive management 
strategies where imitation has been more attractive than innovation. A classical 
example is the Automobile sector where it is only recently that some of new 
players begin to build there own design and innovation capacity.  
 
Attempts to compensate and bring innovation into the domestic economy 
through attracting foreign direct investments on a big scale have not been as 
successful as expected. China attracts more foreign direct investments than any 
other country in the world with the exception of the USA and the UK 
(UNCTAD 2005). During the past five years, hundreds of new R&D centers 
have been established by foreign companies in China and in several recent 
surveys, executives from multinational companies rated China as the most 
attractive country for future R&D investments (see, for example, UNCTAD 
2005). China has become a large exporter of high technology products, which 
accounted for one fourth of China’s total exports in 2005. 
 
Nonetheless, China’s strategy of attracting foreign technology and knowledge 
has only partially been successful. A large share of China’s high tech export still 
consists of the import of high-tech components which are assembled in China 
and then exported abroad (Cong, 2004) and as we have seen no less than 80% of 
high technology exports emanates from firms that are wholly or partially owned 
by foreign capitalists. This is the background for the emphasis on ‘independent 
innovation’ in the new plan. 
 
 
China’s 2006-2020 Science Technology Development Plan10 
On February 9th, 2006, the State Council presented its strategy for strengthening 
China’s scientific and technological progress in the coming 15 years (State 
Council 2006a). The plan reflects China’s clear and strong ambitions to make 
                                                          
10  This section draws upon Ju LIU’s analysis of the original planning documents and it has 
also been inspired by Schwaag Server and Briedne (2006). 
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the country one of the world’s most important knowledge bases. In addition, it 
contains an explicit target to reduce China’s dependence on foreign research and 
development as well as to use public procurement as a way of strengthening its 
domestic industry. The aim of this section is to provide a critical assessment of 
the plan. First, we identify and provide a summary of key components of the 
plan. We also examine the actors, processes and driving forces explaining its 
development. Second, we analyze the plan in the context of China’s larger 
socio-economic challenges. Finally, we assess how the 15-year plan reflects 
some of the principal weaknesses in China’s innovation policy and its 
innovation system. We conclude by some policy recommendations. 
 
 
The general targets of the plan 
The plan sets eight major objectives to be reached over the 15-year plan horizon:  
 
• Industries producing manufacturing equipment and information technology, 
important for the country's national competitiveness, should develop and 
master core technologies at world class level.  
• The scientific and technological base of agricultural production should 
become one of the most advanced in the world,  the production capabilities of 
agriculture should be improved and food safety ensured.  
• Breakthroughs should take place in energy exploration, energy-saving 
technology and clean energy technology, in order to promote more efficient 
energy use, with energy consumption of major industrial products brought 
down to the standards of the advanced economies.  
• Scientific and technological efforts should support modes of production 
pointing toward a recycling economy in major industries and key cities to 
support building of a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society.  
• Major progress should be achieved in fighting major diseases and in 
epidemics prevention, for diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis. 
Breakthroughs will be acquired in R&D of new pharmacies, medical 
equipments, and apparatuses. Technological capabilities will be built up for 
industrial development.  
• The development of S&T for national defense should support R&D of 
modern weapons and equipments, for informationalization of the army, and 
for safeguarding national security.  
• Scientists and research teams should reach world class level and a number of 
important breakthroughs in science should be achieved. Specifically, 
technologies in the frontier fields of information, biology, materials and 
space should reach world advanced level.  
• World-class research institutions and universities as well as internationally 
competitive R&D institutes owned by companies will be built. A relatively 
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complete national innovation system with Chinese characteristics will be 
built. 
 
Some of the key priority areas refer to societal needs some of which emanate 
from the currently dominating growth trajectory. First priorities are the 
development of technologies that can solve problems with energy and water 
resources and developing environmental technologies. Furthermore, China is to 
promote the development of IPR-protected technology based on IT and material 
technologies. Biotechnology, aerospace, aviation and marine technologies 
continue to be prioritized sectors. Finally the plan emphasizes the importance of 
increasing investments in basic research, particularly multidisciplinary research.  
 
The plan lists sixteen key projects that are to be launched. The common criteria 
for these projects are that they address significant socioeconomic problems, they 
are to be found in areas where Chinese technology already possesses sufficient 
competence in relevant technologies, their cost should not be too high and the 
results shall be suitable both for civilian and military applications. Examples of 
key projects are one to put a Chinese on the moon and another to develop the 
next generation of jumbo jets. Others focus on the development of fast 
processors, high-performance chips, oil and gas extraction or exploitation, 
nuclear power technology, water purification, development of new drugs, 
fighting AIDS and hepatitis, and developing the next generation of broad band 
technology. 
 
The plan addresses new technologies that are likely to be significant for the next 
generation of high technology. Among these, biotechnology is at the top of list, 
followed by IT, advanced materials, production technology, advanced energy 
technology, oceanography, laser and space technology. These priorities are not 
radically different from what has been behind earlier generations of science and 
technology programs. But the urgency in relation to finding solutions on 
environmental and energy problems is stronger and the ambition to build 
‘independent innovation capacity’ is more explicit. There are also some major 
differences in the tools proposed for implementing the plan. Public procurement 
and tax subsidies are given a stronger emphasis and in general there seems to be 
a new kind of mobilization around the strategy.  
 
One of the most noteworthy and novel methods suggested in the plan is the 
introduction of tax incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
These incentives are intended to encourage companies to invest in R&D and 
even to establish R&D activities abroad. The latter is particularly interesting and 
it might be unique for China. It signals that ‘independent innovation’ does not 
aim at decoupling Chinese firms from global sources of knowledge and 
innovation. 
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The preparation and implementation of the plan 
It is noteworthy that the development of the new plan was coordinated at the 
highest political level. The prime minister, Wen Jiabao, has been actively 
involved in the development of the new plan and chaired a steering group which 
led the process (MOST 2004).. Many ministries have been involved in the 
drafting of the plan (Cao, 2005). The preparation and drafting of the plan, took 
around three years.  
 
The process was initiated in 2003 with the commissioning of 20 strategic studies 
which focused on key R&D issues, both from a scientific and socioeconomic 
perspective. 2000 researchers were involved in the preparation of these 20 
studies. Once the reports were finished, they were reviewed by the Chinese 
Academy of Science (CAS), the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) and 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). After that, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST) took 12 months to draft the plan, in 
consultation with other actors, such as the Ministry of Finance, China Academy 
of Sciences and China Academy of Engineering. 
 
The plan was presented in February 2006 and in June 2006 the State Council 
presented the a “Consolidated List of the Rules for Implementation of the 
Supporting Policies for the Outline of the National Medium- and Long-term 
Planning for Development of Science and Technology Formulated by the 
Relevant Department” (State Council, 2006b). The list contains 99 supporting 
policies or tasks. For each task, one ministry or government institution is 
assigned a lead role or overall responsibility. Within the lead institution, a 
person is identified by name as bearing main responsibility for each task, with 
the designated person being in general at Vice-Minister Level. In addition, it is 
also clearly indicated which other institutions, should participate in the task and 
when the task is to be completed. The tasks vary in terms of scope or level of 
detail. Overall, however, they all aim at providing concrete policy tools or action 
plans for implementing the overall objectives defined in the plan.  
 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has been assigned 
lead responsibility for 29 tasks, followed by the Ministry of Finance 21, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) with 17 support policies and the 
Ministry of Education with 9. NDRC and the Ministry of Finance have been 
given lead roles in implementing what could be argued to be some of the pillars 
of the new long-term plan. Thus, NDRC has been put in charge of strengthening 
innovation in SMEs and presenting a plan for special projects on promoting 
national independent innovation capabilities, while the Ministry of Finance has 
the responsibility for designing fiscal incentives for increasing R&D and 
innovation in enterprises, and for drafting public procurement policies aimed at 
promoting independent innovation. 
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MOST maintains the responsibility for incubators and science parks, as well as 
implementation measures for supporting research and development in the area of 
scientific technologies, both of which continue to be key areas of China’s 
science and technology policy. However, it is clear the MOST is only one of 
several important players in the new long-term plan. Overall, there are several 
indications that the influence or weight of MOST in China’s latest 15-year plan 
is reduced when compared with previous plans. The new emphasis on 
enterprises as the engine of China’s innovation system is one explanation for 
why ministries such as NDRC and the Ministry of Finance, are given large 
responsibilities for implementing the plan. Two other focal areas, namely public 
procurement and the emphasis on independent or indigenous innovation, also 
point towards ministries and agencies in charge of enterprise and industrial 
policy as well as government purchasing regulations, again NDRC and the 
Ministry of Finance, taking on a greater weight when compared to earlier plans. 
 
In the light of our discussion of different ways to define the innovation system 
we might argue that this shift in responsibilities among strategic agents signals a 
shift in the perspective on the innovation system. In mechanistic STI-dominated 
perspective where it is assumed that there is a simple connection from 
investments in science to innovation it is natural to leave the minister of science 
in charge of innovation policy (this is the Danish case). The latest long-term 
plan indicates that China is moving away from a science and technology policy 
towards an innovation policy where it is realized that organizations and markets 
need to be taken into account. In this new arena, MOST’s leadership is no longer 
self-evident or guaranteed. 
 
Having presented the main components of the long-term plan as well as the 
process that led to it we will now focus on some of the main features of the plan 
and on some of the policy instruments that the plan builds upon. 
 
 
The main features of the plan 
A NSI-perspective 
According to the documents presenting the plan it is the first time the concept of 
national innovation system is used to structure a mid-and-long-term plan 
(SOURCE). The plan defines national innovation system as a social system 
where government is in a guiding position, market plays a fundamental role to 
deploy resources, and various sources of S&T innovation link tightly and 
interact effectively. It is referred to ‘a national innovation system with Chinese 
characteristics’ and argued that it consists of three sub systems. The first is 
technological innovation system in which enterprises are main force and 
industries, universities, and research institutes are integrated. The second is 
knowledge innovation system in which scientific research and higher education 
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are integrated. The third is national defense S&T innovation system in which 
military and civilian S&T activities are integrated. To these are added regional 
innovation systems with various characteristics and differentiated comparative 
advantages. Finally there is a reference to an ‘intermediate service system’ 
where processes of socialization and networking are important.  
 
As we read the plan almost all the attention is given to the three sub-systems and 
little is said about regional systems and about the intermediate service system. It 
is obvious that the plan sees the stimulation of R&D-efforts as the single most 
important step toward innovation. But the weight the plan gives to procurement 
shows attention to the demand side. With this exception the emphasis is on what 
we referred to in the first section as STI-learning. There are some references to 
vocational training but very few to how enterprises are managed and workplaces 
are organized. 
 
Governance 
A general problem with any kind of planning document is that it presents 
intentions and instruments while the capacity to realize the plan will depend 
both on the degree of shared commitment and on the institutional set-up with its 
specific distribution of power. There are some reflections in the plan documents 
on how to improve governance.   
 
To promote and improve the national innovation system building, institutional 
reform will take place in the country’s S&T system. National S&T decision 
making system, macro coordination mechanism for S&T will be established and 
improved. General planning and macro administration of the development of 
S&T will be strengthened by government. S&T policies will act as the country’s 
fundamental public policy. S&T examining and appraising system as well as 
S&T assessing and rewarding system will be reformed. Justice, fairness, 
openness, and innovation-friendliness will be embodied into the systems 
(SOURCE).. 
 
Especially the last sentence is important since it does not take for given that the 
current system is sufficiently just, fair, open and innovation friendly. Corruption, 
favoritism and authoritarian rule are especially costly when it come to promote 
innovation. 
 
The Purpose of the Plan and the Brave Target Numbers 
The plan sets some explicit and rather ambitious quantitative targets to be 
reached over the 15 year period. First, the proportion of R&D expenditures of 
GDP will be raised from 1.3% to 2.5 percent of GDP. Second, more than half of 
economic growth should emanate from ‘technical progress’ – i.e. not from the 
extended use of labor and capital. Third the reliance on foreign technology 
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should be reduced from 60% to 30%. The use of some of these numbers – 
especially the one on technical progress - might appear naïve since the basis for 
the calculation is highly uncertain and dubious. But they may also be seen as 
strong and clear signals for actors in the national innovation system. 
 
The objective of raising R&D-expenditure to 2.5 % of GDP can be compared 
with the 3% goal set for the EU set for 2010 (the EU-goal has proven to be 
unrealistic). In the case of China the 2.5% requires a very steep expansion of the 
resources engaged in R&D (about 20% per annum) since it is assumed that GDP 
will grow four times between 2000 and 2020. To avoid that such high growth 
rates become mirages produced by false statistics rather than real change is a 
major challenge 
 
Enterprises as main force for innovation 
As indicated by the basic definition of the ‘system of innovation’ it is assumed 
that the national government has a lead role but it is also argued that markets 
play a major role. The plan states that enterprises should be seen as being at the 
very core of the innovation system. But little is said on the governance, 
organization and management of enterprises. The focus is more on how 
government through tax subsidies and procurement policies can stimulate firms 
to invest more in R&D and engage more in developing new products and 
services with the public sector as customer. 
 
According to the plan innovation-friendly tax policy will be adopted. For 
instance, 150% of R&D expenditure can be deducted from taxable income of the 
same year. Companies will be allowed to accelerate depreciation of the 
equipment used for R&D. Income tax will be remitted for new startups in 
national high-tech industrial zones for two years since they become profit-
making and after these two years the income tax rate for these companies is 15% 
which is 10 percentage points lower than that for ordinary companies. Donations 
from companies, civilian organizations, social associations, and individuals for 
enterprise technological innovation foundations will also be deducted from 
taxable income. Favorable tax polices will also be given to venture capital 
investment companies, S&T intermediate service agencies, S&T incubators, and 
national university S&T parks. Stronger financial support will be given to 
companies for innovation. Commercial financial agencies will be encouraged to 
invest in innovative companies and innovation projects.  
 
Government procurement will be used as an important tool to encourage 
indigenous innovation. The system of procurement of innovative products will 
be enhanced. The government will purchase the first vintage of innovation 
products created by domestic enterprises or research institutions when the 
innovative products have potential big markets. A control and evaluation system 
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giving guidelines for procuring domestic and foreign products will be set up. 
Normally, in the purchasing process, domestic products have priority over 
foreign products. Only products not available in China can be purchased from 
abroad. When government procures products from foreign companies, those 
companies that are willing to transfer technology to local companies, will be 
given priority before other candidates. 
 
These two sets of instruments play a key role in raising R&D- and innovation-
efforts in the enterprise sector. It is a general problem in all countries practicing 
tax rebates for R&D that it is difficult to control that the enterprise’s expenditure 
is actually addressed to this purpose. In order to make tax rebates effective it is 
crucial that the tax system is reasonably well-functioning and reliable and this 
might not always be the case in China.  
 
The procurement policy leaves quite a lot of lee-way for administrative 
judgment and it can be undermined of corruptive behavior in the central and 
especially in the local administration. Without a major effort to establish ‘good 
governance’ in the private and the public sector the two sets of instruments 
might not be successful.  
 
Indigenous innovation 
One of most interesting feature of the new plan is the declared intention to 
strengthen ‘independent’ or ‘indigenous’ innovation. Policymakers have 
identified a low innovative capacity as the most important explanation for why 
China’s efforts to upgrade its technological capabilities have not yet resulted in 
the world-leading products ’made in China’ that the Chinese government had 
hoped for.  
 
Indigenous innovation is defined as a value-creating process resulting in new 
products based upon core technologies and upon IPR. The plan defines three 
types of indigenous innovation. One is the original innovation, out of which 
there emerge core technologies; another is integrated innovation, which refers to 
the process of incorporating and combining various domestically controlled 
technologies into new products; and the third is developing new products on the 
basis of advanced foreign technologies.  
 
Several different policies aim at IPR creation and protection. Government will 
strongly support the IPRs of core technologies and key products. The national 
S&T departments, comprehensive economic departments, and other relevant 
departments will jointly and regularly issue a catalog of core technologies and 
key products of which China should obtain the IPR. The technologies and 
products listed in this catalog will be given strong support by national S&T plan 
and construction investment. IPR information service platform will be set up by 
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national S&T departments and IPR administration departments. According to 
the plan, China will actively participate in international standard establishment 
and will promote domestic-market-centered technological standards. The plan 
will support research on standards of core technologies, will guide the joint 
research by industries, universities, and research institutes on technological 
standard, and will promote integration of R&D, design, and manufacturing.  
 
It is important to note that a key element in the definition of indigenous 
innovation is self-owned IPR and that the target to raise the share of patents 
owned by domestic firms has been given very high priority in this context. This 
calls for a radical change in the institutional set up and as well in the behavior in 
the enterprise sector in China. It goes against what might be referred to as the 
‘imitation syndrome’. A question is how far public regulation and legal 
procedures can eradicate this weakness of the system. Changing corporate 
culture may be seen as a more difficult and long term way of changing the actual 
behavior of firms in this respect. 
  
International cooperation for S&T development is highlighted 
While there is a strong emphasis on strengthening the domestic capacity to 
innovate there is no general intention to reduce the international cooperation on 
knowledge production.  There is a strong emphasis on the potential to draw upon 
global sources of knowledge through international cooperation and through 
attracting expertise from the rest of the world. 
 
The plan envisages that various forms of international and regional cooperation 
and exchange on S&T will be expanded. Research institutes and universities are 
encouraged to set up joint laboratory or R&D center with oversea R&D 
institutes. International cooperation projects under bilateral or multilateral 
framework of cooperative agreement for S&T will be supported. In particular a 
cooperative institution for S&T cooperation between mainland of China and 
Hong Kong, Macaw, and Taiwan will be set up. Companies are supported to “go 
global”. Export of high-technology and products will be increased. Companies 
that set up oversea R&D institutes and industrialization bases will be 
encouraged and supported. Multinational companies will be encouraged to set 
up R&D institutes in China. 
 
Scientists and S&T institutes will be encouraged to join major international 
scientific projects and international academic organizations. They will also be 
supported to participate in or lead major international or regional scientific 
projects. A training system will be set up to improve the capability for domestic 
scientists to take part in international academic exchange. Chinese scientists will 
be supported to hold leading positions in major international academic 
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organizations. Favorable policies will be offered for setting up major 
international academic organizations or agencies in China. 
 
A fundamental question is how the balance between national objectives and 
international knowledge sharing will be established in practice in enterprise 
strategies. If Chinese laboratories operating abroad were to act primarily as 
national agents not fully committed to the local knowledge networks’ 
knowledge sharing they would not get access to critical local capabilities (cf. the 
analysis by Alice Lam of Japanese biotech firms located in the Cambridge 
region). 
 
Dual use of scientific research in defense and civilian sector  
One of the areas where national priorities as well as secrecy are important is of 
course scientific and technological research for military purposes. The plan aims 
to form a dual-use technological and industrial base that serves both military and 
civilian needs. So far government investment in science and technology 
development has been cut into two parts, one for military use, and the other for 
civil use. According to the plan document, over half of all the military R&D 
projects overlap with civilian ones and it is argued that this has resulted in a lack 
of investment and a waste of human resources in both areas.  
 
To take full use of economic and social resources the two systems will be 
integrated. Military research institutes will be encouraged to shoulder tasks of 
scientific research for civilian use. At the same time, civilian research institutes 
and enterprises are allowed to take part in national defense research projects. 
The purchase of military articles will also be expanded to more areas of civilian 
research organizations and enterprises. 
 
Here the critical question refers to the implications for national knowledge 
protectionism. The US has used military arguments to keep secret important 
elements of its technology base and it has defined a very wide set of sensitive 
technological areas where foreigners are not welcome to join research and 
development efforts. Does the reference to dual use imply that China is moving 
in this direction extending the technological fields that will be pursued a more 
closed environments? 
 
Efforts to train talented people and foster world-class experts and scholars 
The plan is to speed up the development of world-class experts based on major 
S&T projects and construction projects, key disciplines and S&T bases, as well 
as international academic cooperation and exchange projects. Development of 
scientists of strategic importance, experts in S&T administration, leaders of 
different disciplines, and construction of teams for innovation are emphasized. 
Special policies will be issued for experts in core technological domain. 
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Institutions and rules for training and selecting talented people, especially top 
level experts, will be improved.  
 
The role of education in developing innovative people is recognized. 
Postgraduate students are supported to participant in or take up the task of S&T 
projects. Undergraduate students are also encouraged to do S&T projects and to 
develop their research interest and scientific spirit. Universities are required to 
set up subjects of cross-discipline and emerging discipline, and to restructure 
their specialized subject according to the need of the national strategy for S&T 
development and the need of market for innovative people. Efforts to upgrade 
vocational education, continuing education and training should be made to 
stimulate the development and use of applied science. 
 
Enterprises will be supported to train and attract S&T talents. Government will 
encourage companies to hire top level talents by giving favorable policies. 
Scientists and scholars from research institutes and universities are encouraged 
to innovate and to start their own businesses. They are also allowed to do part 
time R&D job in companies. Companies, universities and research institutes are 
encouraged to cooperate for technological talent training. Companies are 
supported to recruit foreign scientists and engineers. More effective measures 
will be taken to attract and employ high level personnel from abroad and to 
encourage Chinese students overseas to return home and work in China. 
 
While emphasis is given to education the objectives set are related almost 
exclusively in quantitative terms and in relation to academic education. There 
are no reflections on the need to reform the university education system in ways 
that could promote creativity among students or link the formal knowledge to 
problem solving in the real world. It is mentioned that there should be efforts to 
upgrade vocational education, continuing education and training but it seems to 
be a secondary concern. 
 
 
Discussion 
The Plan presents adequate responses in several respects 
In the light of the frustrating outcomes of attempts to build a strong innovation 
capacity in Chinese controlled firms and the costs involved when licensing 
foreign technologies it is not surprising that the plan shows tendencies towards 
so-called ‘technonationalism’. But it is a delicate balance between realizing the 
legitimate objective to build ‘endogenous innovation capacity’ within 
enterprises and protectionist approaches undermining knowledge sharing and 
resulting in a more closed and less dynamic innovation system. 
 
185 
Second it is a natural lesson from the current growth process that people carry a 
too heavy burden both in terms of the high saving ratios and in terms of their 
work effort. It is attractive to establish innovation-driven growth that results in 
firms producing more highly valued products with less effort. The problem here 
is to find the right instruments and the ones defined in the plan may be too much 
focused upon STI- rather than DUI-learning. 
 
Third it is obviously a good idea to establish innovation strategies that aim at 
solving some of the major problems that have been created by the current 
growth model. Finding ways to reduce the use of energy and turning the system 
toward low-carbon technology use and developing technologies that are less 
polluting not only offer important solutions for some of China’s problems it may 
lead to world leadership in technology fields where global demand will be 
growing very rapidly.  
 
Fourth the strong role given to NDRC and the Ministry of Finance when it 
comes to realize the plan implies a new understanding of innovation as having 
other critical components than the science base. The emphasis given to public 
procurement shows an understanding of the importance of the demand side. This 
insight can be further developed into a more conscious exploitation of the 
Chinese domestic market. In the field of telecommunication and automobile 
industry there are examples of the creation of technologies that address specific 
needs in China and that later on can become exported to other parts of the world 
with a lower GNP per capita than the one found in the rich part of the world. 
 
But while the plan represents progress and may be seen as being in some respect 
an adequate response to the problems that China has faced the plan remains 
biased in certain dimension and there are some important missing elements. 
 
Technology Bias? 
Eight of the nine men who make up China’s Politbureau are engineers (the ninth 
is a geologist). Normally either the Prime Minister or the President of China is 
recruited among the Faculty of Tsinghua, China’s leading university in 
Technology and Management. Among Chinese economists with a standard 
economics background this is seen as the main reason why there is so (too) 
much talk about innovation in China’s public sphere. It is interesting to see a 
parallel to the strong role of engineers (MITI) in Japan’s post-war industrial 
policy and the weak position of economists (Bank of Japan). As illustrated by 
the Japanese growth success the overweight of engineers may be an advantage 
especially for economies that are on a catching-up trajectory. 
 
While the focus on innovation may be rational in the current context it is not 
sufficient to focus on ‘technical innovation’ in isolation from the social and 
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institutional environment. As argued in the first section the capacity to transform 
technical innovation into economic performance depends upon market 
orientation, human resources and organizational learning. Engineers, as well as 
standard economists, may tend to underestimate the importance of the wider 
setting of the national innovation system and the result may be exaggerated 
expectations regarding what technology can bring to the solution of social and 
economic problems.  
 
One of the problems that the plan aims at remediating is the lack of domestic 
innovation capability. As already indicated this reflects that it has been too easy 
for the big State Owned Enterprises to mobilize low cost capital (through 
privileged access to funding from state-owned banks) and labor and to combine 
it with technology licensed or copied from abroad. To break such habits there 
will be a need for quite radical managerial reform giving the managers a 
stronger incentive to promote the economic performance of the firm. Another 
important factor has been lack of competition in sectors related to defense and 
electrical power where firms have been offered monopoly positions. 
 
But the imitation syndrome has roots further back in history and it is reproduced 
in the education system. The tradition in some of the most favored disciplines 
was that the apprentice should be able to copy in detail the work of the Master 
before he/she was allowed to develop his/her own style. The current education 
system tends to reproduce similar patterns where students are expected to be 
able what they have been taught be the professor. Individuals’ deviation from 
the collective are sanctioned and the incentives to engage in creative activities 
are weak. To reform the education system so that it becomes more problem 
oriented and so that it promotes critical thinking and creativity may be seen as 
one of the most important challenges for a strategy that aims at ‘independent 
innovation’. 
 
Where are the regions? 
It is obvious that China has become very skew in terms of regional economic 
development and that the unevenly distributed capacity to absorb and use new 
technologies is crucial for the future regional development in China. To some 
degree the growing regional inequality was not only tolerated but even seen as a 
driver of uneven growth in China.  
 
But as there is more emphasis on intellectual resources and innovation in the 
strategy regional inequality tends to become so strong so that it might become 
difficult to keeping the national system together. According to research 
organized by UNU Wider, China's inequality in regional innovation capability 
has increased from 1995 to 2004. Location, industrialization and urbanization 
and human capital are significant contributors to the inequality in innovation 
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capability. Unbalanced development in high-tech parks exerts a growing 
explanatory power in driving innovation disparity, which implies that 
institutional factor plays a direct role. 
 
There is also a strong link between globalization and regional inequality in 
China. FDI may have a significant positive impact on the overall regional 
innovation capacity. The strength of this positive effect depends, however, on 
the availability of the absorptive capacity and the presence of innovation-
complementary assets in the host region. The inflow of foreign direct investment 
has further reinforced regional inequality. It has stimulated regional economic 
growth in China's coastal regions but not in the inland regions. 
 
On this background it is significant that there are few references to the regional 
problem in the long term plan. We found five lines in section 7 related to 
building regional innovation system. But there is no mentioning of the regional 
dimension neither in section 8 on policy measures nor in the detailed document 
from August 17 2006 on policy.  While the plan responds to the other major 
challenges that originate in the growth model the regional problem is given little 
attention. It is also striking that there is little room for regional initiative in 
implementing the plan. We believe that a strong investment in knowledge 
infrastructure, education and efforts to modernize traditional sectors in the 
lagging regions may be a key not only to address the problem of regional 
inequality but also to implement the general objectives of the plan. 
 
The silence on the regional dimension contrasts with the new EU-strategy where 
the structural and regional funds increasingly address the promotion of regional 
innovation systems and competence building. As indicated above, regional 
fusions of political and commercial interests have been major drivers behind the 
old growth model that the new plan tries to substitute with a new kind of growth 
trajectory. Therefore it is difficult to see how the ambitious objectives set in the 
plan can be reached without finding ways to mobilize these strong regional 
interests in favor of the strategy. Perhaps a stronger element of local and 
regional participation in decision making for ordinary citizens is a key to the 
necessary realignment of local interests to the new strategy? 
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Aircraft Carriers: China’s way to Great Power Status? 
 
 
Kim Nødskov 
 
 
Abstract 
There are many indications that China is actively researching the design of an 
aircraft carrier. It is unknown whether China will initiate the actual acquisition 
of a carrier, but the indications that are available of their research into aircraft 
carriers and carrier-capable aircraft, as well as their purchases of aircraft carrier 
systems, makes it more than likely that the country is preparing such an 
acquisition. China has territorial disputes in the South China Sea over the 
Spratly Islands and is also worried about the security of her sea lines of 
communications, by which China transports the majority of its foreign trade, as 
well as her oil imports, upon which she is totally dependent. China therefore has 
good reasons for acquiring an aircraft carrier to enable it to protect its national 
interests. An aircraft carrier would also be a prominent symbol of China’s future 
status as a great power in Asia.  
 
China’s current military strategy is predominantly defensive, its offensive 
elements being mainly focused on Taiwan. If China decides to acquire a large 
carrier with offensive capabilities, then she will also acquire the capability to 
project military power into the region beyond Taiwan, which it does not possess 
today. In this way, China will have the military capability to permit a change of 
strategy from the mainly defensive, mainland, Taiwan-based strategy to a more 
assertive strategy, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the countries 
of the region.  
 
The Chinese have bought several retired carriers, which they have studied in 
great detail. The largest is the Russian-built carrier Varyag of the Kuznetsov 
class, which today is anchored in the Chinese Naval Base at Dalian. If they 
decide to acquire a carrier, they can either buy one or build it themselves. The 
easiest way would be to buy a carrier, and if that is the chosen option, then 
Russia would be the most likely country to build it.  Technologically it will be a 
major challenge for them to build one themselves and it is likely that they would 
have to obtain the assistance of another country. But there are indications that 
China may chose this more difficult path, since it has bought four Russian 
carrier landing systems. China is very secretive about this, but when all the 
information is pieced together, then a picture is created of a Chinese aircraft 
carrier program, where Varyag will be made operational for training purposes. 
With this as the model, China will build a similar sized carrier themselves. 
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Based upon the experiences gained from this, China plans to build the very 
ambitious nuclear powered 93,000-ton carrier, described as Project 085. 
 
If this project does become a reality, then it will take many years for China to 
complete it, especially because it will have to develop a very complex catapult 
with which to launch the fighter aircraft, not to mention the development of a 
nuclear power plant for the ship. The Russian press has indicated that China is 
negotiating to buy SU-33 fighters, 
which Russia uses on the Kuznetsov 
carrier. The SU-33 is, in its 
modernized version, technologically 
at the same level as western combat 
aircraft in both the offensive as well 
as the defensive roles. Alternatively 
China may chose to modify the 
domestically produced J-10 multi-role 
fighter.  
 
If China does decide to acquire 
carriers, it would be operationally 
logical to acquire a minimum of two 
to three carriers to ensure an adequate 
and continually available combat capability. A Chinese carrier group, with the 
associated protection and support vessels, submarines, aircraft and helicopters, is 
not likely to be fully operational and war-capable until 2020, given the fact that 
China is starting from a clean sheet of paper. 
 
India, who has experience of carrier operations, is currently building three 
carriers, which are expected to be operational by 2017. India is a competitor for 
regional power in Asia, and China could use this Indian project as an argument 
for acquiring aircraft carriers. The other countries in the region have no large 
carrier programs and will find themselves in a weaker position when it comes to 
the military balance of the region should China acquire carriers. Two to three 
Chinese carrier groups will be a significant military power in Asia which the 
United States will have to match on behalf of its allies in the region. It is 
therefore likely that the United States will have to continue as a security 
guarantor in Asia.   
 
 
China’s research of aircraft carriers 
In the US Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on 
the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 2008, China is 
assessed to have an active carrier design and research program. And if the 
Figure 1: Varyag in the Dalian Naval Base painted 
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Chinese leadership were to choose to do so, the PRC shipbuilding industry could 
start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this decade.1 If that 
were to happen, it would potentially change the maritime military balance in 
Asia and lead naturally to speculations as to how the other nations will respond 
to such a decision. 
 
China is very secretive about a possible carrier program, but several statements 
have slipped out that confirm such a research and design program. On 10 March 
2006, the Hong Kong-based Chinese paper Wen Wei Po quoted the Chinese 
general Wang Zhiyuan2 for saying that in three to five years “The Chinese army 
will conduct research and build an aircraft carrier and develop our own aircraft 
carrier fleet.” He continued: “the escort and support ships for this carrier group 
are either being built or have already been built.”3 Later, in March 2007,4 first 
spokesman Huang Qiang and later Chairman Zhang Yunchuan of the 
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry of National Defense of China 
(COSTIND) said that they were actively researching building an aircraft carrier.5 
In spite of these admissions, China is still not prepared to acknowledge officially 
that they have an active carrier program. The purpose of this brief is to assemble 
the information we have about the Chinese carrier deliberations and activities 
based on public information, and to discuss how such a program might develop 
and what the potential consequences are for the region.6 But first I will discuss 
why the Chinese would like to have aircraft carriers. 
 
 
Why does China want aircraft carriers? 
In recent decades, China has changed its military strategic focus. Since 1949 the 
primary focus had been land-centric defense of mainland China. But after the 
end of the Cold War in 1989, the fall of the Soviet Union and the settlement of 
border disputes with Russia, China has changed its military focus to other 
potential crisis areas, such as Taiwan, the Spratly Islands and the Malacca Strait. 
The common denominator for these is the maritime environment, and China has 
                                                          
1  Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual report to Congress, Military Power of the 
People´s Republic of China 2008”, p.4. 
2  Director of the Science and Technology Committee of the General Armaments 
Department. 
3  Hearing of Richard D. Fischer Jr, Vice President, International Assessment and Strategy 
Center, before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Leverage 
of Foreign Technology To Achieve Advanced Military Capabilities”, 16 March 2006.  
4  China People´s Daily, “Building of aircraft carrier owned to strategic needs”, 25 April 
2007. 
5  L.C. Russell Hsiao, “Is the PLA Navy making plans for a three carrier battle group?” 
China Brief, Volume VIII, Issue 1, 4 January 2008. 
6  For a detailed discussion of China’s carrier deliberations, see: Ian Storey and You Ji, 
“China´s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking truths from Rumours”, Naval War College 
Review, Vol. LVII, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 77-94. 
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therefore invested heavily in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with 
an emphasis on submarine capabilities. PLAN has a significant submarine 
acquisition and modernization program, and submarines have become a 
significant part of PLAN’s capability to control the seas around China and 
Taiwan.  
 
China’s biggest potential crisis area is the 
dispute with Taiwan. China claims 
sovereignty over Taiwan, but on the island 
there are significant forces working for 
independence. China is very determined to 
prevent Taiwanese independence and has 
made preparations for military action should 
Taiwan attempt to move in this direction. 
During previous incidents between China and 
Taiwan, where China demonstrated its 
willingness to use military force, the United 
States sailed two carrier groups close to 
Taiwan and thereby let China understand that 
the United States would not stand by passively if China were to attack Taiwan.7 
China takes this threat seriously and is acquiring military capabilities that will 
enable the country to attack the American carrier groups should they attempt to 
protect Taiwan during a Chinese military attack. But when it comes to a 
potential Taiwan war, an aircraft carrier is more likely to be a liability for China 
than a militarily useable asset. First, Chinese fighters are able to reach Taiwan 
from air bases on mainland China, thus rendering a carrier-based capability 
unnecessary. Secondly a Chinese carrier would be very vulnerable to 
technologically superior American military forces, such as submarines, missile 
attack and air power. During the 2000-2008 presidency of Chen Shui-bian, 
Taiwan’s policy towards China was somewhat provocative, making China spend 
considerable resources preparing for conflict with Taiwan. With the 2008 
election of Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang Party, who is likely to be less 
provocative towards China, it is possible that China may attempt to pursue a 
political solution to the Taiwan issue and spend less resources preparing for war 
with Taiwan. That will enable it to focus on the development of a blue water 
navy which China will need in the future.  
 
China has other territorial disputes that requires a blue water navy and may 
explain why China wants an aircraft carrier. In the South China Sea, China 
claims sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, which has potentially large oil and 
                                                          
7  This as a consequence of the controversial “Taiwan Relations Act of 1979”, which by 
many is seen as a sort of security guarantee for Taiwan in case of a Chinese military 
attack.  
Figure 2: Spratly Islands.   
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gas reserves. China’s demand for oil and gas in steadily increasing, and it needs 
all the natural resources it can get. Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan also 
claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, while Brunei and Malaysia only 
claim some of them. Skirmishes have occurred several times on or around the 
islands. In 1988 China established an observation post on one of the islands, 
which Vietnamese military forces tried to eject. That led to fighting between 
Chinese and Vietnamese forces causing the sinking of two Vietnamese military 
vessels, while a third was set on fire. In other words, this is a dispute where 
some of the parties involved, including China, do not refrain from the use of 
military force. More recently, on 21 January 2008, a military C-130 transport 
plane from Taiwan landed on a newly constructed runway on the island of 
Taiping, which is one of the Spratly Islands.8 This led to great Chinese 
frustrations. The Chinese ability to maintain their self-proclaimed sovereignty 
over the Spratly Islands will improve significantly if they have an aircraft 
carrier.  
 
Another reason why China may want an aircraft carrier is to protect its sea lines 
of communication. China is very dependent on free passage of its merchant 
traffic, especially through the Malacca Strait, through which the majority of the 
maritime traffic to and from China has to pass (see Fig. 3). More than 80% of 
China’s imports of crude oil are transported by ship through the Malacca Strait, 
and the Chinese leaders are becoming more alert to the importance of the strait, 
which they perceive as a strategic vulnerability. In 2003 the Chinese President 
Hu Jintao declared that “certain major powers were bent on controlling the 
strait and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived 
vulnerability”.9  
 
                                                          
8  L.C. Russell Hsiao, “Taiwan Lands on the Spratlys”, China Brief, Volume VIII, Issue 3, 
31 January 2008, p.1. 
9  Ian Storey, China Brief, Volume VI, Issue 8, 12 April 2006, p. 4. 
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Following this, the Chinese media devoted considerable attention to the 
country’s “Malacca Dilemma,” leading one newspaper to declare: “It is no 
exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a 
stranglehold on the energy route to China.”10 Should a third country attempt to 
block traffic through the Malacca Strait, then the presence of a Chinese carrier 
could be the show of force that could ensure the freedom of passage for Chinese 
ships through the strait (except if the United States were involved). China’s self-
perceived vulnerability in the Malacca Strait may be a strategically decisive 
reason for China wanting to acquire an aircraft carrier. 
 
A third reason is the future position of China as a global great power. The 
Chinese are very conscious about what it means to be a great power and what is 
required of a great power. Some Chinese say that “a nation cannot become a 
great power without having an aircraft carrier”. Lt Gen Wang Zhiyuan, deputy 
director of the PLA General Armaments Department, stated in 2006 that 
“aircraft carriers are a very important tool available to major powers when they 
want to protect their maritime rights and interests. As China is such a large 
                                                          
10  Ibid., p. 4. 
Figure 3: China’s Critical Sea Lanes.   Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual report to 
Congress, Military Power of the People´s Republic of China 2008, p.12. 
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country with such a large coastline and we want to protect our maritime 
interests, aircraft carriers are an absolute necessity”.11 There are therefore many 
important militarily strategic reasons why China wants an aircraft carrier, not to 
mention the prestigious symbolic value of the carriers, which the Chinese are 
acutely aware of.  
 
 
The Chinese Maritime Strategy 
On the grand scale, China is pursuing a three-step modernization strategy of its 
defense forces, which is described in the Chinese government’s “White Paper on 
China’s National Defense 2006”.12 “The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 
2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to 
basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and 
being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.” 
 
At the recent National People’s Congress in Beijing, President Hu Jintao stated 
that “we must aim at improving the capability to win high-tech regional wars 
and keep enhancing the ability of the military to respond to security threats and 
accomplish a diverse array of military tasks.”13 The White Paper describes the 
strategy for the development of PLAN, which is to “build itself into a modern 
maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and 
conventional means of operation.” The White Paper in general emphasizes the 
Chinese defensive strategy, their territorial defense and the issue of Taiwan 
being given a high priority. The coastal regions are described as the primary 
maritime focus area, though in general “the Navy aims at gradual extension of 
the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations.”14 China’s defensive 
strategy has so far emphasized the modernization of submarines, ballistic 
missiles and land-based air power, mainly focusing on a potential military 
operation against Taiwan. If China chooses to acquire an aircraft carrier, then 
this could represent a continuation of the present strategy or a change of 
strategy, depending on which type of carrier the get. 
 
Fundamentally they can choose between carriers that operate with either 
helicopters or fighters. The basic difference is that helicopter carriers can only 
conduct support operations, not offensive operations. If, on the other hand, 
                                                          
11  Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China´s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma”, Naval 
War College Review, Volume 59, No. 4, Autumn 2006, p. 28. 
12   White Paper on China´s National Defense 2006, p. 10, 
(http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm). 
13  China Daily 2008-03-10, 22:46, 2008 NPC & CPPCC Session: “Hu calls for enhanced 
defense for world peace”. (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-
03/10/content_6524175.htm).  
14  White Paper on China´s National Defense 2006, s.4, 
(http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htmI). 
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China acquires a fighter-capable carrier, this will lead to a change of maritime 
strategy away from the submarine-focused defense of China to a more extrovert 
strategy focusing on power projection away from Chinese shores.  
 
It is the Chinese goal to be able to gain “sea control”15 out to a defensive line 
called ”First Island Chain”,16 which is a line defined by a series of islands in the 
East and South China Sea (see figure 4).17 In the longer term, the ambition of the 
Chinese18 is to be able to conduct a “Sea Denial”19 strategy out to the “Second 
Island Chain”,20 shown in figure 4. Presently China does this using a 
combination of submarines operating around the First Island Chain, ballistic 
missiles deployed in the Fujan-province and cruise missiles on strategic bombers 
and maritime vessels.  
 
                                                          
15  A strategy, in which a maritime force controls a defined maritime area rendering it 
impossible for an opponent to conduct effective military operations in the area.  
16 Michael McDevitt, “The Strategic and Operational Context Driving PLA Navy 
Building”, in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, Rightsizing the People´s Liberation 
Army: Exploring the contours of China´s military, US Army War College Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2007,  pp. 490-491. 
17  “First Island Chain” which stretches from Japan to Ryukyus (Okinawa), Taiwan to Pratas, 
circling the Spratly Islands and the stretching northeast to the Paracel islands along the 
coast of Vietnam in the northern part of the South China Sea. See Fig. 4. Ian Storey 
18  McDewitt, “The Strategic and Operational Context Driving PLA Navy Building”, pp. 
490-491. 
19  A strategy, by which it is attempted to deny the enemy the ability to use the sea in a 
certain geographical area. 
20  Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China´s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma”, Naval 
War College Review, Volume 59, No. 4, Autumn 2006, p. 138.  
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But if China, as a future great power, wants to raise its level of ambition by 
demonstrating an active presence and influential power beyond the First Island 
Chain, then this requires having the ability to control the surface and sub-surface 
situation, as well as the ability to maintain air control in the area if necessary. If 
PLAN were to conduct successful military operations in this area, it would 
require the ability to achieve air superiority, as a minimum over the Chinese 
maritime task force, but also over the objective over which the conflict is fought. 
To achieve this combat aircraft are required, which is a problem if operations are 
conducted outside the range of land-based fighters, and this is why an aircraft 
carrier may be a decisive asset. If China were to possess a carrier, it would be 
able to maintain air superiority over the Spratly Islands or be able to 
demonstrate power in the Malacca Strait if anyone were to block traffic through 
it. 
 
In the following, only the possible acquisition of a fighter-capable carrier will be 
discussed, since a helicopter carrier will have no significant strategic 
importance. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: First Island Chain and Second Island Chain   Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Annual report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, p.23. 
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What type of carrier? 
There are in general three types of carriers. With the first type the fighter starts 
unassisted powered by its own engines and lands vertically, as on the English 
carriers of the Invincible class. Flight operations from this type of carrier require 
the aircraft to be able to land vertically like the British Harrier aircraft. China 
does not have this type of aircraft, and since this technology is very complicated 
it is unlikely that it will acquire this sort of carrier.  
 
On the second type of carrier the aircraft also starts unassisted, powered by its 
own engines, but it lands conventionally using an arresting cable to stop it when 
it lands. The Russian carrier of the Kuznetsov class uses this technique. 
 
On the last type of carrier the aircraft performs a catapult-assisted start and lands 
conventionally, using an arrester cable, as on the United States carrier of the 
Nimitz class or the French Charles de Gaulle class. The main advantage of a 
catapult-assisted start is that the aircraft take-off weight can be much larger than 
with unassisted starts. This is especially important when conducting offensive 
operations using heavy bombs and missiles. Technologically carriers of the 
Kuznetsov class are accessible to the Chinese since they would be able to buy it 
from Russia, but it would be more difficult and take longer to build a catapult-
equipped carrier, since the technology is very complicated. And the EU weapons 
embargo prevents the country from buying the technology from France, which 
means that the Chinese will have to design and construct it themselves or 
possibly in cooperation with Russia. 
 
The Chinese have studied carriers for the last thirty years. They have visited 
American, English and French carriers, and they have bought phased-out 
carriers and studied them in great detail. In 1985 a private Chinese individual 
bought the Australian carrier HMS Melbourne (15,000 tons), which was studied 
by the Chinese before it was scrapped. The carrier flight deck was dismantled 
and used by the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) to practice on.21 In 1998 a 
private Chinese company bought the Russian carrier Minsk (40,000 tons), which 
was stripped for its weapons and electronic components. It was studied and 
subsequently used as a tourist attraction. A similar fate befell the sister vessel 
Kiev, which was bought in 2000 and used for tourism. In 1998 the Chinese 
bought the Russian carrier Varyag of the Kuznetsov class, 67,500 tons. 
 
The vessel, which was decommissioned in 1992 after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, was only 70% complete, and was bought without an engine, rudder and 
armaments. Its sister ship, the Russian Kuznetsov, is operational today in the 
Russian navy operating SU-33 fighters and helicopters. The Kuznetsov has no 
                                                          
21  Ian Storey and You Ji, “China´s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truths from 
Rumours”, p. 80. 
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catapult, which is why there is a limit to the amount of offensive weapons the 
aircraft can carry.   
 
Although China denies that it is studying the design of carriers, in 2005 Varyag 
was seen in dry dock being painted in the classic gray paint scheme of the 
Chinese navy. Sources in the Russian navy say that China has bought four 
carrier landing systems, capable of handling heavy fighters like the SU33.22 It is 
suggested that one system is to be studied and copied, while another is to be 
mounted on the Varyag, which are to be get ready for training purposes. The last 
two landing systems are to be used on two carriers, which China denies plans 
for. But the South Korean newspaper The Hankyoreh quotes unnamed Chinese 
sources close to the Chinese military that China is considering the development 
of two carriers under project 085, a 93,000-ton Nimitz-sized nuclear carrier, 
according to a Chinese Communist Party dossier.23 The source also indicates 
that China has a project 089, a 48,000-ton conventionally propelled carrier, 
which, fully loaded, will have a displacement of 64,000 tons, approximately 
equivalent to the Varyag. In accordance with the dossier the 93,000-ton nuclear 
carrier is to be finished by 2020 and is to be built at the China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation’s Jiangnan Shipyard. The size of this carrier is similar to the 
unfinished Russian carrier Ulyanovsk, and China may have bought the design 
sketches of this ship from Russia. 
 
Such a project will undoubtedly be long term. China would have to build the 
complicated catapult, not to mention a nuclear reactor to propel the ship. 
However, China does have knowledge of using nuclear reactors. They have 
knowledge from their commercial nuclear power plants24 as well as from their 
nuclear-propelled submarines. This is a very ambitious project, but Chinese 
industry is developing rapidly and has managed to produce high technology 
products in record time, as was seen with the development of the J-10 fighter. It 
is therefore considered that over a longer period of time Chinese industry will be 
able to overcome this challenge, also considering that, after all, this is an 
existing technology that has been used by other countries for many years.  
 
Because the Chinese are so secretive about their plans it is hard to say exactly 
what is going to happen, but we can say with great certainty that China is 
                                                          
22  RIA Novosti, Russian News and Information Agency, “China to build two new aircraft 
carriers with Russian help”, 27 July 2007, 18;36,  
http://en.rian.ru/world/20070727/69828953.html 
23  The Hankyoreh, “China to build a 93.000 ton atomic-powered aircraft carrier”, 29 March 
2007, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/199284.htm 
24  China has eleven commercial nuclear reactors and is building another six. Additional 
reactors are contemplated. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China”, 10 
April 2008, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63.html 
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showing great interest in fighter-capable carriers. If the Chinese were to acquire 
such a carrier, they could either chose to buy it or to build it themselves. If they 
were to buy a carrier, they would be able to capitalize on other countries’ 
experiences of carrier design. Russia has already plans to build new carriers 
herself with offensive capabilities, and China and Russia may cooperate on this 
project.25 As long as the EU maintains its weapons embargo of China, it is 
unlikely that China will buy a carrier from EU, even though both France and 
Spain have shown interest in such a project. 26 If China were to buy a carrier, 
they would therefore be most likely to buy it from Russia, and this would also be 
an interesting option for the Russians, since that would provide co-funding of 
the Russian carrier project. 
 
Alternatively China will have to build a carrier herself based on the experience 
of the Varyag. But, as mentioned earlier, this would be a very ambitious project. 
The Varyag is three times bigger than any navy vessel China has ever built, and 
there is skepticism among international scholars whether China is capable of 
building a carrier herself. 27 The acquisition of four carrier landing systems does 
indicate, however, that China has plans to do just that. It will be a long-term 
project, and it is very likely that they will require Russian assistance. When the 
different sources of information are compiled, a pattern of a project appears that 
indicates that Varyag will be made operational for training purposes and that a 
medium-sized carrier will be built based on the experiences of the Varyag and of 
similar size. On this basis, consideration is being given to building the very 
ambitious 93,000-ton nuclear carrier described as project 085. All three projects 
are ambitious, but all three seem to come from Russian carrier projects, which 
indicate that China is obtaining the external support that American naval experts 
in particular consider necessary.28    
 
Aircraft  
From a military perspective, states acquire carriers because they need the ability 
to achieve air superiority over the maritime task force and to be able to use 
combat aircraft in the area of operations. Thus the choice of fighter is highly 
significant because, by choosing a fighter, one is also choosing the combat 
capability of the carrier group. If the fighter is to start unassisted without a 
                                                          
25  Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Russian Federation. 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CISS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Russian%2
0Federation&Prod_Name=CISS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/russs130.ht
m@current 
26  Ian Storey and You Ji, “China´s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truths from 
Rumours”, p. 83. 
27  David Shambaugh, “Modernizing China´s Military, Progress, Problems and Prospects”, 
University of California Press, 2002, p. 271. 
28  Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China´s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma”, Naval 
War College Review, Volume 59, No. 4, Autumn 2006, p. 21. 
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catapult, as from the Varyag class, there will be limitations on how much weight 
the aircraft can carry. But if the aircraft is capable of air refueling, then it can 
start with less fuel, meaning less weight, and allow the aircraft to carry a heavier 
weapon load. China has ten medium-sized H6 tanker aircraft and is purchasing 
an additional six II-78 Midas Large tanker aircraft, which will allow minimum 
fuel take-off from the carrier, provided that the carrier is within range of the 
tanker aircraft.29 If, on the other hand, the plane is using catapult-assisted start, 
like project 085, then the plane will be able to carry a larger weapons load, and a 
ship of this size will be able to project a substantial number of aircraft. The 
American Nimitz class carrier can operate with up to 82 aircraft, encompassing 
fighters, support aircraft and helicopters. 30 
 
A carrier uses fighters to protect the carrier and the carrier task force, as well as 
to conduct the operations that carrier 
task forces are assigned to do, which 
can encompass either defensive or 
offensive operations. It is therefore 
useful if the fighter is multirole, 
capable of doing both offensive and 
defensive operations. Generally fighters 
that operate from carriers must have 
stronger wings and landing gear than 
other planes due to the forces they are 
subjected to during take-offs and 
landings. The Chinese have a 
domestically produced fighter, the J-10, 
which is a multirole fighter, but in its current version the J-10 has neither the 
strength nor the engine power to operate from a carrier. But sources indicate that 
China is researching how to improve the structure of the aircraft and is 
negotiating the purchase of more powerful engines that will permit carrier 
operations with the J-10. 31 
 
At the Moscow 2005 air show, it was revealed that China is exploring the 
possibility of buying the Russian SU-33, which operates from the Russian 
carrier Kuznetsov. This was additionally confirmed by Russian newspapers in 
2006, which were able to report that China was negotiating with Russian arms 
                                                          
29  Sinodefence.com, the 12th of March 2008, 
http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/airlift/h6tanker.asp 
30  Naval-Technology.com, Nimitz Class Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carriers, USA, 8 April 
2008, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nimitz/ 
31  Hearing of Richard D. Fischer Jr, Vice President, International Assessment and Strategy 
Center, before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, PLA Leverage 
of Foreign Technology To Achieve Advanced Military Capabilities, 16 March 2006. 
Figure 5: SU-33                                                  
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dealers on the purchase of up to 50 SU-33s.32 In its modernized version, this 
plane is equipped with modern radar, active helmet-guided missiles and 
precision-guided air-to-ground capabilities. This is a modern fighter equivalent 
to a modern American F-18 E/F, which operates from the American carriers.    
 
In modern combat, it is necessary to obtain information about the military 
situation at sea and in the air. China has bought land-based airborne early-
warning and control aircraft, and these would be able to support a carrier group 
within range of its home base. But if a carrier were to operate independently and 
effectively far from the Chinese mainland, it must have a carrier-based airborne 
early-warning capability. China has the option of buying the Russian KA-31 
Radar Picket naval helicopter with an airborne early-warning capability, which 
is also used by Russia and India. 33 
 
 
The carrier group and logistical support 
A carrier on its own is of no use. A host of supporting capabilities is required to 
permit independent carrier operations. The carrier must be protected from 
maritime threats from submarines and surface vessels, as well as from fighter 
and missile attack from the air. The Chinese are very aware of this threat, given 
that an important part of their Taiwan strategy is based on deterring the 
American carrier groups from interfering in a Chinese operation against Taiwan, 
using mines, submarines, fighters and bombers launching long-range anti-ship 
missiles. China has an ongoing naval acquisition and modernization program 
and will be able to protect a carrier with the existing fleet. In the last two years, 
PLAN has taken delivery of seven new destroyers and frigates.34 But if they also 
want to carry out the existing maritime operations they are already conducting, 
then it will necessary to acquire additional naval vessels of destroyer size, 
including anti-submarine, surface vessel attack and air defense capabilities. A 
carrier group has very large logistical requirements, and dedicated support 
facilities are needed to permit the repair and maintenance of such large vessels. 
But China has apparently also considered this. Satellite photos have revealed 
that since 2005 China has constructed a naval base close to Sanya on the island 
of Hainan in the South China Sea. There are two 950m piers as well as three 
230m piers, which together could accommodate two or more carrier groups.35 
                                                          
32  Article in the Russian newspaper Kommersant, 23 October 2006, “Russia to deliver SU-
33 fighters to China”, 
http://www.kommersant.com/p715509/r_528/China_jet_fighters_export/ 
33  Airforce-technology.com, “Ka-31 Radar Picket Naval Helicopter, Russia” 9 April 2008,  
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/ka31/ka317.html 
34 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual report to Congress, Military Power of the 
People´s Republic of China 2008, p. 4. 
35  Richard D. Fischer Jr. “Secret Sanya: China´s New Nuclear Naval Base Revealed”, 15 
April 2008, Janes Defence Weekly, 
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Communication and the provision of intelligence would be essential if the 
carrier were to operate far from mainland China. Communication is required 
between the ships in the carrier group and back to headquarters at home. Since 
the carrier planes will have a range which exceeds the range of the carriers’ own 
intelligence-gathering capability, it will be essential that the carrier is provided 
with up-to-date intelligence information about the operation from a central 
intelligence source. Especially target information, including pictures, requires a 
large satellite band width. It must be assumed that China will acquire precision 
ammunition for their aircraft, and precision weaponry also demands accurate 
target information, as accurate as the precision capability of the weapon 
involved, which again demands high-precision intelligence-gathering from 
satellites, drones, human intelligence and other sources. China has an intensive 
satellite program, including communications satellites and Synthetic Aperture 
Radar Imagery satellites,36 and the country is developing a satellite navigation 
system, COMPASS, consisting of 5 geostationary and 30 orbiting satellites, 
which is planned to provide global satellite navigation coverage with precision 
similar to the American GPS system.37 This capability will enable carrier 
operations far from the Chinese mainland.  
 
China will also require a sea replenishment capability that can provide the 
carrier with the necessary fuel and spare parts to continue operations. China 
does possess this capability, but will require additional replenishment ships if 
the other parts of the navy also need sea replenishment.38  
 
 
Chinese maritime operations and doctrine 
If China’s ambition to become a regional great power is to be fulfilled, then it 
must as a minimum be able to control the seas out to the First Island Chain, but 
China’s aspirations to be able to conduct Blue Water operations have been 
unfulfilled until now for several reasons. One reason is that for many years 
China could not afford to build large naval vessels. Secondly, the Chinese had to 
focus their maritime modernization process on the potential military conflict 
over Taiwan, which did not justify an investment in large ships. Thirdly, China 
was always focusing on the defense of the Chinese mainland, and since they 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/
jir/history/jir2008/jir10375.htm@current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText 
36  Sinodefence.com, “Remote Sensing Satellite 2 (JianBing 6)”, 25 May 2007, 
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/yaogan2.asp 
37  Sinodefence.com, “Compass Navigation Satellite System (BeiDou 2)”, 3 February 2007, 
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/beidou2.asp 
38  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual report to Congress, Military Power of the 
People´s Republic of China 2008, p. 36. 
207  
have been influenced by Soviet maritime doctrine, China has never developed a 
Blue Water doctrine or tactics.39  
 
Before China can execute effective carrier operations, PLAN will have to go 
through a prolonged development, education and training process. The Chinese 
must learn to operate the carrier on its own. They must learn to sail, maneuver, 
communicate, operate, defend, repair and replenish. Then they must learn how 
to start and recover aircraft, and the pilots must learn to operate over Blue 
Water, far from the shores of China. After that, they have to develop, train and 
optimize similar procedures on a grander scale with the whole carrier group, 
consisting of the carrier, support ships, submarines, fighters and helicopters. 
This is very complex task that has to be trained to great perfection before the 
carrier group is ready for war.  
 
China starts from a very low level. In the last two years there have been reports 
of 5-6 episodes of Chinese maritime vessels operating around the First Island 
Chain and Chinese submarines operating east and south of Taiwan.40 In May 
2007 the Chinese Frigate Xiangfan participated in an exercise in the Malacca 
strait together with 12 other nations.41 In other words, China is slowly expanding 
its area of operations into Blue Water, but it will take many years to develop 
proper Blue Water doctrine. Carrier operations are technically one of the most 
difficult types of military operation, since they encompass all the disciplines of 
maritime operations, air operations and very often land operations as well, 
which must be coordinated and synchronized, focused on the same military 
objective. Development of joint doctrine is a very complex process, which is 
often impeded by service rivalry and limited knowledge of the other services’ 
requirements for optimizing their operations.  
 
 
How many carriers? 
If a Chinese carrier is to have any strategic relevance, then it must be 
continuously available, which is why one carrier is insufficient. Carriers require 
regular maintenance and must stay in harbor for several months at a time. Over a 
two-year period an American carrier is only operational for one year. Thereafter 
it will be docked for maintenance and modernization for six months. Then it will 
be made ready for operations again. In the first three months, it will go through 
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basic carrier training, which is followed by another three months of more 
advanced training, where the ship may be used operationally in case of an 
emergency. That means that over a two-year period the ship is only operational 
for one year. 42 If China is to have a continuous carrier capability, it will as a 
minimum require two to three carriers, depending on how advanced its 
maintenance technologies are.  
 
China also has to decide how much combat power it wishes to be able to project, 
which should be measured in the number and types of combat aircraft. The 
Kuznetsov, which is the sister ship to the Varyag, can carry 28 fighters and 24 
helicopters.43 Of the 28 fighters, it can only be expected that 70% are operational 
at any one time. The remaining aircraft will be non-operational or scheduled for 
maintenance. This means that only 20 aircraft will be operational, and they will 
be able to fly only twice in 24 hours. During operations, where there is a threat 
to the carrier, a number of sorties will have to be allocated to the defense of the 
carrier group. Air defense operations are flown around the clock with a 
minimum of two aircraft at a time, which means that 24 out of 40 sorties will 
have to be allocated to air defense of the carrier group. Thus means that there are 
only 16 sorties available for the mission the carrier was originally tasked to do. 
That is not a lot, and will force the Chinese to consider whether one operational 
carrier is enough. During the Falklands War, Britain used two carriers, which in 
total flew 1561 fighter sorties, of which only 126 were offensive. The remaining 
1435 sorties were air defense missions in defense of the British Maritime Task 
Force.44 This means that, if China is aiming to possess a medium-sized carrier, 
then several carriers will be required to enable operations with more than one at 
a time.  
 
If China acquires a Nimitz-size carrier, then it will be able to fly more offensive 
missions. A Nimitz class carrier has 48 fighters on board, and with 70% 
operational they will be able to maintain 33 aircraft operational at any time. 
With two sorties a day, that will amount to 66 sorties a day, of which 24 sorties 
must be allocated to air defense when the carrier is under threat of attack. This 
means that a Nimitz-size carrier will be able to conduct 42 offensive sorties a 
day. That would be sufficient in a conflict against an incompetent enemy with 
no air defense, but it will not be enough against an enemy with a professional air 
defense system. This indicates that China should acquire at least two to three 
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carriers to be operationally effective, even in a minor conflict. If China has 
ambitions to become a superpower at the level of the United States, then the 
carriers must be the size of a Nimitz-class carrier, as in project 085.  
  
 
The regional military balance 
China has used its economic rise to improve and expand its relations with the 
states in Asia, mainly through significant increases in trade, investment in 
infrastructure and economic aid, hoping to create strong bonds with the 
countries and to alleviate anxieties over the accumulation of power that is 
occurring on their doorstep. However, the Chinese annual double digit increase 
in military spending over the last decade has forced the countries in the region to 
keep an eye on China’s military build-up. If China acquires an aircraft carrier it 
is likely to cause reactions throughout the region.  
 
India is concerned about the increased Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal 
and the Arabian Sea, and India has found itself surrounded by less friendly 
nations, who all have good relations with China, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Myanmar. These states are located along the vital sea lanes to the Middle 
East and Africa that China is so dependent on, and all of these countries have 
agreed to let China use their deep sea ports and airfields (also known as the 
String of Pearls)45 and, in the case of Myanmar, to establish intelligence 
collection facilities close to India.46 Of the Asian states, only India is developing 
a real carrier capability. India already has an old small carrier, but it has also 
bought a modified Russian Kiev-class carrier (INS Vikramaditya, 45,000 tons 
full load), which will operate with 16 MIG29K (Fulcrum-D). INS Vikramaditya 
is expected to become operational in 2010. India is building an additional two 
air defense ships, carriers (37,500 tons) which will operate with 30 aircraft.47 
The two carriers are expected to go operational in 2012 and 2017 respectively. 
Given that this will change the military balance in Asia, this would justify the 
acquisition of carriers by China.   
 
Japan and China have had strained relations for many years and they have three 
maritime territorial disputes. Firstly, they disagree on the definition of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea. Secondly, China, 
                                                          
45  Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenges of China´s Rising 
Power Across the Asian Littoral”, July 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=721 
46  C. S. Kuppuswamy, “Myanmar-China Cooperation: Its implications for India”, 28 March 
2008, Independent Media (Centre India, 
http://india.indymedia.org/en/2003/02/3096.shtml 
47  Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – India. 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/SASS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=India&Pro
d_Name=SASS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/sassu/indis130.htm@current 
210  
Taiwan and Japan disagree on the rights to the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands, 
which are believed to hold large oil and gas reserves and lastly China and Japan 
disagree on the rights to the Okinonotorishima Island, which is a rock located 
half way between Taiwan and Guam. Tensions have arisen regularly between 
the two countries over territorial issues, as in 2004 when Chinese submarines 
entered Japanese territorial waters48 and Japanese naval vessels have fired at 
Chinese fishermen violating the self-proclaimed Japanese fishing rights around 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.49 The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is 
of a significant size with 44 destroyers of western standard and Japan has an 
impressive history of using aircraft carriers before and during World War II. 
However, article 9 of chapter II of the Japanese constitution that was written 
after World War II by the United States dictates that “the Japanese people will 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes”. It carries on saying that “the 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”.50 As it is currently 
interpreted, Japan is therefore constitutionally prevented from acquiring an 
aircraft carrier with offensive capabilities, which is why Japan only has 
helicopter carriers. But if China decides to acquire large carriers, Japan is likely 
to consider how it will respond. In 2007 Japan took steps towards a revision of 
its constitution,51 and a decision on a Chinese carrier program could influence 
the Japanese revision. China on the other hand expressed concern over the 
Japanese initiative, saying that “people have begun to doubt whether Japan will 
continue its path of a peaceful development”. 52 The Chinese concern over a 
possible Japanese change in defense policies may be an incentive for additional 
strengthening of PLAN by acquiring aircraft carriers. Within the present 
constitution Japan’s response to a carrier decision may range from acquiring 
anti-ship missiles and submarines, but it cannot acquire a large carrier. Japan is 
currently building two helicopter destroyers (13,500 tons) capable of operating 
with 11 large helicopters. Because this carrier is of a similar size as the British 
Invincible class carrier and has a classic carrier design with a large flat top, 
international military experts are discussing whether it will be able to operate 
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with a small number of Joint Strike Fighters in the Short Take Off and Vertical 
Landing version.53 If Japan is unable to change the constitution, and therefore 
unable to acquire matching aircraft carriers, the alternative for Japan could be to 
enter a defense alliance with the United States, with whom China cannot 
compete militarily. Diplomatic sources indicate that the United States, Japan and 
Australia are moving to begin a joint security alliance to counter China and 
Russia. 54   
 
Vietnam, who has been at war with both the United States (1963-75) and China 
(1979), is seeking better relations with both major powers, trying to balance the 
two. Vietnam has good economic relations with China and receives economic 
aid and investments in infrastructure from China. But lying next to a rising giant 
Vietnam is concerned about an expanding Chinese sphere of influence and of 
being reduced to an economic appendage to China.55 Vietnam and the United 
States have therefore establish better relations, first by normalizing diplomatic 
relations in 1995, then in 2004 by the US removing Vietnam from the list of 
“Countries of Particular Concern”.56 Trade has increased between the two 
countries and in 2007 they entered an agreement of overcoming issues of the 
Vietnam war and taking small steps in terms of defense cooperation. Vietnam, 
which has territorial disputes with China over the Spratly Islands, does not have 
the financial ability counter the Chinese military buildup or to acquire carriers. 
But it is possible that Vietnam will respond by acquiring a mine-laying 
capability, long-range anti-ship missiles or submarines to counter a Chinese 
carrier. Paradoxically, it is also possible that an increased Chinese maritime 
power projection capability in the South China Sea may induce Vietnam to seek 
support from the United States to counter Chinese pressure. 
 
The Philippines, who has no significant military force, has territorial disputes 
with China over the Spratly Islands. Tensions eased in 2005 as China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam agreed on a Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking 
(JMSU), which would survey the sea around the Spratly Islands for oil and gas. 
The agreement was supported by vast Chinese investments in infrastructure 
supporting a stagnant Philippine economy. However, the Philippine government 
encountered heavy domestic criticism over the arrangement, with allegations of 
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corruption when distributing the Chinese aid and that the government violated 
the constitution when agreeing to the JMSU.57 A bill is being passed through the 
Philippines House of Representatives which updates the Philippines archipelagic 
baseline claims to the Spratly Islands which will be forwarded to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf before May 2009. Beijing’s 
reaction to this was that this would “exert negative impact on the healthy 
development of our bilateral relations.”58 So the Philippines and China may have 
agreed to do seismic surveys, but that does not mean that the territorial dispute is 
solved. The Philippines rest their security on a 1952 US-Philippines Mutual 
Defense Treaty and until 1992 the United States had forces stationed on the 
Philippines. After 9/11-2001 the Philippines have been very supportive of the 
United States´ counter-terrorism campaign and in 2003 the US designated the 
Philippines as a major non-NATO ally.59 It is therefore likely that the 
Philippines will look to the United States as a security guarantor if China were 
to intimidate them militarily over the Spratly Islands. 
 
The United States has the largest and most powerful fleet in the world with 10 
carriers of the Nimitz class, which are larger, more modern and carry more 
aircraft than any other carrier. The United States armed forces are trained in 
integrated joint operations across the services and the United States have Air, 
Navy and Marine Corps bases around the Pacific sufficient support substantial 
military operations. The United States would therefore easily be able to counter 
two to three Chinese carriers. But should China decide to acquire a carrier 
capability, the United States is likely to acknowledge the Chinese change to a 
more assertive strategy, and decide to improve their military capabilities in the 
region further, to ensure that the United States can continue to act as a security 
guarantor in the region.  
 
If the tremendous increase in Chinese military expenditure continues over the 
next decade it is likely that the Chinese maritime capabilities will reach a new 
level, especially with a Chinese decision to acquire aircraft carriers. Such a 
capability will change the regional military balance substantially. A possible 
result of this could be a regional polarization with China on the one side and a 
series of states that will enter some sort of defense arrangement, at various levels 
of commitment, with the United States.  
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Conclusion 
The Chinese “White Paper on China’s National Defense 2006” objective for its 
armed forces is to make major progress by 2020, and the acquisition of a carrier 
capability would be exactly such a major progress. Only time will tell whether 
China will deviate from its present military strategy, which focuses on the 
defense of the mainland of China coupled with a potential Taiwan crisis. If 
China decides to acquire aircraft carrier groups with fighters that have offensive 
capabilities, the country will then have a military capability that will enable a 
change of strategy in a more assertive direction. A Chinese carrier capability 
will expand its military range significantly, and China will be able to project its 
power abroad on an unprecedented scale. China will be able to protect its 
interests and put military might behind its territorial claims in the region, 
especially when it comes to the Spratly Islands. It will also be able to protect the 
vital sea lanes from Africa and the Middle East. 
 
China has not officially acknowledged it has have an active carrier program, but 
the amount of circumstantial evidence that is available, makes it more than 
likely that it will acquire carriers. Seen from a Chinese perspective of military 
efficiency, the acquisition of a minimum of two to three carriers is required to 
enable a continuous military effective capability. Cooperation with Russia, 
which has experience of carriers, will ease the process, whether China buys 
carriers from Russia or chooses to build the carriers itself. There are many 
indications that China plans to build carriers in China, and when all the 
information is pieced together, it points towards the Varyag being made 
operational for training purposes. China will use the experiences gained from 
this to build a carrier of a similar size.  
 
When it comes to military development and military doctrine, China looks 
towards the United States, and if China has great power ambitions on a similar 
scale, then it will be necessary for it to have carriers of the Nimitz class size. In 
the long term, with assistance from Russia, it is considered possible for China to 
build such carriers, given the tremendous development Chinese industry has 
gone through in recent years. 
 
When it comes to carrier combat aircraft, China can choose either to modify the 
indigenously produced J-10 multirole fighter, or it can buy the Russian SU-33 
multirole fighter.  
 
A Chinese carrier group with the associated support vessels, submarines, 
fighters and helicopters is unlikely to be fully operational for war until 2020, 
given that China has to start from the very beginning. 
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India is currently developing three aircraft carriers that are expected to be 
operational in 2017. China could use this as an argument for the acquisition of 
carriers. The other nations of the region are not acquiring similar capabilities at 
the moment, and the military balance will tip out of their favor should China 
acquire carriers. One, two or three Chinese carriers will be a significant source 
of power in the region, and it is likely that the United States will have to 
continue to act as a security guarantor and provide security to its allies in the 
region. 
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